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Abstract 
The primary aim of this thesis is to examine whether and how Kantian ethicists can 
accommodate the intuitions that motivate moral particularism: the intuition that the 
moral domain is very complex, that our moral obligations vary with circumstances in 
ways that are hard to codify, and that there are exceptions to most, if not all, moral 
principles that we can think of or formulate (Part One). The secondary aim of this 
thesis is to draw on the insights gained in the course of this investigation in order to 
contribute to the solution of two other problems that occupy contemporary Kantian 
ethicists (Part Two). 
To begin with, I discuss and reject a number of existing attempts to account for 
the circumstance-dependence of our moral obligations within a Kantian framework. 
What all these attempts have in common is the assumption that, for Kant, a principle 
of duty is universally valid only if it is valid in all cases or situations. I call this the 
“Case-Scope Reading” of Kant’s conception of universal validity. When combined 
with the requirements that emerge from the challenge mounted by their particularist 
opponents, this reading throws Kantians on the horns of a trilemma. In response, I 
suggest that we should rethink this understanding of universal validity in light of the 
distinctive role and significance assigned to universal rules within Kant’s theory of 
objective knowledge. If we do, we are led to what I call the “Agent-Scope Reading” 
of Kant’s conception of universal validity: the view that a principle is universally valid 
if and only if it can be agreed to hold by all rational agents (qua judging subjects) and 
for all such agents (qua objects judged) in the same circumstances.  
This reading has a number of advantages. Not only does it expose the trilemma 
mentioned above as merely apparent, it also helps Kantians to dissolve the so-called 
Problem of Relevant Descriptions and to defend Kantian Constructivism against its 
Humean critics.  
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“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is 
true and what is false?” – It is what human beings say that 
is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. 
That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.  
(Wittgenstein 1953: §241)  
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Introduction 
Moral life is full of subtleties. In most situations, we ought to be honest, but when 
we speak to someone on the verge of suicide, telling the truth might be a bad idea. 
The promises we make are generally binding, except if we were coerced into making 
them or if an emergency prevents us from following through. In a more or less just 
society, theft is wrong, but Robin Hood was a hero. In these and many other cases, it 
is of vital importance that we pay attention to the nuances and details of the moral 
situations that we are in, that we fully appreciate the ways in which they differ from 
one another, and that we do not shy away from the complexities that pervade the 
moral domain. Circumstances matter, and our moral thinking and moral theorizing 
should reflect their significance.  
This is often thought to pose a problem for Kantian ethics, which is well known 
for its emphasis on universal laws and strict duties. According to Kant and Kantians, 
our moral obligations can be codified in universally valid principles of duty. But if the 
above examples are indeed indicative of the complexity of the moral domain and the 
subtle ways in which our obligations depend on the circumstances, then shouldn’t we 
expect that any fruitful generalization would be riddled with exceptions? And should 
we not worry that insisting on principles that purport to cover all cases will make us 
blind to relevant details and differences? Consider one of the cases mentioned above. 
Breaking a Promise to Help: You promised your friend to post their visa application, just 
in time for the deadline. But then, on the way to the post office, you see a child 
fall off their bike, hit their head, and pass out. You are pressed for time, so you 
must decide: either you carry on walking and keep your promise or you stop and 
help the child. 
The duty to keep one’s promises is a paradigmatic example of the kinds of duties that 
Kant is often thought to have regarded as absolutely strict and exceptionless. But in a 
case like the above, treating it as such would lead you to ignore the child’s suffering, 
which certainly seems relevant. In a situation like this, we would think it permissible 
or even obligatory to break one’s promise, and if you stuck to your principle, if you 
insisted on keeping your word, then we would accuse you of insensitivity, of ignoring 
a morally significant aspect of the situation. So perhaps there is no duty to keep one’s 
promises per se. Perhaps the relevant duty is rather more complicated. But, again: if 
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the above cases are any indication, such duties would have to be very complicated 
indeed.   
My primary aim in this thesis is to examine whether and how Kantian ethicists 
can accommodate the circumstance-dependence of moral obligations. My secondary 
aim is to explore what the interpretation that I present as a solution to this problem 
can contribute to the solution of other problems that occupy contemporary Kantian 
ethicists. In particular, I will discuss the so-called Problem of Relevant Descriptions 
(ch. 4), and the dispute between Humean and Kantian Constructivists (ch. 5). In the 
rest of this introduction, I want to first provide a more precise characterization of the 
challenge that the circumstance-dependence of our moral obligations poses for Kant-
ians (sect. 1). Among other things, I will explain why it is a special case of the broad-
er challenge that moral particularists mount against their generalist opponents, and 
indicate the outlines of my solution and its wider applications. Then I will briefly 
remark on my methodology (sect. 2) and outline the course of my argument (sect. 3). 
1.  The Particularist Challenge to Kantian Ethics 
1.1 Kantian Principles 
When critics argue that Kant’s emphasis on principles leads him to disregard the role 
of circumstances (see e.g. Constant 1964: 63-71, Anscombe 1958), there are different 
targets that they might have in mind.      
First, they might be objecting to either one of the two kinds of principles that Kant 
is known for advocating: his “supreme principle of morality” (G 4:392), the Categorical 
Imperative,1 or the specific principles of duty that are thought to follow from it. Of 
course, to some extent, the two stand and fall together: the counterexamples devised 
to discredit the Categorical Imperative cast doubt on whether adequate principles of 
duty can be established on its basis, and the counterexamples developed to discredit 
specific principles of duty raise questions about how the Categorical Imperative is to 
																																																								
1 Kant’s aim in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is to search for and establish this supreme 
principle. As is well known, he offers several formulations of the Categorical Imperative: the Formula 
of Universal Law (G 4:421), the Formula of Humanity (G 4:429), the Formula of Autonomy (G 
4:432), and the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends (G 4:439). For our purposes, the most relevant of 
these is the Formula of Universal Law because this is where Kant’s commitment to universally valid 
principles of duty is usually thought to originate. It will come up at various points, and its content and  
application will be discussed in ch. 3, sect. 3.3. The relationship between the formulas lies beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but I will briefly discuss the Formula of Humanity in ch. 4, sect. 4.2.     
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be applied.2 So it would be ill-advised to focus on one to the exclusion of the other. 
However, if one’s central concern is that Kant’s theory overgeneralizes, that it treats 
cases that are importantly different as if they were alike, then it would make sense to 
either object to his allegedly exceptionless principles of duty directly or otherwise to 
the Categorical Imperative as a source of such principles. For if one didn’t think that 
the Categorical Imperative yields any exceptionless principles of duty, then the over-
generalization worry would not arise, or at least not obviously.3 This is why the first 
part of this thesis will focus on specific principles of duty, such as the duty to keep 
one’s promises, and counterexamples devised to undermine them, such as the above 
Breaking a Promise to Help case. But, of course, the Categorical Imperative and the 
notions associated with it (e.g. “universalisability”, “maxim”, etc.) will always be there 
in the background, informing our thinking about how Kant’s specific principles of 
duty should be conceived. In the second part of the thesis, when we turn to other 
debates in Kantian ethics, the Categorical Imperative will take centre stage. 
Second, they might be assuming that Kant’s principles of duty are designed to 
play either one of two different roles.4 In the philosophical tradition, moral principles 
have been taken to play two distinct roles: the practical role of guiding action and the 
theoretical role of standards that explain why things have certain moral features or 
statuses, e.g. why an action is impermissible (Timmons 2001: 3-6). Accordingly, the 
concern might be, on the one hand, that Kant’s principles of duty are bad guides: 
that using them is not conducive to good decision making. If a strict prohibition of 
promise-breaking was among his principles, for example, it would seem reasonable 
to complain that this principle lets us down when we need it most, namely in difficult 
situations, such as the Breaking a Promise to Help case. On the other hand, one could 
make a case that Kant’s principles of duty fail as theoretical standards: that, far from 
helping us to understand and systematize the moral domain, they actually stand in 
the way. This, again, seems like a reasonable complaint, at least if the moral domain 																																																								
2 Tamar Schapiro is right when she notes that many Kantians have tried to exploit this link (2006: 35): 
many have tried to refute the objection that Kant’s principles of duty are not sensitive to the role of 
circumstances by arguing that his critics have misapplied the Categorical Imperative. This is true of 
Barbara Herman’s response, which I will discuss in ch. 2, sect. 3, but also of others, e.g. Hill 1991 and 
2000: 33-55. 
3 It could still arise, for example, if one thought that the Categorical Imperative is an algorithm for 
moral deliberation, which leads us to ignore the differences between situations. In ch. 3, sect 3.1, I will 
agree with Herman that, if the Categorical Imperative was such an algorithm, it would not do so.   
4 The same question arises with regard to the role of the Categorical Imperative. I will come back to 
this issue in ch. 2, sect. 3.2, and ch. 4, sect. 2.3, 4.2. 
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is as complex as we imagine it to be. By the end of ch. 3, I hope to have shown that 
this distinction between roles is at best misleading. However, until then, I will focus 
on the theoretical role (if only because the literature on this role is more extensive),5 
and leave aside whether Kant’s principles of duty are suitable guides. In particular, 
following the widely shared view that Kant’s principles of duty determine the deontic 
statuses of actions, I will examine whether they are fit to figure in explanations of 
why actions are permissible, impermissible, or obligatory.  
Now that we have identified the target of the challenge, namely Kant’s view that 
there are universally valid principles of duty which explain why our actions have the 
deontic statuses they have, we can turn to the challenge itself. What exactly is the 
nature of this circumstance-dependence of moral obligations, which Kantians should 
be able to account for? 
1.2 A Trilemma for Kantians 
In contemporary debates, it is often argued that there are broadly two ways in which 
circumstances can have a bearing on our moral obligations. We can refer to them as 
“undermining” and “outweighing”. Let us assume that we have found a case where a 
certain feature, e.g. being a promise-breaking, makes an action impermissible. This 
does not mean that every promise-breaking is impermissible because, in a different 
case, there might be circumstantial features that undermine the deontic import of 
promise-breaking (e.g. the fact that you were coerced into promising) or features that 
have a different deontic import that outweighs the import of promise-breaking (e.g. 
the fact that, by breaking your promise, you can help a child in need). Contemporary 
metaethicists associate these two modes of defeat6 with two distinct levels of import. 
Whether there are defeaters in the undermining sense is taken to determine whether 
a feature, e.g. being a promise-breaking, makes its usual contribution to the overall 
deontic status of an action or not. Whether there are defeaters in the outweighing 
																																																								
5 With a few exceptions (e.g. McKeever and Ridge 2006: 196-223, Väyrynen 2008), most contributions 
to the generalism-particularism debate seem to focus on the theoretical role.  
6 As Garrett Cullity points out (2013: 9), it is common to use the term “defeat” to cover both of the 
modes mentioned above. However, sometimes philosophers use this term to refer to a version of the 
undermining mode only. I will stick to the common usage. It is also worth noting that our two modes 
are actually broader categories that encompass a range of more specific modes. For discussions of 
these categories and the more specific modes contained under them see e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong 1999: 
1-12, Dancy 2004: 13-52, and Schroeder 2011: 328-44.  
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sense, by contrast, is taken to determine whether the contribution made by promise-
breaking suffices to make your action overall impermissible.  
In light of this, the challenge to Kantians could be framed as a twofold challenge. 
First, Kantians must be able to account for the possibility of defeat by features of the 
circumstances. Second, their account must be able to correctly discriminate between 
cases of undermining and cases of outweighing. The second challenge is a challenge 
that Kantians can hardly meet. For no matter how closely we look, there just doesn’t 
seem to be any basis for a distinction between two modes of defeat in Kant. This 
explains why most Kantians deny the very existence of a contributory level and the 
possibility of outweighing.7 So, in order to give Kantian ethics a fair chance, we shall 
set the benchmark a bit lower: we shall limit ourselves to asking whether Kantians 
can account for cases of defeat by circumstantial features at all, and ignore whether 
they categorize them correctly. In practice, this will mean that we will not take issue 
with the fact that most of the Kantian accounts discussed below reduce outweighing 
cases to undermining cases.8  
With this in mind, we can now turn to a thesis that contemporary metaethicists 
introduce to capture the possibility of defeat in the undermining sense and adapt it to 
our purpose by extending its scope so that it covers both modes of defeat. The thesis 
in question is “holism”. In its original form, it is a thesis about contributory reasons 
(Dancy 1993: 60-6, 2004: 73-8), but in line with what we decided, we shall consider a 
modified version of this thesis that concerns overall deontic statuses.   
Holism about Deontic Statuses: A feature or set of features that makes an action have a 
certain (overall)9 deontic status in one situation may not play the same role in 
other situations.10 																																																								
7 Thus, Dancy is right when he observes that Kantians are generally “suspicious of the very notion of 
a contributory reason, and ... try to capture the relevant phenomena in other ways” (2004: 67). There 
are some exceptions, however. Some Kantians (see ch. 1, sect. 3 and ch. 2, sect. 3.3.1) reduce cases of 
undermining to cases of outweighing, and not vice versa. But even they do not recognise more than 
one mode of defeat – they simply opt for the other one.  
8 In this I include my own account. I give some reasons for thinking that we may not actually need the 
notion of outweighing or a contributory level in ch. 2, sect. 3.3.1. But the reasons given are far from 
conclusive. 
9 For the sake of brevity, I will omit the qualification “overall” in what follows. Unless I say otherwise 
“deontic status” means “overall deontic status”, and the same goes for “impermissible”, “obligatory”, 
“wrong”, and so forth.  
10 This formulation deviates from standard formulations (see e.g. Dancy 2004: 7) in that it omits the 
phrase “or may play the opposite role”. The reason for this omission is partly strategic, but only partly. 
In ch. 3, I will argue for a view that is in some respects similar to Robert Brandom’s inferentialist view 
	 6 
For example, the fact that your action is a promise-breaking may make it impermissi-
ble in many cases, specifically, in standard cases where you weren’t coerced and no 
weightier concern is at stake, and so forth. But it may not play the same role in other 
cases, specifically, in exceptional cases, e.g. when you were coerced or when a child 
needs your help. This, then, is the thesis that Kantians ought to accommodate. Now, 
why is this a problem?   
According to so-called moral particularists, holism casts doubt on the viability of 
traditional moral theories which attach great importance to moral principles (see e.g. 
Dancy 1993: 60-2, 2004: 73-93, Little 2000). In fact, particularists believe that holism 
supports the following claim, which lies at the heart of their own position.  
Moral Particularism: Even if there are some true moral principles, nothing in moral 
theory or moral practice hinges on them – we can explain the obtaining of moral 
statuses and act well without them.11 
It is nowadays widely agreed that the argument leading from holism to particularism 
is at best indirect (see e.g. Little 2000: 277, McKeever and Ridge 2006: 26-7). It is 
indirect because holism does not say how complex the moral domain actually is: how 
many circumstantial features actually do make a difference to various obligations, and 
how complicated the connections really are. All it says is that anything could make a 
difference. If there wasn’t all that much complexity, then it might be possible to cap-
ture our moral obligations in principles that are both true and fruitful (principles with 
a few unless-clauses, say), but this, particularists say, would be a “cosmic accident”, 
and it does not seem to be true of our morality as it is (Dancy 2004: 82). Let us grant 
that the moral domain is very complex indeed. In that case, all moral generalists,12 
including Kantians, face a challenge, which arises because the demand that principles 
should be valid in all situations, both actual and counterfactual, is in tension with the 
																																																																																																																																																							
(2000: 87-92). Like him, I appeal to non-monotonic inferences. As Dancy points out (2004: 8-9), this 
kind of view cannot explain how a feature that plays a certain role in one case could, on its own, play 
the opposite role in another. In response, I would want to dispute his claim that this is how it must be, 
intuitively speaking. I have no intuition to this effect. 
11 There are different versions of particularism, but this is the version that I shall focus on. It comes 
closest to the version advocated by Jonathan Dancy in Ethics Without Principles. 
12 For current purposes, we can characterize moral generalism quite broadly, namely as the view that 
Moral Particularism is false.   
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demand that they should be able to serve as guides and/or theoretical standards.13 
What does this mean for Kantians, specifically? 
I will argue that, for Kantians, this challenge takes the form of a trilemma. This 
is because, in order to meet the challenge to which the particularist critique gives rise, 
they have to accommodate three prima facie incompatible claims, which can be seen 
as desiderata on a satisfactory version of Kantian ethics.  
Universality: The features in virtue of which actions have their deontic statuses can be 
captured in universally valid principles of duty. 
Asymmetry: In standard circumstances, an action of a kind that is usually14 impermissi-
ble is impermissible solely in virtue of the features that make it count as an ac-
tion of that kind (i.e. not in virtue of the fact that defeaters are absent). 
Complexity: In exceptional circumstances, an action of a kind that is usually impermis-
sible can be obligatory or permissible, and when it is, then this is partly in virtue 
of features other than the ones that make it count as an action of that kind (i.e. 
in virtue of the fact that defeaters are present).  
It is generally thought that Universality is one of the foundational doctrines of Kantian 
ethics.15 Asymmetry captures the idea that an explanatorily fruitful principle should not 
make reference to features that are irrelevant in the case to be explained. Complexity is 
an articulation of the idea from which we began: the idea that our moral obligations 
depend on and vary with circumstances. These three desiderata seem to be in tension 
because it is, on the face of it, impossible to satisfy more than two of them at once. 
The tension can be summed up as follows.  
The Particularist Challenge: Kantians have to explain how it is that our explanations of 
exceptional cases make reference to defeaters (Complexity) while our explanations 
of standard cases don’t (Asymmetry), even though both explanations are meant to 
																																																								
13 For a discussion of these two demands see Väyrynen 2011: 248-9. 
14 When I come back to these desiderata in ch. 2, sect. 1, I will use the more technical term “default” 
in order to refer to the deontic import that certain features usually have and the deontic statuses that 
they usually bestow. For discussions of default reasons see e.g. Lance and Little 2006, Dancy 2004: 69, 
111-7, Väyrynen 2004, McKeever and Ridge 2006: 46-75. 
15 Of course, as we will see, everything depends on how universal validity is understood. We will come 
back to the question of how Universality is thought to follow from what Kant says in ch. 1, and in ch. 2 
and 3 we will consider different readings of it.  
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appeal to one and the same explanatory principle, that is, to the same principle 
of duty (Universality).   
To illustrate, Kantians have to give an account of how it is that the deontic status of 
the relevant actions in both the Breaking a Promise to Help case and a standard case are 
meant to be explained by appeal to the same principle, if, in the former case, we have 
to refer to the fact that there is a passed out child, whereas in the latter case, we do 
not need to (and should not) refer to the fact that there is no passed out child. In ch. 
2 I will argue that, in their attempts to deal with this tension, Kantians have found 
themselves thrown on the horns of a trilemma.16 
It is worth noting that the combination of Universality and Asymmetry seems to 
lead to a view that resembles more “orthodox” forms of Kantianism.17 For if one 
combines the view that there is one principle covering all cases with the view that the 
relevant principle is the kind of simple principle that works in standard cases, then 
one seems forced to treat all cases as if they were standard cases. And this, it seems,18 
is exactly what one is forced to do if one takes seriously the implications of Kant’s 
rigoristic19 texts and remarks – above all, his essay “On a Supposed Right to Lie from 
Philanthropy” (8:423-30), where he responds to an infamous example put forward by 
Benjamin Constant.20 
Murderer at the Door: A murderer knocks at your door and asks about the whereabouts 
of his victim, who is hiding in your house. If you are honest, you put the victim’s 
life at risk, but if you opt for a lie, then you violate the duty not to lie.  
In his response to Constant, Kant argues that, even in such an extreme case, lying is 
strictly impermissible.21 The broader implication of his rigoristic assessment of cases 																																																								
16 For now, I will limit myself to highlighting the tension. The horns of the trilemma will be discussed 
in ch. 2, sect. 1.   
17 I say “resembles” because orthodox Kantians would reject our talk of action kinds that are “usually 
impermissible”. They would insist that they are always impermissible. 
18 In ch. 1 I will consider three attempts to resist this pressure.  
19 This is only one of many rigorisms that Kant’s critics have accused him of. Further views that have 
been dubbed rigoristic are his monism about value, his view that there are no moral conflicts and no 
moral residues, his view that the motive of duty is the only morally worthy motive there is, and finally, 
the two views that he himself calls rigoristic (though, of course, praisingly), namely the view that there 
are no morally neutral actions or characters (R 6:22). For a discussion of Kant’s various rigorisms see 
Timmermann 2001. 
20 Constant’s example occurs in a pamphlet entitled “On Political Reactions”, which was published in 
1797. In the relevant section, Constant argues against excess in the application of principles. 
21 In the eyes of his critics, this is proof of his outrageous rigorism. Kantians have spilled considerable 
amounts of ink trying to defend him. We will consider some of these attempts in ch. 1.   
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such as the above seems to be that all principles of duty take the form “Actions of 
kind A have the deontic status D”, e.g. “Lying is impermissible”. If this was indeed a 
commitment that Kantians could not flout, where would this leave them in relation 
to the task of accounting for the role of circumstances?  
I think it would expose them to a more basic objection. 
Rigorism Objection: Kant cannot account for the fact that there are exceptions to prin-
ciples of the form “Actions of kind A have the deontic status D”. 
This is the objection from which I want to begin. It will give me an opportunity 
to engage with the responses of Kantians who are more orthodox in the sense that 
they want to uphold the view that certain kinds of actions are strictly impermissible. 
From there I will move on to more unorthodox Kantian accounts, which allow that 
Kant’s principles of duty might be more complex in structure and content than the 
principles we considered above.  
1.3 Case-Scope vs. Agent-Scope: A Preview 
My response to the Particularist Challenge hinges on a distinction between two readings 
of Universality. According to the standard reading, which I call “Case-Scope Reading”, 
a principle of duty is universally valid only if it is valid in all cases or circumstances. If 
this is the sense in which Kant’s principles of duty are universal, then the worry that 
his moral theory is not sensitive to important differences between situations and that 
it overgeneralizes is appropriate indeed. However, in what follows I will try to show 
that there are in fact no good reasons for thinking that this is the notion of universal 
validity that Kant needs or wants.22 I will suggest that, if we pay attention to the kinds 
of considerations that lead Kant to insist on universal laws in the first Critique, we will 
find that his concern is not a concern with our ability to generalize across cases at all. 
What Kant is concerned with, instead, is the question of how it is possible for us to 
acquire objective knowledge of a certain domain. For this to be possible, he believes, 
we need to think of the relevant domain as being governed by universal laws. I argue 
that these findings point to a different reading of Universality, which I call the “Agent-
Scope Reading”. According to this reading, a principle of duty is universally valid iff 																																																								
22 It would be more accurate to say that this is not the notion that he should want, given his most basic 
commitments. One of the results of my discussion will be that, occasionally, Kant misunderstood the 
implications of his own views.  
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it can be agreed to hold by all rational agents (qua judging subjects) and for all such 
agents (qua objects judged) in the same circumstances. Since, on this reading, universal 
validity does not require validity in all cases or circumstances, since it is assessed rela-
tive to a particular set of circumstances, the overgeneralization worry does not arise. 
This proposal has interesting implications for contemporary debates between 
Kantian ethicists and their opponents.23 I will discuss two of these implications in the 
second part of the thesis. What I will argue, specifically, is, first, that the Agent-Scope 
Reading does away with the notorious problem of how to ensure that our maxims 
contain relevant descriptions of our actions and situations (see ch. 4). Second, I will 
argue that it allows us to understand the difference between Kantian and Humean 
Constructivism as a difference in what the form of reasons is taken to be, not merely 
a difference in what reasons we are taken to have, content-wise (see ch. 5).   
2.  A Remark on Methodology 
This thesis is an attempt to reinterpret the arguments and ideas of a historical figure 
whose work has shaped the thinking of generations of moral philosophers, including 
our contemporaries, in a way that advances a current debate in metaethics. As such, 
its success depends on resisting two temptations that one is at risk of succumbing to 
when approaching a historical text with a philosophical mindset. On the one hand, 
there is the temptation to be so exegetically diligent, so rigorous and careful in one’s 
attempt to arrive at a proper understanding of the text, that one is never quite ready 
to commit, never quite ready to settle on a reading from which a critical engagement 
could begin. This is the temptation of excessive reverence. On the other hand, there 
is the temptation of jumping to conclusions, of imposing contemporary distinctions, 
taxonomies, and argumentative patterns onto the text without questioning whether 
they fit, and thinking that one is ready to criticize and reject (or, indeed, defend) the 
views of the author, when one is not. This is the temptation of presumptuousness.  
Both tendencies are well familiar and often remarked on, and the commonplace 
counsel is to aim for a healthy balance. This does seem right, but it is also somewhat 
vacuous. How does one determine when a healthy balance is achieved? Surely, this 
depends on one’s objectives: on why one wants to engage with the historical figure in 																																																								
23 Its implications extend to discussions of other aspects of Kant’s ethics, too. These will be explored 
in the final section of ch. 3, after I have presented my argument for the Agent-Scope Reading.   
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question and what one is trying to accomplish. If no aims are specified, the healthy 
balance counsel is vacuous. It seems to me that a similar vacuousness attaches to the 
now conventional distinction between Kant’s ethics and Kantian ethics. These labels do 
not seem to be associated with any distinction in objectives. Rather, they are used to 
classify projects merely on the basis of how closely the author sticks to the letter of 
Kant’s texts.24 In my view, this is not a fruitful distinction. For this reason, I will not 
try to locate my project on the Kant’s-ethics-Kantian-ethics spectrum.25 Instead, I 
want to briefly explain how my reason for engaging with Kant’s texts suggests a cer-
tain mode of engagement, and how a commitment to this mode will help me to 
strike a balance between faithful and liberal interpretation that is right for my purposes.  
The larger goal to which the present thesis can hopefully make a contribution is 
to overcome some of the impasses that the generalism-particularism debate seems to 
have reached. Crudely speaking, one impasse seems to be the following. The debate 
as a whole has emerged from the particularists’ complaint that principle-based moral 
theories tend to overgeneralize: that they tend to treat cases that are importantly dif-
ferent as if they were alike. This has shaped how both parties think of what is at 
stake. In many cases, both sides frame the dispute as a dispute about whether and to 
which extent generalization is possible and necessary. But with this being the implicit 
assumption, it seems that any attempt to defend generalism is almost set up for fail-
ure. After all, no one is prepared to deny that the moral domain is very complex and 
that, nonetheless, we manage to cope with this complexity. So the claim that we need 
to generalize in order to reduce complexity and facilitate understanding does not cut 
any ice. This is where I suggest we should turn to Kant and his reflections on why 
principles are needed. 
However, in order to find what we are looking for, namely different reasons for 
thinking that moral principles are required, we must engage with the passages where 
these reasons are given on their own terms. We have to suspend our contemporary 
assumptions about the main point of contention that divides the friends and enemies 
of moral principles and be open to the possibility that terms like “universal validity” 
don’t mean what we take them to mean. This is the approach that I will adopt in ch. 
3, where I present my own response to the Particularist Challenge. In this chapter, I will 																																																								
24 Of course, the above assessment does not do justice to each and every account of the distinction 
that has been proposed. For a critical discussion of the distinction, see Wood 2008: 1-4.  
25 Accordingly, I shall use the terms “Kant’s ethics” and “Kantian ethics” interchangeably.  
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turn to one of the centrepieces of Kant’s first Critique, the Transcendental Deduc-
tion, and ask why Kant thought that universally valid laws were needed to acquire 
objective knowledge of nature. This investigation will bring to light that the kinds of 
principles that the possibility of objective knowledge presupposes don’t have to gen-
eralize (and won’t overgeneralize) across cases and situations. As such, it will point to 
a different reading of the Universality desideratum: the Agent-Scope Reading that I 
sketched above (sect. 1.3).  
It will be a result of my discussion – and not one of its presuppositions – that 
Kant’s rigoristic remarks, including his response to Constant, should be ignored, that, 
here, we should depart from his texts. This departure is justified because it allows us 
to appreciate the distinctive character of his arguments for why we need principles, 
thus helping us to overcome impasses that we have reached in our current debate.   
3. Outline 
In the first part of the thesis, I discuss and reject a number of existing Kantian re-
sponses to the Rigorism Objection and the Particularist Challenge. I then propose an alter-
native response.  
In the first chapter, I look at three Kantian responses to the Rigorism Objection 
(see sect. 1.2 above). These responses are orthodox in the sense that they try to ac-
count for exceptions to Kant’s principles of duty without abandoning the claim that 
certain kinds of actions are intrinsically impermissible (Tamar Schapiro refers to this 
claim as the “Deontological Thesis”). Each of these responses appeals to non-ideal con-
ditions: to the idea that exceptional cases are in some sense corrupted instances of 
the principle of duty in question. The hope behind this appeal is that putting the 
blame on non-ideal conditions will allow Kantians to leave the principles themselves 
untainted. My discussion reveals that this hope is vain: that the cases in question are 
not corrupted, and hence that, even in an ideal world, there would still be exceptions. 
The appeal to non-ideal conditions is unsuccessful because, in each case, the claim 
that the relevant cases are corrupted is secured either by leaving the content of the 
relevant principles of duty unspecified or by blurring the lines between different ac-
tion kinds. On this basis, I conclude that the content and structure of Kant’s princi-
ples of duty have to be more complex, as unorthodox Kantians argue. However, in 
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thinking about what this more complex structure and content could be, they face the 
Particularist Challenge (see sect. 1.2 above). 
In the second chapter, I discuss two quite unorthodox Kantian responses to the 
Particularist Challenge. I begin by introducing the three prima facie incompatible desid-
erata that a Kantian response to this challenge must satisfy: Universality, Asymmetry, 
and Complexity. I then explore the resulting trilemma and each of its horns. With the 
trilemma in mind, I turn to Christine Korsgaard’s and Barbara Herman’s responses, 
which can be understood as attempts to escape the trilemma. Both appeal to the idea 
that Kant’s principles of duty are universal and nonetheless defeasible and, in both 
cases, the strategy for escaping the trilemma is a division of labour: their views con-
sist of two distinct elements, each of which satisfies two of the three desiderata. This 
strategy fails, however, because, in both cases, the overall view is fraught with incon-
sistencies. In the end, Korsgaard and Herman have to choose from two problematic 
options: a view that flouts objectivity and a view according to which our principles of 
duty contain long lists of unless-clauses. 
In the third chapter, I present my own response to the Particularist Challenge. In 
line with the methodological commitments outlined above (sect. 2), I first consider 
Kant’s famous argument for the claim that we could not have any knowledge of the 
objects of experience if we did not synthesise the manifold of sense in accordance 
with concepts that serve as universal rules. With this in mind, I show that rules can 
fulfil the requisite function without holding in all cases or circumstances. I argue that 
it is enough if they are robust across a certain range of circumstantial variations, 
namely variations in what I call “subjectively relevant circumstances”: aspects of the 
circumstances that merely seem relevant to a certain subject because they are under 
the influence of some distorting factor, but that aren’t actually relevant to how things 
go with the object. When carried over to the moral domain, this distinction points to 
the Agent-Scope Reading of Universality, according to which a principle is universal iff 
it can be agreed to hold by all rational agents (qua subjects) and for all such agents 
(qua objects) in the same circumstances. I will argue that this novel reading has the 
advantage of dissolving the trilemma. In addition, it supplies an important distinction 
between legitimate exceptions that are called for by the circumstances, and illegiti-
mate exceptions that agents might be inclined to make for themselves. I conclude the 
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chapter by considering how the Agent-Scope Reading bears on discussions of other 
elements of Kant’s ethics.  
In the second part of the thesis, I explore what, if anything, the Agent-Scope 
Reading can contribute to the solution of other problems that exercise contemporary 
Kantian ethicists. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the so-called Problem of Relevant Descriptions. 
This problem goes back to G.E.M. Anscombe’s famous complaint that Kant’s “rule 
about universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as 
a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it” 
(1958: 2). I begin by clearing up several misunderstandings of the problem. In doing 
so, I bring out that the problem consists in the fact that Kant’s Formula of Universal 
Law seems to stand in need of an independent account of moral sensibility which 
does not render the formula itself superfluous. However, if we presuppose the Case-
Scope Reading of Universality, there can be no such account. The only way in which 
the problem can be resolved, I argue, is by adopting the Agent-Scope Reading. For 
only then can we see the Formula of Universal Law itself as playing the role of a 
Kantian account of moral sensibility.  
In the fifth chapter, I defend Kantian Constructivism against Sharon Street’s 
Humean criticism. To begin with, I briefly outline and endorse Street’s objections to 
Korsgaard’s early argument for the value of humanity. I argue that this argument fails 
because Korsgaard is trying to combine a Humean view of what it is to be a reason 
with a Kantian view of the kind of strong objectivity that attaches to moral reasons. 
That she combines these inconsistent views, I suggest, can be explained by the fact 
that she misunderstands the concern that underlies Kant’s Categorical Imperative. In 
her view, his concern is a concern for a certain stability of character – a concern that 
the Case-Scope Reading of his universalisability requirement is well suited to address. 
I argue that Kantian Constructivism can be rescued if we acknowledge that Kant’s 
primary concern is a concern for objectivity. For once we see his project in this light, 
it becomes apparent that a properly Kantian view of what it is to be a reason has to 
introduce the point of view of other agents right from the start. This is exactly what 
the Agent-Scope Reading of his universalisability requirement does.  
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PART ONE 
Chapter 1 
An Ideal World Without Exceptions?  
Three Responses to the Rigorism Objection 
1.  The Deontological Thesis  
Kantians have had a tendency to downplay the significance of the Rigorism Objection, a 
tendency to treat it as a worry that does not really threaten the core of Kant’s moral 
theory. Among other explanations, they have suggested that the source of Kant’s 
perceived rigorism lies in matters as shallow as the bad temper of an old man (Paton 
1953: 202), a lack of exegetical attention to the context in which Kant uses rigoristic 
language (Sedgwick 1991, Wood 2011), a failure to distinguish between two distinct 
notions of unconditionality on the part of his commentators (Singer 1954: 581), and 
misunderstandings of how to apply the Categorical Imperative (Herman 1993: 132-
83, Korsgaard 1996a: 133-58, Hill 2000: 33-55).26 However, according to Schapiro, 
there is an important point that all these downplaying explanations miss. In tracing 
the root of the problem to features that are specific to Kant’s work and the history of 
its reception, they forget that “the basic worry arises as readily in response to tradi-
tional deontological theories as it does in response to Kant’s theory” (2006: 35). In 
Schapiro’s view, this oversight has prevented Kantians from appreciating that the 
real source of the Rigorism Objection lies deeper, in a commitment that all deontologi-
cal theories have in common: the view that impermissibility and obligatoriness are 
intrinsic features of certain kinds of actions. Focusing on impermissibility, she articu-
lates this view as follows:27 																																																								
26 As I noted in sect. 2 of the introduction, my main question is whether Kant’s most fundamental 
commitments expose him and his followers to the Rigorism Objection and to the trilemma to which the 
Particularist Challenge seems to give rise. For this reason, I am not concerned with any explanations of 
why he said the rigoristic things that he said except explanations that connect these rigoristic statements 
to his most basic commitments. This is true only of the third and fourth items on the above list. I will 
return to the third in ch. 3, sect. 3.1, and to the fourth in ch. 2, sect. 3, ch. 3, sect 3.3, and in ch. 4. 
27 The below formulation follows Schapiro (2006: 34), except in that she speaks of “categorical moral 
rules” and of “wrongness”. I have dropped the designation “categorical” because, as we will see in 
sect. 5, this has no bearing on whether circumstances can make a difference. The reason why I chose  
to speak of “impermissibility” is that the three-way distinction between permissibility, impermissibility, 
and obligatoriness is more nuanced than the two-way distinction between rightness and wrongness. 
Note that the Deontological Thesis could also be rephrased in terms of obligatoriness. This might raise 
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Deontological Thesis: The actions prohibited by Kant’s principles of duty are impermis-
sible in themselves, i.e. impermissible in virtue of the features that make them 
count as the kinds of actions they are. If an action is impermissible in itself, then 
variations in external circumstances cannot make it permissible or obligatory.28  
For example, if deception is inherently manipulative, and manipulating other people 
is the very essence of treating them as a mere means (as some have argued, see e.g. 
Herman 1993: 154-5, Korsgaard 1996a: 347), then Kantians should not regard the 
impermissibility of deception as in any way dependent on the circumstances. For, at 
least on the face of it, circumstances can make a difference only to the consequences of 
acts of deception, and, according to Kantians and other deontologists, these ought to 
be discounted.  
It does not take much to see that this sort of view leads to rigoristic conclusions. 
If the very same features that make an action count as an act of deception also make 
it impermissible, and necessarily so, then the principle that acts of deception are im-
permissible must be exceptionless: it must be valid in all situations. Similar arguments 
can be made about other kinds of actions, e.g. lying, stealing, and breaking promises. 
Given this pressure towards rigorism, anti-rigoristic Kantian ethicists seem forced to 
either reject Schapiro’s claim that Kantians are committed to the Deontological Thesis, 
or to show that the pressure can be resisted: that intrinsically impermissible action 
kinds can have permissible instances.29 My aim in this chapter is to arrive at the con-
clusion that Kantians should go with the first option.  
If I wanted to argue for this conclusion directly, then I would seek to refute the 
reasoning which leads Schapiro to attribute the Deontological Thesis to Kant. Her ar-																																																																																																																																																							
questions about positive and negative duties in Kantian ethics, however. We will touch on some of 
these questions in sect. 3 and 4 below.  
28 When discussing the possibility of defeated prohibitions in this and the next chapter, I will speak of 
the actions in question as “permissible or obligatory” and thus disregard the difference between cases 
in which the import of the circumstances is such that the action becomes permissible and cases where 
it is such that the action becomes obligatory. In contemporary debates, the difference between them is 
often captured by distinguishing between different modes of defeat: “outweighing” vs. “undermining” 
(see introduction, sect. 1.2). 
29 In fact, there is a third option: Kantians could also argue that, for the purpose of moral assessment, 
actions have to be picked out by more fine-grained descriptions, which take account of features that 
common parlance would usually classify as circumstances. This strategy is in some ways analogous to 
the strategy pursued by some contemporary generalists who reject holism about reasons by arguing 
that enablers and defeaters are, in fact, part of the reasons themselves (e.g. Raz 2006: 108-13). In both 
cases, the dispute is difficult to adjudicate because each party presupposes their own intuitions about 
what constitutes a fully specified action kind or a complete reason (Väyrynen 2006: 714, 716). For that 
reason, I shall put this third option to one side. 
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gument for this attribution, which is quite brief, takes as a starting point Kant’s view 
that consequences cannot bear on the normative force of a categorical demand.30 
Features of the circumstances, such as others’ wrongdoing, she says,  
can only affect us by altering the causal nexus within which we act. That nexus 
determines the consequences of our own lawful action. But to think that the val-
ue of our own lawful action depends upon its consequences is … to think of the 
law as a hypothetical imperative. Given that the moral law is categorically rather 
than hypothetically binding, others’ misconduct cannot undermine its normative 
force. (Schapiro 2003: 330; my emphasis) 
I will return to this argument in the final section. For now, I want to consider and 
criticize three responses to the Rigorism Objection that aim to reconcile the idea that 
Kant’s principles of duty admit of exceptions with the Deontological Thesis. I want to 
proceed in this way because it gives me an opportunity to think about how more 
“orthodox” Kantians handle this issue. For whether or not we share their ambition 
to stick to the letter of Kant’s texts, it seems that we should judge their responses to 
the Rigorism Objection on their own merits.   
What all these responses have in common is that, in one way or another, they at-
tribute the fact that principles of duty admit of exceptions to non-ideal conditions: to 
partial compliance, to natural and historical limitations,31 circumstantial contingencies 
such as the availability of means, or the phenomenon of loose speech. The point of 
arguing that, in an ideal world, where these non-ideal conditions would not obtain, 
Kant’s principles of duty would be strictly exceptionless, is to show that there is no 
problem with the principles themselves, and that the problem arises only when we try 
to apply them. My objection is that these responses preserve the appearance of an 
ideal world without exceptions only at the cost of either leaving unspecified what a 
given duty demands or blurring the lines between different duties and action kinds. 
On this basis, I conclude that the Rigorism Objection does cast doubt on Kant’s princi-
ples of duty, at least if they are taken to have the content and structure that orthodox 																																																								
30 For an explicit statement of this argument, we have to go back to an earlier paper of Schapiro’s. In 
her 2006 paper, where the Deontological Thesis is first introduced, she alludes to this argument only 
indirectly, by sketching and endorsing Herman’s and Korsgaard’s accounts of the wrongness of de-
ception as rooted in its inherently manipulative character (2006: 36-7).  
31 The contemporary discussion of ideal and non-ideal theorizing is indebted to John Rawls. In A 
Theory of Justice, Rawls introduces the condition of partial compliance as the basis for his distinction 
between ideal and non-ideal theory (1999: 7-8), and natural and historical limitations as circumstances 
of justice (1999: 109-10, 215-6). 
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Kantians take them to have: if they present certain action kinds as impermissible or 
obligatory. From this it follows that Kantians aiming to defend these principles have 
to abandon the Deontological Thesis, that they have to be more open-minded – more 
“unorthodox” – about the structure and content of these principles.32  
2.  The Constitutive Deficiency Response 
2.1 Defective Circumstances and Deficient Options 
The first “reconciliatory” response to the Rigorism Objection that I want to consider is 
Schapiro’s own. Her discussion is centred around the prohibition of deception. To 
put it crudely, Schapiro argues that in certain circumstances deception is permissible 
or even obligatory because being honest is impossible (2006: 45). Of course, it is 
always possible to stick to the letter of honesty: it is always possible to intentionally 
say what we believe to be true. However, when the circumstances in which we act are 
defective, then, Schapiro says, they can have a corrupting influence on our attempt to 
play by the rules: they can make it impossible for us to be honest in both letter and 
spirit. In such cases, the only form of honesty available to us is a deficient form of 
honesty, one that does not go beyond mere truth telling, and because this is so, be-
cause honesty proper is out of reach, it may be better – closer to the spirit of hones-
ty, if not its letter – to intentionally say something that one believes to be false: to 
deceive in the spirit of honesty (Schapiro 2006: 47-8). When deception in letter, i.e. 
intentionally telling someone a falsehood, is the best surrogate for honesty, when it is 
the lesser of two evils, its intrinsic impermissibility is mitigated and we are by way of 
exception allowed to engage in it (Schapiro 2006: 49). Let’s consider the example that 
exercises Schapiro: Constant’s infamous example of the murderer at the door (see 
sect. 1.2 of the introduction). 
Murderer at the Door: A murderer knocks at your door and asks about the whereabouts 
of his victim, who is hiding in your house. If you are honest, you put the victim’s 
life at risk, but if you opt for deceit, then you would seem to be doing something 
intrinsically impermissible.  
																																																								
32 This is what they have to do, if they don’t want to resort to the unpromising strategy mentioned in 
fn. 29 above. 
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In Schapiro’s view, in such a situation, you cannot be honest in letter and spirit. You 
are thus allowed to tell the murderer what you believe to be false (deception in letter 
only) because, in this case, doing so comes closer to the spirit of honesty than telling 
him what you believe to be true (honesty in letter only).  
Schapiro’s response presupposes quite a rich conception of honesty and of its 
counterpart, deception, a conception of both as composites of letter and spirit. We 
have already mentioned the respective letter-components, but what does their spirit 
consist in? Schapiro agrees with many of her fellow Kantians that deception is essen-
tially a form of interference with someone’s ability to govern themselves (Korsgaard 
1996a: 141, 347). Honesty is thus essentially “a way of acknowledging or respecting 
(by not interfering with) another’s autonomy” (Schapiro 2006: 46). But, in Schapiro’s 
view, this analysis is incomplete. The problem with deception, she notes, is not only 
that it interferes with people’s autonomy, but also that it prevents people from taking 
up a shared practical standpoint, that it basically constitutes a refusal to reciprocate in 
a scheme of shared thought and action. Accordingly, being honest not only in letter 
but also in spirit means telling the truth as a way of satisfying the other’s “(implied) 
demand to think and act from a shared standpoint” (Schapiro 2006: 50). Both anal-
yses, the standard analysis and Schapiro’s revised one, present honesty and deception 
as forms of interaction between members of a moral community, but they differ with 
respect to what they see as the governing norm of this community: on the standard 
analysis, it’s a norm of non-interference; on Schapiro’s analysis, it’s a norm of shared 
agency or co-legislation.33  
With this in mind, we are in a position to specify what Schapiro means when she 
says that, in certain circumstances, being honest in letter and spirit is impossible. It is 
impossible in the sense that, in these circumstances, intentional truth telling is not a 
way of living up to the interlocutor’s implicit demand to take up a shared practical 
standpoint. The two circumstantial conditions that she considers are, firstly, a lack of 
autonomy and, secondly, evil ends or intentions on the part of the interlocutor (2006: 
50-1). If your interlocutor is unable or unwilling to take up a shared standpoint, then, 
whatever request they are making, it is not an implicit demand to take up a shared 																																																								
33 In sect. 4, I will suggest that, for Kant, these are two different perspectives on the moral community 
rather than two competing conceptions of it. The former is the perspective that Kant takes up in the 
Doctrine of Right (MM 6:229-371), the latter the perspective that he takes up in the Doctrine of Vir-
tue (MM 6:375-493). 
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standpoint. So even if you say something that you believe to be true, saying it will not 
be a way of satisfying that demand. The murderer at the door, for example, chooses 
an end that is so blatantly immoral that he “makes it appropriate for you to regard 
him as having refused … to play the co-legislation game,” and if he has refused to 
play that game, then, “whatever demand he is issuing, it is not the demand to share in 
thought and action” (Schapiro 2006: 52).  
Schapiro is aware that talk of mitigated obligations towards wrongdoers threatens to 
lead us on a dangerous slippery slope, that this sort of talk can be thought to license 
problematic forms of vigilantism, for example. She therefore adds the following two 
provisos. First, when we are faced with less severe forms of wrongdoing, we are not 
usually inclined to interpret them as signs of a refusal to co-legislate: they are mere 
offences, not betrayals of the moral relationship (Schapiro 2006: 53-4). As such, they 
do not mitigate our obligations towards the wrongdoer at all. Second, even when our 
obligations are indeed mitigated, there are constraints on what we are allowed to do. 
For, since the moral relationship is not an optional relationship, since wrongdoers are 
still rational agents whom we owe respect, we are only allowed to deviate from the 
letter of a given duty in ways that help us come closer to its spirit, e.g. to deceive a 
wrongdoer in the spirit of honesty, but not to torture them gratuitously (Schapiro 
2006: 54-5). Later on we will see that these two provisos do not suffice to restrict the 
field of deviations that are licensed by Schapiro’s account in a determinate manner. 
However, in order to get to the root of the problem, we need to first understand 
what Schapiro’s talk of defectiveness and deficiency amounts to.   
Why are certain circumstances allegedly defective, leaving only deficient options 
for action, rather than simply being different from other circumstances and calling for 
different actions for that reason? In her 2006 paper on Kantian rigorism, in which the 
Deontological Thesis is first introduced, Schapiro presupposes this defectiveness claim 
without arguing for it (2006: 49), but we can find the missing argument in her 2003 
paper on non-compliance as a non-ideal condition. In the latter paper, she discusses 
the constitutive dependency of actions that are part of a practice (so-called “practice 
actions”, such as promising, punishing or negotiating) on the compliance of others. 
Her discussion is indebted to John Rawls’ idea that practice rules define procedures 
which, if complied with, constitute participation in a new form of activity (Rawls 
1955: 24). Taking up this idea, Schapiro notes that practices are subject to the threat 
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of subversion (2003: 344). If the degree of non-compliance with the rules of a prac-
tice crosses a certain threshold, then the practice can become a sham, meaning that 
attempts to perform practice actions on the part of compliant parties are not just 
productively unsuccessful in the sense that they fail to accomplish their respective ends, 
but also constitutively unsuccessful in the sense that it is not appropriate to characterize 
them in the terms of the practice (Schapiro 2003: 337). Let us consider an example.  
Negotiation: It is constitutive of the practice of negotiating that both parties present 
and receive each other’s claims and arguments in good faith, that they genuinely 
try to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. If the person you are negotiating 
with is merely pretending to do these things, while in fact stalling for time, then 
they are subverting the negotiation not only in the sense of making it impossible 
for you to come to an agreement, but also in the sense that they prevent you 
from engaging in an activity that deserves to be called “negotiating”. Both of 
you are merely going through the motions, merely babbling on, as it were.  
Now, of course, one could say that, in such a case, the fact of non-compliance, rather 
than introducing a defect, just creates a situation that is different in kind, a situation 
that calls for the “scolding game”, say, rather than the “negotiation game”,34 but that 
would be an unusual way of describing what is going on. It is indeed more plausible 
to say that the circumstances are defective and that, as a result, the parties are engaged 
in a deficient negotiation. According to Schapiro, this talk of defectiveness and defi-
ciency is appropriate whenever various forms of stage-setting, e.g. external signs or 
implicit communication, establish the relevant practice in such a way that the agents 
involved can be said to be occupying the relevant roles (2003: 339).35 Then there is a 
game that they ought to be playing, whether they manage to or not.  
These observations suggest that defective circumstances can be identified in the 
following way. First, we look for signs that indicate which “game” we are supposed 
to be playing on a given occasion. Once we know which rules we are supposed to 
play by, we can determine whether all players are a) capable of playing by these rules 
and b) sufficiently compliant for the game to be intact. If one of these conditions is 																																																								
34 I am assuming that scolding is the appropriate reaction to someone’s refusal to negotiate properly. 
35 Schapiro adds that, “in these cases, the non-compliant party is tacitly or implicitly claiming the pro-
tections and prerogatives attached to his role while at the same time failing to live up to its demands” 
(2003: 339). 
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not fulfilled, then the circumstances are defective and the whole game is a sham, a 
series of deficient moves, a mere going through the motions. In such circumstances, 
the stringency with which the rules of the game apply to us, as compliant players, is 
mitigated, meaning that exceptions might be warranted. However, now that we have 
a set of criteria that allow us to distinguish between circumstances that are defective 
and circumstances that are merely different in the sense that different rules apply, we 
can see that Schapiro’s story about the Murderer at the Door example is not entirely 
convincing.  
2.2  Different Games, Different Rules 
In order to determine whether the circumstances in the Murderer at the Door case are 
indeed defective, we need to settle on a “game”. Which game is it that you and the 
murderer are supposed to be playing on this occasion? Is it the game of exchanging 
information? Or the moral game as such, the game of joint agency and co-legislation? 
The trouble is that neither answer is without problems.  
On the one hand, if we say that it is the game of exchanging information, then, 
unless the murderer is trying to deceive you about his intentions,36 there is no reason 
to assume that the relevant game or practice has been subverted. After all, his evil 
intentions notwithstanding, the murderer is a) an autonomous agent who is capable 
of distinguishing between truth and falsehood, and b) compliant, as far as the rules of 
the information exchange game are concerned. His evil intentions seem to have no 
bearing on the integrity of the information exchange game that he and you ought to 
be playing under the current supposition. This thought is confirmed by the fact that 
our intuitions about the Murderer at the Door case differ from our intuitions about the 
Negotiation case. Recall that, in the Negotiation example, we were inclined to agree with 
Schapiro’s assessment: if one party is stalling for time, then it is counterintuitive to 
say that the other party is still negotiating. But arguably there is nothing wrong with 
saying that you, as the compliant party, are being honest with the murderer, despite 
his evil intentions. Compare this to the following scenario: someone in a Nazi uni-																																																								
36 In Korsgaard’s view, the murderer must disguise his evil intentions because otherwise he could not 
expect that you will cooperate (1996a: 136). Schapiro rejects this assumption, citing the following case 
as a counterexample: “Suppose that a Nazi came to the door under the mistaken impression that you 
are a good Aryan who believes strongly in the Nazi cause and that you are harbouring a Jew simply 
out of ignorance of his identity. This Nazi would have every reason to be completely up-front about 
his intentions on the assumption that you sympathize with them” (2006: 51-2). 
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form knocks on your door and asks whether you are hiding a Jew in your house. The 
stage for the information exchange game is set. Horrified you begin to stutter some-
thing, at which point your interlocutor suddenly bursts into laughter, revealing that it 
was all a bad joke. If, despite this revelation, you answered them truthfully, then it 
might be somewhat strange to say that you were being honest. It would be strange 
because, by bursting into laughter, your interlocutor indicates that they are not actu-
ally playing the information exchange game, and so any further attempt on your part 
to make a move in that game would be a mere going through the motions. This ex-
ample differs from the Murderer at the Door example in that the rule being violated is a 
rule of the very game being played: the information exchange game.  
On the other hand, it is equally problematic to say that you and the murderer are 
meant to be playing the moral game as such. Prima facie, this line might look more 
promising. Since the moral game is a game that does not need to be established via 
mechanisms of stage-setting, since it is a game that we ought to play all the time,37 it 
seems appropriate to say that you and the murderer ought to be playing that game. 
And once we focus on the moral game, we can regard the murderer’s evil intentions 
as a refusal to play by the rules. To use Schapiro’s terms, we can see him as refusing 
to deliberate from a standpoint that all rational agents (including the innocent victim) 
can share. So why not focus on the moral game then? The problem is that we get the 
wrong result. The result that we were after is that the murderer’s refusal mitigates the 
stringency of the principle of duty that prohibits deceiving others. But what we seem 
to have shown instead is that it mitigates the stringency of the supreme principle of 
morality that urges us to deliberate from a shared practical standpoint, that is, that it 
mitigates the stringency of the Categorical Imperative. Now, of course, as a Kantian 
one could argue (though I would say against Kant) that the murderer’s unwillingness to 
play by the rules of the moral game makes it permissible to treat him as a mere 
means, at least if this is done in the spirit of morality.38 But, once again, whatever the 																																																								
37 By this, I don’t mean that every decision or practically relevant consideration is a moral decision or 
consideration – an idea famously criticized by Bernard Williams (1985: 179). In most situations, there 
is nothing moral at stake. What I mean, instead, is that we are always under the obligation to remain 
within the limits of morality, no matter what we are doing.     
38 A version of this view is advocated by Korsgaard in her essay “The Right to Lie”. In this essay, she 
argues that, in circumstances of evil, we may deviate from the demand expressed by Kant’s Formula 
of Humanity – from the demand to never treat humanity merely as a means, but to always treat it as 
an end (G 4:429). This is because, in such circumstances, trying to live up to the ideal that this formula 
articulates would make us into tools of evil (Korsgaard 1996a: 151-4).   
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general merits of such a Kantian twist on Rawls’ double-level theory (Rawls 1999: 
216), it does nothing to show that there are exceptions to the allegedly exceptionless 
prohibition of deception.  
After all, it could be argued that it is already built into the content of our specific 
duties that people do bad things, that it is part of our shared understanding of what 
we owe to each other, part of our shared understanding of honesty, that there are 
situations in which honesty is not a reasonable demand. If this were true, then the 
murderer’s evil plan would not result in a breakdown of the information exchange 
game. Instead, we would have to say that the game has a special rule for situations of 
this kind – a rule that is different from the rule that applies in standard cases, but a 
rule nonetheless. So from the point of view of the information exchange game, the 
circumstances would be different, but not defective.  
Two points could be made on Schapiro’s behalf. First, it is worth noting that the 
moral game is not only non-optional but also all-encompassing: all other games fall 
under its purview.39 Thus, Schapiro could reply that, with the moral game having 
been subverted, the information exchange game cannot be perfectly intact either. 
This is a valid point, but it does not so much undermine the above criticism as 
prompt me to reframe it. Let us assume that, by subverting the moral game, the 
murderer has also subverted all other games that one might try to play with him. In 
that case, all bets are off. They are off not in the sense that we are allowed to treat 
him in any way we like (that is ruled out by the proviso that we must strive to realize 
the spirit of the relevant game), but rather in the sense that, for any activity involving 
him, we must ignore the rules that would usually regulate this activity and ask our-
selves how to best approximate the spirit of morality. The problem with this very 
general precept is that it introduces a worrying degree of arbitrariness, that it puts 
agents on unregulated territory, leaving it up to every individual to decide what they 
think is right in a given case. In fact, the problem here is reminiscent of Kant’s con-
cerns about the state of nature. Unlike Hobbes, Kant does not believe that the state 
of nature is a state where anything goes, for, in his view, we are always bound by the 
demands of duty. But, in the state of nature, each of us is our own judge of whether 
																																																								
39 See fn. 37 above.  
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a given act complies with these demands, and this why it is a very precarious state 
(Kant R 6:95).40   
There is a second point one could make on Schapiro’s behalf. One could argue 
that my objection is question-begging in the sense that it presupposes an assumption 
that Schapiro rejects: the assumption that we have to choose between two alternative 
readings of the Murderer at the Door case, namely between the moral game reading and 
the information exchange game reading. Recall that, according to Schapiro’s analysis 
of honesty as a composite of letter and spirit, being honest means telling the truth 
(that is, playing by the rules of the information exchange game) as a way of living up to 
the demand to think and act from a shared standpoint (that is, playing by the rules of 
the moral game). Once again, the point as such is well taken, but does not undermine 
my criticism. What I take issue with is, in a sense, precisely the expansion that comes 
with her analysis: the fact that, in order to account for the Murderer at the Door case, to 
explain how the murderer’s evil plans make your honesty towards him constitutively 
deficient, she has to expand our ordinary understanding of honesty to a point where 
it becomes unrecognizable, to a point where it encompasses all things moral.41 Once 
we conceive of honesty in this very broad way, we lose our grip on the idea that the 
spirit of honesty will point you to the surrogate action that is best suited to address 
the specific defect that your situation exhibits. The precept to approximate the spirit of 
honesty becomes so general that we struggle to tie it back to the consideration that is 
presumably uppermost in your mind, namely the fact that someone’s life is in danger.  
 The lesson to be learned, I think, is that the explanation of why we are allowed 
to deceive the murderer is not as generic as Schapiro makes it out to be. She is right: 
the murderer cannot expect an honest response. But the reason why this expectation 
is inappropriate is not simply that he refused to take up a shared practical standpoint, 
but rather, more specifically, that the duty to be honest, as we all understand it, ends 
where the duty to protect innocent victims from aggressors begins. This, of course, is 
just a different way of saying that principles of duty restrict one another internally or, 																																																								
40 In addition, we might worry that the precept to aim for or approximate the realization of the spirit 
of morality suggests that we have to engage in consequentialist reasoning, which is exactly the mode 
of reasoning that Schapiro is so determined to avoid (2003: 331-2, 344, 350 and 2006: 38, 45).  
41 Let me clarify this point. The reason why her analysis of honesty amounts to such an expansion is 
that she is operating within the constitutivist framework outlined above. Within this framework, rules 
are constitutive of types of activities. If the activity of being honest is governed by the principle that 
one ought to say what one takes to be true as a way of living up to the demand to think and act from a 
shared standpoint, then all principles of duty are implicated in the constitution of this activity.  
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in other words, that the actions they prohibit are not intrinsically impermissible, i.e. 
that the Deontological Thesis is false. I have not done enough to establish this conclu-
sion, but before we move on to the next attempt to resist it, I want to note that my 
explanation of why there are exceptions has another important advantage. It covers a 
wide range of cases, including cases that Schapiro’s account does not cover because 
they do not seem to involve any constitutive failures.42  
3. The Conflicting Grounds of Obligation Response 
3.1 A Kantian Theory of Pro Tanto Duties  
Let us turn to another move that is open to those who strive to reconcile exceptions 
with the Deontological Thesis. Some commentators have argued that the below passage 
from the Metaphysics of Morals contains the key to a Kantian solution to the problems 
of moral conflict, moral residue, and moral regret.43 This is because, in their view, it 
shows that Kant accepted the now popular idea that moral considerations can retain 
their moral import even when defeated (McCarty 1991, Timmermann 2013). 
A conflict of duties ... would be a relation between them in which one of them 
would cancel the other ... But since duty and obligation are concepts that express 
the objective practical necessity of certain actions and two rules opposed to each 
other cannot be necessary at the same time, if it is a duty to act in accordance 
with one rule, to act in accordance with the opposite rule is not a duty but even 
contrary to duty; so a collision of duties and obligations is inconceivable. However, a 
subject may have, in a rule he prescribes to himself, two grounds of obligation ... 
one or the other of which is not sufficient to put him under obligation ..., so that 
one of them is not a duty. – When two such grounds conflict with each other, 
practical philosophy says, not that the stronger obligations takes precedence ... 
but that the stronger ground of obligation prevails. (Kant MM 6:224) 
																																																								
42 Schapiro acknowledges this limitation and mentions some such cases in a footnote (2006: 56-7). 
43 These problems have been raised by Williams and Martha Nussbaum, among others. In their view, 
if a moral theory leaves no room for genuine conflict between competing moral concerns, then it 
cannot explain why we feel regret even when we have done the right thing and were unable to do 
better. Williams argues that this is a problem for cognitivist moral theories in general (1973: 175-6), 
and Nussbaum maintains that it is a problem for Kant in particular (1986: 32). 
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According to the above commentators, Kant’s claim that grounds of obligation can 
conflict suggests that defeated grounds of obligation retain their deontic import. As 
such, this claim is thought to point to a Kantian theory of pro tanto duties.44  
If they are right, then this passage may contain the solution to our problem, too. 
Think of the deontic import of the fact that an action is a lie. If the duty not to lie 
was a pro tanto duty, the deontic import of being a lie would be defeasible,45 meaning 
that some lies could be overall permissible or obligatory. The principle of duty that 
prohibits lying would admit of exceptions. But, according to proponents of pro tanto 
duties, even permissible or obligatory lies are impermissible in at least one respect – 
namely qua lies. If this is true, if lies qua lies are always impermissible, and necessarily 
so, then it seems appropriate to say that lies, as such, are intrinsically impermissible: 
impermissible in virtue of the features that make them lies. This would mean that the 
Deontological Thesis could be upheld, even if the kinds of duties that it covers admitted 
of exceptions. Let us call this the “Conflicting Grounds of Obligation Response” to 
the Rigorism Objection. But why should we think that this is indeed what Kant has in 
mind when he speaks of conflicting grounds of obligation? Let us examine the details 
of this interpretation and consider its merits.    
The pro-tanto-duties interpretation of the above passage hinges on a distinction 
between duties and obligations. According to Richard McCarty and Jens Timmer-
mann, the term “duty” refers to a general principle of duty, i.e. to a duty type, whereas 
“obligation” refers to an instance of such a principle, to a particular case in which 
one is bound to perform a certain action, i.e. a duty token (McCarty 1991: 68, Tim-
mermann 2013: 42-3). Duties, qua principles, determine which features constitute 
grounds of obligation or, in other words, which features have a pro tanto deontic 
import. When a ground is not defeated by a stronger competitor, then its import is 
decisive: it determines the overall deontic status of the relevant action and, as such, it 
																																																								
44 The forefather of pro tanto duties is William David Ross (2002: 16-47). He speaks of “prima facie” 
duties, but notes that the phrase is somewhat unfortunate because it suggests that the duties in ques-
tion are merely apparent, which is not what he has in mind (2002: 20). For this reason, his commenta-
tors agree that it is more appropriate to speak of “pro tanto” duties instead, as this phrase conveys 
that an action is impermissible or obligatory in some respect. Generally speaking, principles of pro tanto 
duty pick out features of actions or situations that make an action in some respect impermissible or 
obligatory. 
45 Recall that we are using the notion of defeat to cover both undermining and outweighing. In this 
context, “defeasible” means “outweighable”. 
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determines what we have an obligation to do.46 Let us consider an example that we 
already mentioned in the beginning of the introduction. 
Breaking a Promise to Help: You promised your friend to post their visa application, just 
in time for the deadline. But, on the way to the post office, you see a child fall 
off their bike, hit their head, and pass out. Two principles of duty apply here: the 
duty to keep one’s promises and the duty to help people in emergencies. So 
there are two grounds of obligation or features with deontic import, favouring 
different actions: the fact that you promised makes it pro tanto impermissible 
for you to stop, the fact that the child needs help makes it pro tanto obligatory47 
to do so. If we assume that the child’s need is the stronger ground, then it is 
overall obligatory for you to stop. This is what you have an obligation to do.  
The advantage of distinguishing between duties and obligations is that it makes 
plain why Kant says what he says: that duties and obligations cannot conflict, while 
grounds of obligation can. Duties are principles considered in abstraction from the 
contingencies that attend their application.48 The only way in which such principles 
could conflict would be by contradicting one another directly. A duty not to kill, for 
example, would contradict a duty to kill violent aggressors. Of course, such conflicts 
must be impossible if Kant’s moral theory is to be consistent (Timmermann 2013: 
42).49 Grounds of obligation are features on which our duties bestow deontic import. 
Since actions can fall under more than one duty, there can be several grounds of ob-
ligation at once. As a result, the same action can be obligatory and impermissible, but 
it is so in different respects, and so the conflict here is not of a problematic kind: it is not 
a contradiction. Finally, there are obligations. Obligations cannot conflict because to 
say of one and the same action that it is overall permissible and overall obligatory is, 
																																																								
46 Kant speaks of strength, not weight, and so do McCarty and Timmermann. But given their reading 
of the above passage, they could just as well speak of weight.  
47 This is perhaps a somewhat unusual way of speaking, as it would be more common to say that you 
have a pro tanto duty to stop. But what I want to convey is the idea that, on the present view, there 
are pro tanto deontic statuses and overall deontic statuses. Thus, to say that your action is pro tanto 
obligatory is to say that it is obligatory in one respect, not that one has an obligation to perform it.  
48 Since principles of duty per se do not say that this or that particular action has this or that deontic 
status, the fact that one and the same action can fall under several duties does not mean that the duties 
themselves conflict with one another.    
49 If they weren’t, there could be antinomies of moral laws, which Kant rules out, e.g. in a draft of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, 23:389. 
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again, a contradiction. So, in each case, one ground of obligation must “prevail”.50 To 
sum up, the pro-tanto-duties interpretation seems to make good sense of the key 
claims in the Kant passage cited above, and it has the additional benefit of counte-
nancing moral residues, i.e. genuine deontic import that cannot be honoured.51 
Now it is time to return to our own concern: the Rigorism Objection. If we attempt 
to appropriate the pro-tanto-duties reading for our purposes, we run into a problem. 
The problem has to do with the nature of the cases that we are trying to account for. 
Consider the Breaking a Promise to Help case, for example. What we want to say about 
this case is that a ground of obligation that obtains in virtue of what Kant would see 
as a duty of right (the duty not to break promises) is defeated by a ground that obtains 
in virtue of what he would call a duty of virtue (the duty to help).52 The worry is that 
this sort of case is ruled out from the start because, contrary to what we have been 
saying above, Kant’s theory of pro tanto duties is actually limited to duties of virtue, 
with duties of right being decisive whenever they apply. This is Timmermann’s view, 
among others (Timmermann 2013: 43-6, Aune 1979: 191-5). 
Such a restriction suggests itself when we reflect on how pro tanto duties might 
fit into Kant’s overall project. According to Timmermann, the right place to look is 
Kant’s claim that duties of virtue possess latitude; that, because such duties prescribe 
ends, they leave it open how and when to take steps towards those ends (Kant MM 
6:390). In Timmermann’s view, it makes sense to treat such duties as pro tanto duties 
because their latitude is a reflection of the fact that other duties can take precedence, 
																																																								
50 It should make us suspicious that the present interpretation assumes that the two impossibilities, the 
impossibility of conflicts between duties and the impossibility of conflicts between obligations, have 
distinct sources. After all, Kant himself offers a single explanation and he seems to think that it covers 
both impossibilities. In the following section this suspicion will be confirmed. There I will argue for a 
reading according to which there is no such distinction between duties and obligations. 
51 For McCarty’s and Timmermann’s purposes, it is important that the deontic import is genuine, and 
not merely apparent. Their opponents, the critics mentioned in fn. 43 above, believe that, for Kant, 
duties are binding whenever they apply, and thus that, in his view, all conflicts are merely apparent in 
the sense that they are based on mistakes of subsumption – on the mistaken view that a given case 
falls under two principles of duty. On this basis, these critics conclude that Kant cannot make sense of 
moral regret: the regret that we feel when we were unable to fulfil a genuine (albeit pro tanto) duty. 
McCarty and Timmermann aim to defend Kant against these critics.  
52 Kant draws the distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue in MM 6:239, and explains it 
further in other passages, for example, 6:382-4, 394-5, 410. There are interesting questions about how 
this distinction relates to various other distinctions between kinds of duties that Kant introduces: wide 
vs. narrow, perfect vs. imperfect, mediate vs. immediate. Exploring these would take us beyond the 
scope of this thesis. So, apart from a brief remark in sect. 4.1 below, I will leave these questions aside. 
For detailed discussions of these and related questions see e.g. Trampota et al. 2013. 
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making the means required to pursue the prescribed ends “morally unavailable”.53 In 
such cases, there is a pro tanto duty to pursue the end in question, but no overall 
duty or obligation to do so. This leads Timmermann to believe that duties of right, 
such as the duty to honour promises and contracts, are not pro tanto duties, because, 
as Kant says (MM 6:380), these duties do not prescribe ends but, instead, prohibit 
actions.54 
This reasoning rests on a mistake, however. There is indeed a sense in which du-
ties of virtue prescribe the pursuit of obligatory ends, whereas duties of right restrict 
the range of permissible means, and in sect. 4.1 below we will see what exactly that 
sense is. But whatever the difference amounts to, when Kant says that duties of right 
do not prescribe ends, we should not take him to be saying that they cannot demand 
that we bring about certain states of affairs. For surely the duty to keep promises or 
the duty to fulfil contractual obligations can make such demands.55 Conversely, when 
Kant says that duties of virtue do not prohibit actions, we should not take him to be 
saying that there are no specific actions that are blatantly incompatible with a genuine 
commitment to an obligatory end (McCarty 1991: 77-8, Walla 2015: 733-6). This 
suggests that the roles can be reversed: that there can be situations where the means 
that would be required to keep one’s promise, e.g. to keep walking to make it to the 
post office, are morally unavailable because taking these means would amount to a 
denial of assistance so harsh that it would betray a fundamental indifference to the 
needs of other people. For this reason, we should not rule out the possibility that a 
ground of obligation that obtains in virtue of a duty of right could be defeated by a 
																																																								
53 Timmermann 2013: 48, 60. Note that this is not uncontroversial. It could be argued that the point 
of countenancing latitude is not to highlight the fact that duties restrict one another, but instead to 
avoid overdemandingness (Walla 2015: 737-41). However, Kant himself is quite explicit about endors-
ing the former view (MM 6:390).  
54 Timmermann 2013: 43-6. It is worth noting that, given Kant’s taxonomy, this would mean that the 
duty not to lie is a pro tanto duty, because it is classified as a duty of virtue (MM 6:429-31). If we ac-
cept Timmermann’s account of the distinction, this is an odd outcome. After all, it seems that the duty 
not to lie is as much a prohibition of actions as the duty not to break promises. That Timmermann 
ignores this problem has to do with the fact that he treats the distinction between duties of right and 
duties of virtue, on the one hand, and the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, on the 
other, as co-extensive (2013: 44-6). In this, he deviates from Kant.   
55 By this, I do not mean that it is part of the content of the above duties that one ought to bring about 
certain specific states of affairs. All I mean is that, in order to fulfil such a duty on a given occasion, 
one might have to bring about a certain state of affairs. McCarty acknowledges this possibility when 
he says that some duties of right, e.g. the duty to keep one’s promises, “preclude the evasion of [a 
moral] commitment” (1991: 70). But his phrasing here betrays that he is reluctant to say that duties of 
right can prescribe the pursuit of ends.    
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ground that obtains in virtue of a duty of virtue. With this in mind, we can now 
move on to a critical discussion of the Grounds of Obligation Response. 
3.2 Determinate Content and Indeterminate Import, or Vice Versa? 
So far we have focussed on two issues: on whether the pro-tanto-duties reading can 
account for Kant’s comments on conflicts and whether it works as a response to the 
Rigorism Objection. Now I want to raise a larger question: the question of whether this 
is indeed a good way of understanding Kant’s ethics. The proponents of the pro-
tanto-duties interpretation are generally in a difficult position. The textual basis for 
their reading is meagre, and even Kant’s remarks on latitude do not actually support 
it – they merely leave room for it. After all, latitude could also mean that duties re-
strict one another internally, in the way suggested at the end of sect. 2.2.56 So in order 
to adduce Kant’s remarks on latitude as evidence for their view, pro-tanto-duties 
Kantians have to interpret them in a certain way, namely as expressing the idea that 
the means to an obligatory end can be morally unavailable. Let us scrutinize Tim-
mermann’s argument to this effect. In the following passage, he explains the notion 
of moral unavailability by using the example of someone with limited financial means 
who is forced to choose between supporting their poor parents and showing their 
gratitude to a benefactor. He argues that, given the strength of the respective 
grounds, the means for showing gratitude are morally unavailable, meaning that there 
is a pro tanto duty to show gratitude, but no overall duty or obligation.  
Grounds of obligation depend on the precarious availability of means to generate 
[actual obligations] ... The reason for this follows directly from Kant’s distinction 
between moral and instrumental reasoning. It is ... correct to say that it is my duty 
to give my savings to my parents, but strictly speaking, I have an obligation to 
help and giving them my savings is the way this is achieved, a mere means. The 
relevant description of the ground created by pure practical reason falls short of 
recommending that I transfer my savings to my parents’ bank account. Nor does 
moral reasoning tell me that my benefactor’s need can be relieved by giving him 
the same sum of money ... Pure practical reason tells me that benefactor and par-
ents alike deserve my support and that my parents are morally more important. 
Empirical practical reason tells me that the only suitable means is a certain sum of 
money, which is insufficient to help out both. If it turns out that the money is re-																																																								
56 In fact, that is exactly what Kant seems to be saying in MM 6:390. 
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quired to satisfy the stronger ground, this is no different in principle from other 
cases in which I am not in a position to help because the means are out of reach 
as a result of any other kind of impossibility: psychological, logical, physical, met-
aphysical etc., or indeed by the unrelenting direct ought of perfect duty. (Tim-
mermann 2013: 57) 
What is noteworthy about this passage is how Timmermann uses the division of 
labour between pure practical reason, as the capacity for moral reasoning, and empirical 
practical reason, as the capacity for instrumental reasoning, to explain how there can 
be grounds of obligation that don’t translate into obligations proper. Since Kant rules 
out conflicts of obligation, it is important that pure practical reason does not go so 
far as to prescribe two incompatible courses of action, for example, that it does not 
tell me to both transfer my savings to my parents’ bank account and to give them to 
the benefactor. The task of pure practical reason, in such a case, is limited to setting 
obligatory ends and determining their importance in relation to one another on an 
abstract level. The search for suitable means, which relies on knowledge about the 
world in general and the present situation in particular, is left to empirical practical 
reason, and sometimes its verdict is that there are no suitable means available. But 
what kind of fact is the fact that certain means, though physically and psychologically 
available, are morally unavailable? 
Timmermann’s claim that the moral unavailability of means is “no different in 
principle” from their physical and psychological unavailability suggests that the fact 
that certain means are morally unavailable is much like a non-moral fact. Specifically, 
it suggests that, from the standpoint of morality, it is as contingent as a non-moral fact. 
This, I think, is not an unintended connotation of Timmermann’s remarks. In fact, 
this idea plays a crucial role in his argument for the conclusion that defeated grounds 
of obligation retain their deontic import. His argument is this: given that “Kantian 
ethics ... is a conscious attempt to protect moral life from the influence of fortune, 
accidental circumstance cannot render valid [grounds of obligation] null and void” 
(Timmermann 2013: 60). If this reasoning turned out to be faulty, the pro-tanto-
duties interpretation would lose much of its plausibility. 
So let us ask again: what kind of fact is the fact that the financial means required 
to show one’s gratitude to a benefactor are morally unavailable? Surely it is different 
from the fact that one is too short to reach the branch with the nice red apple. It is 
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different because it is partly a matter of what or who ought to be prioritized. From the 
standpoint of morality, this fact is not contingent, it is not something that just is the 
way it is, not something to shrug one’s shoulders at. Instead, it is the kind of fact that 
we know through pure practical reason. Let’s think about what pure practical reason 
tells us, according to Timmermann. It tells us that that both our benefactor and our 
parents deserve our support and that our parents are morally more important. How 
do we have to understand these commands such that, combined with knowledge of 
non-moral facts, they yield determinate instructions regarding what to do? Surely, to 
say that our parents are more important is not to say that they are more important per 
se: as rational agents endowed with dignity, the two parties have equal standing. Nor 
should we assume that the end of supporting our parents is more important in the 
sense that we should always prioritize it. After all, we can imagine extreme cases, cases 
where a small gesture could prevent a benefactor from losing their faith in humanity, 
for example. Timmermann’s emphasis on the need to exercise judgment and his re-
mark that urgency is an important consideration suggest that he would not rule out 
that, in exceptional cases, the duty of gratitude might take precedence (2013: 53). But 
if this is right, it means that the commands of pure practical reason, when stated in 
this abstract, formulaic fashion, are indeterminate in content. They command that we 
perform a yet-to-be-determined range of actions, whereby determining what those ac-
tions are is not just a matter of adding knowledge of non-moral facts.  
Let us reflect on the implications of this insight. Recall why Timmermann insists 
on a division of labour between moral and instrumental reasoning. It is because pure 
practical reason issues its commands prior to and independently of the contingencies 
encountered in complying with them that such contingencies can never render these 
commands “null and void”. Now, if the business of applying duties to the messy 
reality of everyday life was a matter merely of reviewing contingent facts to find the 
means to fully determinate obligatory ends, then Timmermann would be right: a case 
could be made that a shortage of means cannot take away from the deontic import of 
the features that our duties pick out. What our discussion has shown, however, is 
that moral and instrumental reasoning are in fact much more closely intertwined than 
Timmermann would have us believe. It has shown that it is in confronting the messy 
reality, in taking account of the circumstances, that we determine what our previously 
indeterminate duties entail, what actions they prescribe, and how they restrict each 
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other. In a nutshell, Kantian duties are not duties to perform a determinate range of 
actions with a yet-to-be-determined import – they are not pro tanto duties. Instead, 
they are duties to perform a yet-to-be-determined range of actions with a determinate 
(namely: decisive) import.  
To illustrate, let us briefly revisit our example. The pro-tanto-duties reading says 
that, in transferring our money to our parents’ bank account, we are failing to act on 
a pro tanto duty of gratitude, which urges us to transfer a particular sum of money to 
a particular benefactor on a particular occasion. We have found that this is not how it 
is. Pace Timmermann et al., there is no ground of obligation, no feature with deontic 
import that we are failing to honour. To say, in the abstract, that we have a duty of 
gratitude is not to say anything about what we ought to do in this particular instance. 
In this instance, the duty does not apply. There is therefore no respect in which our 
transferring the money to our parents is impermissible.  
The conclusion that there is no residual deontic import brings us back to our 
main concern: to the Conflicting Grounds of Obligations Response to the Rigorism 
Objection. This response hinges on the premise that there is residual deontic import: 
that there is always still a respect in which a lie or promise-breaking is impermissible, 
even when it is permissible or obligatory overall. We have shown that this premise 
cannot be upheld. The Conflicting Grounds of Obligations Response fails.  
However, before we can move on, we should briefly revisit Kant’s comments on 
conflicting grounds of obligation. How are these to be understood, if not along pro-
tanto-duties lines? Here it is important to pay attention to where such conflicts are 
supposed to occur. In the passage cited above, Kant claims that they occur in “rule[s] 
[that a subject] prescribes to himself”. As many commentators have noted (Herman 
1993: 167, O’Neill 2002: 342), this suggests that he is speaking of maxims, that is, of 
subjective principles of action. So why does Kant switch from talking about duties 
and obligations (objective principles) to talking about maxims (subjective principles)? 
I would argue that this is precisely because the kinds of conflicts that he goes on to 
countenance are conflicts that occur only in the subject. They are conflicts between two 
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perspectives on a given situation between which a subject is torn because they cannot 
decide which duty the present case falls under.57 
4. The Casuistical Questions Response 
4.1 “Strictly Speaking, This Is Not a Lie” 
The third and final response that I want to consider in this chapter takes as a starting 
point a long-neglected part of Kant’s discussion of duties in the Doctrine of Virtue: 
his so-called casuistical questions (MM 6:423, 426, 428, 431, 433, 437, 454, and 458). 
The twenty or so questions come in eight bundles, each associated with a particular 
duty.58 Although they vary in their purport, ranging from quests for action guidance 
via empirical questions to questions concerning the value of certain states of affairs, 
they are all, in one way or another, geared towards settling questions of subsumption. 
In particular, it is clear that these questions are not supposed to cast doubt on the 
scope or bindingness of the principles of duty at issue: on whether they are strictly 
universal, say, or on whether they present the performance or omission of certain 
kinds of actions as necessary.59 Rather, what they call into question is whether this or 
that particular act falls under the concept of the relevant action kind or end kind. 
Here are some examples:  
Is it murdering oneself to hurl oneself to certain death (like Curtius) in order to 
save one’s country? (MM 6:423) 
Can an untruth from mere politeness (e.g. the “your obedient servant” at the end 
of a letter) be considered a lie? (MM 6:431) 
Does not all this [preferential tributes of respect in words and manners] prove 
that there is a widespread propensity to servility in human beings? (MM 6:437) 
																																																								
57 This, of course, is the conclusion that McCarty and Timmermann are desperate to avoid because it 
would mean that conflicts between grounds of obligation are merely apparent after all. See fn. 51 above. 
58 The number of questions depends on how the blocks of questions in the Doctrine of Virtue are 
divided up. According to David James, there are twenty (1992: 68). 
59 This is certainly disputable. Many of the questions concern borderline cases of action kinds or states 
where the classification is a matter of degree, e.g. excess in the enjoyment of food and drink. These 
are clearly questions of subsumption. Some of the other questions are harder to interpret in this way, 
however. Consider the following example: Bitten by a mad dog, is it wrong for someone to destroy 
themselves so that, in their incurable hydrophobic madness, they don’t harm others? (MM 6:423-4). 
On the face of it, this is a quest for action guidance, not a question of subsumption. But one could 
argue that the incurable madness will extinguish this man’s humanity anyway or will have extinguished 
it already, so that one of the features that characterize suicide, according to Kant, is not present here. 
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In recent years, these questions and Kant’s general comments on casuistry have 
attracted more and more attention, especially among commentators who are keen to 
defend Kant’s ethics against the Rigorism Objection (e.g. Sherman 1997: 311-6, O’Neill 
2002: 343-44). In an attempt to explain this recent surge of interest, Rudolf Schüssler 
observes that the only route open to Kantians who would like to grant “exceptions” 
to perfect duties is to resist subsuming the target cases under them (2012: 77). This 
remark is as illuminating as it is paradoxical. It is paradoxical because, prima facie, it 
does not make sense to regard a case that does not fall under a rule as an exception 
to that very rule.60 Nevertheless, it is clear enough what Schüssler has in mind. When 
orthodox Kantians are presented with a lie or theft or promise-breaking that seems 
permissible or even obligatory, they can sidestep a counterintuitive verdict by saying 
that the act in question is not actually a lie or a theft or a promise-breaking. And, to 
justify such an ostensible deviation from the letter of Kant’s rigoristic texts, they can 
point to his casuistical questions. Let us consider what they can say in more detail. 
In raising and discussing these casuistical questions, Kant seems to acknowledge 
that there is a gap between principles of duty and particular acts and that bridging 
this gap is often far from straightforward, requiring judgment and attention to the 
details of the case. And if this is right, if he really does acknowledge that there is such 
a gap, then he can make room, if not for genuine exceptions to principles of duty, 
then at least for the appearance thereof. For the more intricate the subsumption of 
acts under action kind concepts is thought to be, the more reasonable it is to expect 
that ordinary language won’t always follow suit and that, speaking loosely, people will 
often apply concepts of impermissible or obligatory action kinds, e.g. the concept of 
a lie, to acts that do not actually fall under these concepts. This loose speech will then 
create the illusion of exceptions, e.g. of permissible lies. This line of thought indicates 
how the appeal to Kant’s casuistical questions can help Kantians answer the Rigorism 
Objection. By suggesting that the correct use of action kind concepts is a very intricate 
matter, the casuistical questions point to a distinction between ideal and non-ideal 
uses of such concepts and, in doing so, they pave the way to a story about exceptions 
that preserves the Deontological Thesis. Strictly speaking, so the story goes, certain action 
kinds are intrinsically impermissible and therefore impermissible in all situations, but, 
loosely speaking, there are instances of these kinds that are permissible or obligatory.  																																																								
60 This is why it is appropriate to put the term “exception” in scare quotes.  
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There are two obstacles to getting this response off the ground. First, there is a 
concern about the scope of casuistry in Kant’s ethics. For although Kant does raise 
some casuistical questions about perfect duties to the self, his official position seems 
to be that the domain of casuistry is actually limited to imperfect ethical duties.61 This 
suggests that, in our target cases, i.e. cases of lying, promise-breaking, and so forth, 
there is no gap between principles and acts after all. The following passage from the 
Metaphysics of Morals hints at such a restriction in scope.  
But ethics, because of the latitude it allows in its imperfect duties, unavoidably leads 
to questions that call upon judgment to decide how a maxim is to be applied in 
particular cases, and indeed in such a way that judgment provides another (sub-
ordinate) maxim (and one can always ask for yet another principle for applying 
this maxim to cases that may arise). So ethics falls into a casuistry, which has no 
place in the doctrine of right. (MM 6:411; my emphasis) 
We need to carefully attend to the subject matter of this restriction, however. As 
Schüssler has argued (2012: 73-85), it is important to distinguish between casuistry in 
the narrow sense, which is a matter of identifying appropriate subordinate maxims to 
maxims of obligatory ends, and casuistical questions, which are exercises in casuistry 
only in the broad sense in which all forms of case-based reasoning in ethics and law 
are. In the above passage, Kant is speaking about casuistry in the narrow sense.62   
In order to understand this distinction, we need to take a little detour and revisit 
a topic touched on in sect. 3.1: the distinction between the ethical and the judicial 
domains, as reflected in Kant’s division of the Metaphysics of Morals into a Doctrine of 
Right and a Doctrine of Virtue.63 We were surprised to find that both duties of right 
and duties of virtue can demand that we bring about a certain state of affairs and that 
both can prohibit specific actions. This left us wondering why Kant maintained that 
prescribing ends was the distinguishing mark of duties of virtue and prohibiting ac-																																																								
61 This apparent tension has puzzled Kant’s commentators (e.g. James 1992: 70, Unna 2003: 455-8), 
but, as we will see below, there is a resolution.   
62 While I agree with this distinction, I do not agree with Schüssler’s claim that the latitude involved in  
identifying subordinate maxims means that it is not a matter of getting it right or wrong (2012: 72). As 
I argued in sect. 3.1 and fn. 53, the latitude of duties of virtue should be understood as a reflection of 
the way in which duties restrict one another.  
63 The following account is inspired by Kant’s remarks in MM 6:382-3. To simplify matters, I here 
ignore the distinction between ethical duties and duties of virtue. The former category is broader than 
the latter in that it includes the indirect duty to seek the incentives for the fulfilment of one’s duties of 
right in the moral law (MM 6:220, 383). I think that everything I say is compatible with this additional 
point, however.  
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tions the mark of duties of right. I think that we can make sense of this claim if we 
regard the distinction between the ethical and the judicial domain as a distinction 
between perspectives on moral life, broadly construed. When we look at moral life from 
the judicial perspective, we treat people’s ends as contingent and regard morality as 
limiting the means that they can take to advance their interests. This is the sense in 
which duties of right are concerned with actions only: they abstract from whether 
people’s ultimate ends are good or not. When we look at the same moral life from 
the ethical perspective, we think of morality as prescribing necessary ends (the end of 
perfecting ourselves and the end of promoting the happiness of others), to which we 
have to seek suitable means. This is the sense in which duties of virtue are concerned 
with ends only: they do not assess actions one by one, but consider them only as 
parts of a larger life plan. Some actions are such that they are blatantly incompatible 
with a good life plan, e.g. torture and murder, and perhaps extreme cases of denying 
assistance. The duties that tell us to abstain from these actions are on the “perfect” 
side of the spectrum. But for most actions there is room for doubt and disagreement 
about whether they can be part of a good life plan. It is not obvious, e.g., how to best 
go about helping people in need. The duties that regulate these kinds of actions are 
on the “imperfect” side of the spectrum. 
With this in mind, we can see why casuistry in the narrow sense is limited to im-
perfect ethical duties: it is only in the ethical domain that we “move down” from 
maxims of obligatory ends to subordinate maxims, and it is only in the case of imper-
fect duties that difficult questions “that call upon judgment” can arise. Casuistry in 
the broad sense, by contrast, matters in both spheres and for all kinds of duties, for 
we can always ask casuistical questions about whether a given concept, e.g. an action 
kind concept or a virtue concept, applies to a given case.64  
The second obstacle concerns the standpoint from which a claim to the effect 
that, “strictly speaking, this act is not a ϕ-ing” could be made. In her paper “Instituting 
																																																								
64 It is an interesting question why Kant does not raise casuistical questions in the Doctrine of Right. 
Of course, in practice, the task of answering such questions falls to judges. Perhaps discussing prece-
dents would have taken Kant too far afield. It is also worth noting that many of the questions of sub-
sumption that arise in the ethical sphere are casuistical questions in the narrow sense, i.e. questions of 
whether a given subordinate maxim specifies suitable means to the realization of some obligatory end. 
So, as one would expect, there is an overlap between casuistry in the narrow sense and casuistry in the 
broad sense. For a similar point, see O’Neill 2002: 332.  
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Principles”, Onora O’Neill insists that the appeal to the faculty of judgment65 is 
“wholly unhelpful in showing how the gap between principle and act is to be 
bridged” (2002: 332). In her view, the broadly Neo-Aristotelian accounts that focus 
on this faculty are accounts not of practical but of theoretical judgment, of a kind of 
judgment that is third-personal rather than first-personal, and that concerns a par-
ticular that is already present (e.g. a situation), not a particular that is to be produced 
(an act). The task of practical judgment with its world-to-mind direction of fit, she 
argues, is to “satisfy or contribute to satisfying a maxim [or principle of duty]” (2002: 
335), not to subsume given act tokens under such principles. This is why she would 
argue that we cannot defend Kant’s ethics against the Rigorism Objection by claiming 
that some of the act tokens that we tend to subsume under concepts of intrinsically 
impermissible action kinds do not actually fall under these concepts. She would say 
that, in the context of such a defence, it is irrelevant whether we speak loosely. What 
matters is, so to say, whether we “act loosely”, and the worry is that, once we shift to 
this wording, it is all the more obvious that we have fallen into casuistry in the pejo-
rative sense.66  
It seems to me that O’Neill is wrong when she suggests that the problems that 
we encounter in moral deliberation from the first-person standpoint are completely 
different from the ones we face when judging situations, characters or other people’s 
actions (2002: 81-2). The question of whether a certain principle of duty applies in a 
certain case or not arises from both standpoints, and in both cases there is a danger 
of answering it in a biased way.67 This means, on the one hand, that the Casuistical 
Questions Response should not be rejected out of hand: that the way we speak, both 
as ordinary people and as philosophers, is not irrelevant in the context of the present 
dialectic. But, on the other hand, it also means that we cannot simply claim that a real 
or imaginary act, such as the false statement that is at stake in the Murderer at the Door 
case, does or does not fall under a certain principle. Instead, we have to corroborate 																																																								
65 In Kant’s terminology, the faculty of judgment is the faculty of subsumption (CPR A132/B171). 
This is not to be confused with the activity of judging, which he attributes to the understanding.   
66 O’Neill raises similar concerns about Anscombe’s idea that maxims contain descriptions (O’Neill 
2004: 312-4). I discuss these concerns in ch. 4., sect. 3, where I expand on the response given here. 
67 One of the problems that O’Neill takes to be distinctive of practical judgment, for example, is that, 
in judging practically, we have to balance the demands of many different principles (2002: 85). But 
surely we can say the same of third-personal judgments about situations, characters and other people’s 
actions: that it is difficult to determine how to describe a case or person in morally appropriate terms 
and which principles to invoke in doing so.  
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such a claim in a way that dispels the worry that we are abusing casuistry. Let us see if 
this can be done.       
4.2 The Use and Abuse of Casuistry 
The pejorative notion of casuistry is a good starting point for our critical discussion.68 
It is generally difficult to shake off the impression that in casuistical arguments terms 
are being stretched and bent to people’s wills.69 The suspicion is well familiar. It is 
felt whenever people seeking to justify exceptions start quibbling over language, and, 
on reflection, there is no reason why it should not extend to moral philosophers – 
especially those who are anxious to reject a rigorism charge that critics have brought 
against their favourite thinker. This, then, is the objection we need to consider: that 
the Casuistical Questions Response is an abuse of casuistry. To clarify: the objection 
here is not to the claim that, in day-to-day conversation, we tend to use our terms 
loosely. That claim is not likely to cause much controversy. What is problematic is the 
use of this claim in attempts to justify exceptions, given the obvious temptation of 
abuse. Before we can assess the reasoning that leads the proponents of the present 
response to the conclusion that, strictly speaking, this or that act is not a ϕ-ing, we 
need criteria. How does one fend off the charge of abuse? How does one back up 
the claim that, strictly speaking, a given act is not a lie without begging the question? 
Let us begin from the standpoint of an ordinary agent, rather than the standpoint of 
a moral philosopher, and consider two strategies that are most certainly unsuccessful.   
First, one cannot simply shrug one’s shoulders. This might seem obvious, but it 
is not, for one might think that this is exactly what the term “judgment call” conveys: 
that there is nothing more to say, nothing to convince an interlocutor who just does 
not “see it”. Think of disagreements about the applicability of colour concepts and 
the utter pointlessness of pushing someone to back up their claim that the sweater is 
blue, not green. This is not how it is with moral disagreements, however.70 Here we 																																																								
68 Merriam Webster defines casuistry, among other things, as a “specious argument” or “rationalization”, 
and one of the definitions given by the Oxford Dictionaries is “the use of clever but unsound reasoning, 
especially in relation to moral questions; sophistry”.  
69 This is an objection that both early modern thinkers and conservative catholic theologians mounted 
against the casuistical practice of Jesuits, when casuistry fell into general disrepute in the 17th century. 
For a discussion of how this debate influenced Kant, see Schüssler 2012: 90-4. 
70 It seems to me that this difference is not always sufficiently appreciated. In a much-discussed paper, 
entitled “Values and Secondary Qualities”, John McDowell draws an analogy between values and 
colours (1998: 131-50). The point of his analogy is to argue for a no-priority view: for the view that 
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do expect people to say more. Of course, it is possible that the subsumption of acts 
under principles of duty is a judgment call in a broader sense: in the sense that it is 
impossible to specify a second-order rule for how to go about the task of subsuming 
cases under a given first-order rule. This seems very plausible.71 The truth, I think, 
must lie somewhere in between the two extremes. If you were challenged to back up 
your claim that your telling the murderer a falsehood was, strictly speaking, not a lie, 
you would have to be able to say something to corroborate this assertion, but you 
would not be required to give a foolproof algorithm or full list of necessary and suf-
ficient conditions, which would settle the question beyond doubt. 
Second, one cannot fend off the charge of abuse by pointing to the deontic sta-
tus of the act in question. In the Murderer at the Door case, for instance, you cannot 
substantiate your claim that your statement was not a lie by saying that making it was 
permissible or obligatory. This would be question-begging, given your opponent’s 
suspicion that you are quibbling over terms precisely because you are biased and thus 
inclined to treat the act in question as permissible or obligatory.72 The considerations 
that you cite must provide independent support for the intended conclusion.73  																																																																																																																																																							
values and colours are both essentially related to human sensibilities and objective, and that neither of 
these characteristics is to be given explanatory priority over the other. However, when particularists 
draw on his views and arguments as a source of support for theirs, they sometimes seem to take the 
analogy further, assuming that evaluative concepts share a further characteristic of colour concepts, 
which McDowell highlights elsewhere. In Mind and World, McDowell says that colour concepts are 
only “minimally integrated into possible views of the world” (1994: 30). Part of what he means by this, 
I think, is that the possession of a colour concept is a conceptual capacity with relatively little content, 
that, when we apply the concept “red”, for example, there is not much we can say in support of this 
application. It seems to me that something like this must be presupposed in Dancy’s claim that “there 
is nothing that one brings to the new [moral] situation other than a contentless ability to discern what 
matters where it matters” (Dancy 1993: 50). I doubt that McDowell would agree with this extension 
of his analogy, and I think that, on reflection, it is not very convincing. I would argue that our evalua-
tive concepts are unlike colour concepts in that they are deeply integrated into our views of the world, 
and that we do expect each other to give reasons when such concepts are applied.   
71 Indeed, according to Kant, we have to assume that this is impossible and unnecessary if we are to 
steer clear of an infinite regress. He says: “The power of judgment is the faculty of subsuming under 
rules, i.e. of determining whether something stands under a given rule ... or not ... Now if we wanted 
to show generally how one ought to subsume under these rules, i.e., distinguish whether something 
stands under them or not, this could not happen except once again through a rule. But just because 
this is a rule, it would demand another instruction for the power of judgment, and so it becomes clear 
that ... the power of judgment is a special talent that cannot be taught but only practiced ... in the 
absence of [this] natural gift no rule that one might prescribe to him [to a student] for this aim is safe 
from misuse” (CPR B 171-3). Of course, this is nothing but a gesture at a topic that would have to be 
discussed in much more detail.  
72 The worry is, in other words, that one is trying to make an exception for oneself. I will say more about 
the distinction between exceptions for oneself and exceptions that are called for by the circumstances 
in ch. 3, sect. 2.5.  
73 This is what Schüssler has in mind when he cautions against an inference that some Kantian have 
been tempted by, namely the move from the claim that questions of subsumption are often open and 
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Having said what fending off the charge of abuse cannot look like, we have come 
closer to understanding what it must look like. To fend off such a charge, we have to 
cite features of the act other than its deontic status that warrant its exclusion from 
the sphere of the relevant action kind concept. What is interesting is that this kind of 
justification is strikingly similar to the kind of justification we would expect from 
someone trying to back up their claim that a given lie is permissible or obligatory, 
except that the latter justification would not take the detour via the question of sub-
sumption. Let us consider an example.  
Lie to a Friend: I overheard how you lied to a common friend and now I am scolding 
you. One way of justifying what you did would be to say that it was not strictly 
speaking a lie. If I responded with a rebuking look, you might try to allay my 
suspicion by saying that you had no intention to deceive. But note that there is 
another, more direct route that you could take: you could accept my claim that it 
was a lie and appeal to the very same consideration, that is, to the fact that you 
had no intention to deceive, to show that it was a permissible lie.74  
There is no doubt that real life disputes about alleged exceptions to perfect duties 
come in both these forms. Yet, according to proponents of the Casuistical Questions 
Response, justifications that proceed via the latter, more direct route are at best loose 
talk, and at worst misguided. If you and I agree that lying is impermissible, then, in 
their view, the real point of contention between us must be whether your act was a 
lie, no matter which direction our conversation takes on the surface level. (After all, 
if lying is indeed impermissible, then, following the Deontological Thesis, it must have 
that status across the board.) But why should we accept that, at a deeper level, all 
disputes about alleged exceptions to perfect duties are disputes over semantics?75 
Why should we accept that, once it is settled that the action falls under the concept 
of a lie or a theft or a promise-breaking, it is also settled what its deontic status is? 
																																																																																																																																																							
intricate to the claim that settling such questions is a matter of focusing directly on the deontic status of 
the relevant acts (2012: 94-5). Schüssler is right to note that this conclusion leaves us wondering how 
it is possible to have intersubjective insight into or share judgments about whether a particular case 
falls under a principle of duty or not. After all, if I think that some act is a lie and you think that it is 
not, then my pointing out that it is impermissible won’t help us to make any progress.  
74 This example is interesting precisely because an intention to deceive is sometimes thought to be a 
necessary condition for lying. I will come back to this below, both in the main text and in fn. 77. 
75 In fact, in ch. 3, I will argue that in a sense they are, but by that I won’t mean that they are all disputes 
about the applicability of an action kind concept.  
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It seems that we have run into a difficulty. On the one hand, we have managed 
to get an idea of what a successful attempt to substantiate claims of the form “Strictly 
speaking, this is not a ϕ-ing” might look like. But, on the other hand, we have realized 
that this is not necessarily how such substantiations would be presented. So now that 
we know what a good substantiation might look like, we no longer know how to tell 
whether we have found one. The following thought might help to get us out of this 
conundrum: if the difference between the two justificatory strategies open to you in 
the Lie to a Friend case was indeed merely a difference between strict and loose uses of 
language, as proponents of the Casuistical Questions Response maintain, then they 
should sound equally intuitive. And, arguably, in this case, they do. Given that you 
intend to justify yourself by appeal to the fact that you had no intention to deceive, it 
makes at least as much sense for you to reject my characterization of your act as a lie 
as to proceed on the assumption that it was one. But what about our target cases? 
What about the Murderer at the Door case, for example? Presumably, here, you would 
justify your making a false statement by appeal to the fact that the addressee of your 
statement was planning to use the information provided to murder someone. Now, 
in this case, it would seem much more appropriate to accept your opponent’s claim 
that you lied and argue that, in this situation, lying was permissible. For why would 
the fact that someone’s life is in danger bear on whether your statement is a lie? 
Let us take a step back and reflect on what we have said. What the comparison 
between these two cases reveals, I believe, is that our intuitions about the felicity of 
justifying oneself directly or indirectly, via a refusal to subsume, turns on the extent 
to which the consideration appealed to is part of what we regard as the semantic core 
of the relevant term.76 In this respect, the Lie to a Friend case is a bit of a special case: 
the reason why, in this case, the two justificatory routes seem equally intuitive is that 
it is genuinely controversial whether an intention to deceive is necessary for lying or 
not.77 But many of our target cases, including the Murderer at the Door case, fall clearly 
on the direct-route side of the spectrum. These cases differ from the cases presented 																																																								
76 It could be argued that I am using a bad criterion because our felicity intuitions might be influenced 
by pragmatic considerations. Perhaps it is for merely pragmatic reasons that the shorter route sounds 
more intuitive. I think a comparative analysis would show that this is not what is going on. The more 
important point, in any case, is the idea of a semantic core and the question why the fact that a life is 
in danger would bear on whether your statement is a lie. The appeal to justificatory routes and felicity 
intuitions is meant to serve as an illustration, not as an argument that stands on its own.    
77 Deceptionists argue that an intention to deceive is necessary for lying (e.g. Mahon 2008b, Lackey 
2013); non-deceptionists argue that it is not (e.g. Saul 2012). 
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in Kant’s casuistical questions in that the considerations appealed to are clearly not 
part of the semantic core of the relevant action kind concepts. Thus, in these cases, 
claims to the effect that a given act is, strictly speaking, not a lie, or a promise-breaking, 
or what have you, would be unfounded: not proper uses but abuses of casuistry.  
With this in mind, let us return to the standpoint of the orthodox Kantian moral 
philosopher. He or she wants to defend Kant’s ethics by arguing that any apparent 
exception to principles of perfect duty, e.g. the principle that lying is impermissible, 
isn’t actually an exception because the act in question isn’t actually of the relevant kind, 
e.g. not a lie, despite the fact that, speaking loosely, we might call it that. The above 
argument has shown that that might work in some cases, but certainly not in all, and, 
crucially, not in the cases that Kantians and their critics tend to argue about. So even 
though there is a gap between principles or concepts, on the one hand, and particular 
cases, on the other, and even though Kant shows awareness of this gap, none of this 
helps to reconcile the idea that there are exceptions with the Deontological Thesis. The 
Casuistical Questions Response is ultimately a second-order abuse of casuistry.78 But 
when we say this, it is important to keep in mind that our objection to this abuse of 
casuistry is not the objection of 17th century catholic theologians who were anxious to 
restore the strictness of divine commands. Most of us share the intuition that cases 
such as the Murderer at the Door case call for exceptions, that lying to the murderer can 
be justified, although only via the direct route: by arguing that it is a permissible lie 
because an innocent victim needed protection. So, from our point of view, the above 
discussion suggests that we need to reject the Deontological Thesis and to admit that it is 
part of our understanding of the duty not to lie that, in certain circumstances, it has 
to give way to the duty to protect. 
5.  Taking Stock: No Ideal World Without Exceptions 
In this chapter, we looked at three orthodox responses to the Rigorism Objection: three 
attempts to show that a commitment to the Deontological Thesis would not preclude 
Kant from acknowledging exceptions. In each case, the general strategy was to argue 																																																								
78 This point is very similar to the point that I made when criticizing Schapiro’s response in sect. 2.2. 
There I said that, in order to claim that the murderer’s evil plan makes being honest with him impos-
sible, Schapiro has to expand our ordinary understanding of honesty to the point where it includes all 
moral matters. Now my point is that, to deny that the lie to the murderer is a genuine lie, proponents 
of the Casuistical Questions Response must expand what we would usually see as the semantic core of 
the term “lie” or “lying” to the point where one of the necessary conditions of applying this term is 
that the interlocutor isn’t planning to murder anyone.  
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that, whenever we think that we have found an exception to a principle of duty, what 
we have actually found is an instance of the principle that is in some way corrupted: a 
constitutively deficient case or a case where the principle cannot be followed because 
the means are unavailable or a case that common parlance usually misclassifies. The 
hope was that putting the blame on these non-ideal conditions would allow Kantians 
to leave the principles themselves untainted. Unfortunately, our discussion has brought 
out that this hope is vain: that the cases in question are not actually corrupted, and 
hence that even in an ideal world there would still be exceptions.   
We arrived at this conclusion by showing that, in each case, in order to secure 
the claim that the relevant cases (such as the Murderer at the Door case) are corrupted, 
it was necessary to either stick to a very abstract understanding of the duties at issue 
and avoid specifying their content (sect. 3), or to expand our ordinary understanding 
of the relevant action kinds to the point of unrecognizability (sect. 2 and 4). These 
are actually but two sides of the same problem: once we specify what the relevant 
principles of duty demand in concreto, and do so without blurring the lines between 
different kinds of actions, we realize that these principles are internally intertwined. 
Grasping such a principle involves understanding in which situations it is valid, and 
when it has to give way to another principle and the moral concern that animates it. 
It is part of our understanding of the duty not to deceive, for example, that, in a case 
like the Murderer at the Door, this duty has to give way to the duty to protect people 
from violent aggressors.   
Of course, if we accept this point, we thereby abandon the Deontological Thesis. 
According to Schapiro, this is problematic because, in allowing that circumstances 
can make a difference, we go against a fundamental Kantian doctrine: the idea that 
morally worthy conduct is a matter of principles, not consequences. In sect. 1, we men-
tioned why she has this concern: in her view, circumstances “can only affect us by 
altering the causal nexus within which we act” (Schapiro 2003: 330). But why should 
we accept this assumption? Why should we rule out the possibility that circumstances 
might affect us by making a difference to how we conceive our actions? Why should 
we deny that they can figure in our principles, that they can matter in the space of rea-
sons and not just in the space of causes? This is the possibility to which we shall turn 
in the next chapter.  
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In acknowledging this possibility, we move beyond orthodox readings of Kant’s 
ethics towards more unorthodox readings that treat the Rigorism Objection as a concern 
about Kant’s principles of duty themselves – about their structure and content, rather 
than just their application to a world of contingencies. As such, the concern becomes 
an essentially particularist concern. It becomes a concern about how we can and why 
we should uphold the idea that principles play a fundamental role in moral thinking, 
given the complexities of the moral domain. As we will see, this concern comes with 
its own challenges, challenges that unorthodox Kantians have to rise to if they want 
to say that features such as being a lie or a promise-breaking have their deontic im-
port only by default79 and not across the board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
79 In the introduction I used the less technical term “usually”. In what follows I will use the term “by 
default”. The idea that some features might have a certain moral status by default (e.g. be a reason by 
default, be wrong by default etc.) has been adduced to defend moral particularism against the charge 
that it “flattens the moral landscape” because it draws no distinction at all between the moral import 
of features such as killing and lying and the moral import of shoelace colour. In this context, default 
statuses have been introduced as a solution. For more detailed discussions of default reasons see e.g. 
Lance and Little 2006, Dancy 2004: 69, 111-7, Väyrynen 2004, McKeever and Ridge 2006: 46-75. 
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Chapter 2 
Universal and Nonetheless Defeasible?  
Two Responses to the Particularist Challenge 
1.  The Particularist Challenge: A Trilemma 
Our discussion in the previous chapter has brought to light that the Rigorism Objection 
calls for radical measures: that, if Kantians want to provide an adequate response, 
they have to abandon the orthodox assumption that there is only a small number of 
features that can make a difference to the deontic status of actions (namely those that 
make them count as instances of action kinds that are by default obligatory or im-
permissible, e.g. as lies), and that these are the only features that figure in Kant’s 
principles of duty. As a result, Kantians are under pressure to deviate from the letter 
of Kant’s texts and to admit that the content and internal structure of such principles 
is, in fact, more complex. However, in going down this route, they get caught up in 
disputes that are in some ways very similar to those that exercise contemporary gen-
eralists in their attempt to face up to their particularist opponents. My hypothesis in 
this chapter is that we can understand why unorthodox Kantians deal with rigorism 
concerns the way they do and, more importantly, why they fail, if we appreciate that 
the various demands that are being negotiated in the generalism-particularism debate 
leave them stuck in a trilemma. Let us first recall what these demands are. 
In the introduction, we defined particularism in the following way.  
Moral Particularism: Even if there are some true moral principles, nothing in moral 
theory or moral practice hinges on them – we can explain the obtaining of moral 
statuses and act well without them. 
As we noted, the main argument cited in support of this view is the argument from 
holism (see Dancy 1993: 60-2, 2004: 7, 78-85). Holism, recall, is a view about how 
certain things (in our case, actions) come to have certain moral statuses or properties 
(in our case, overall deontic statuses). More specifically, it is the view that, strictly 
speaking, anything can make a difference to the obtaining of a given moral status, and 
that this is why our explanations (in our case, of why a certain action is permissible, 
impermissible or obligatory) vary so much from case to case. The version of this 
view that, we said, matters for our purposes is Holism about Deontic Statuses. 
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Holism about Deontic Statuses: A feature or set of features which make it the case that 
an action has a certain (overall) deontic status in one situation may not play the 
same role in other situations.80  
Particularists maintain that holism substantiates their misgivings about principles, if 
not directly, then at least indirectly, because, in their view, it is difficult to see how 
the variability with circumstances that it posits could be captured in moral principles 
that are not entirely useless (Väyrynen 2011: 255). We will return to the specifics of 
this worry below. For now, we must register how this argument sets up the dialectic 
between generalists and particularists: if generalists accept that holism is true, they are 
faced with the task of accommodating the variability with circumstances that holists 
insist on.81 Taking our clue from the foregoing discussion, we can frame this as lead-
ing to two challenges. First, to account for the complexity of the moral domain, that is, 
for the fact that even features with a default import (e.g. being a lie) do not have this 
import invariably (i.e., that their import can be defeated). And, second, to resist the 
temptation to say that the defeaters were part of the explanation all along and hence 
to deny that the explanation actually varies, i.e. that there is any asymmetry in explana-
tory burden between standard and exceptional cases (sect. 2.3.2, 3.3.2). The chal-
lenge, in short, is to accommodate the following two desiderata. 
Asymmetry: In standard circumstances, an action of a by default impermissible kind is 
impermissible solely in virtue of the features that make it count as an action of 
that kind (i.e. not in virtue of the fact that defeaters are absent). 
Complexity: In exceptional circumstances, an action of a by default impermissible kind 
can be obligatory or permissible, and when it is, this is partly in virtue of features 
other than the ones that make it count as an action of that kind (i.e. in virtue of 
the fact that defeaters are present).  
For Kantians, this is a challenge indeed, not least because they tend to defend a 
radical form of generalism: 
																																																								
80 As before, “deontic status” means “overall deontic status”, unless otherwise indicated. I will omit 
the “overall” in what follows.  
81 Of course, generalists are also free to reject holism. Some have argued, for example, that holists rely 
on misleading examples because the reasons in these examples aren’t fully specified. See e.g. Stratton-
Lake 2000, Raz 2006, and Hooker 2008. 
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Universality: The features in virtue of which actions have their deontic statuses can be 
captured in universally valid principles of duty. 
The commitment to the third desideratum, the Universality desideratum, is thought to 
follow from a centrepiece of Kant’s ethics: the universal law formulation of the Cat-
egorical Imperative (G 4:421). If it does, then it is surely a commitment that even the 
most unorthodox Kantians should be unwilling to flout – and that it does follow is by 
and large beyond dispute.82 However, how it follows is something that is rarely made 
explicit. Crudely speaking, the idea seems to be this: if the “universalisability test” has 
shown that an action with a certain set of features (the ones that the maxim specifies) 
cannot be willed or even thought to be performed across the board, then it follows 
that any action with the same features is equally problematic. In ch. 3, we will see that 
this line of reasoning is flawed, but for now its merits and demerits are beside the 
point. In this chapter, all that matters is the opinion of those whose views we are 
trying to make sense of: that these thinkers aim to accommodate Universality, and that 
they aim to do so for the reasons just cited, is enough.  
Taken together, these three prima facie incompatible desiderata give rise to a tri-
lemma. Let us begin with an overview, followed by an illustration. 
The Trilemma 
First Horn  Universality and Complexity rule out Asymmetry  (Fine Print Reading) 
Second Horn  Universality and Asymmetry rule out Complexity  (Rigorism) 
Third Horn Complexity and Asymmetry rule out Universality  (Particularism,  
Pro Tanto Duties) 
Recall the Breaking a Promise to Help case. If Kantians want to combine the view that 
breaking a promise in this exceptional case is permissible in virtue of the fact that the 
action is not only a promise-breaking but also a helping (Complexity) with the view 
that the deontic import of promise-breaking can be captured in a universal principle 
of duty covering all cases (Universality), then they must say that, in standard cases, 
where breaking a promise is impermissible, this is partly because there is no child 																																																								
82 Sometimes Kantians seem to be disputing it, but in many cases their attempts to reinterpret Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative in a way that involves no commitment to Universality don’t go very deep. As we 
will see below, this is true of Herman, who distances herself from the derivation-of-duties model of 
the role of the Categorical Imperative, but actually does not give up on Universality completely (see 
sect. 3 below).  
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that needs help (vs. Asymmetry). On this view, the principle of duty that captures the 
deontic import of promise-breaking has a fine print: breaking promises is impermis-
sible unless there is a child that needs help. Of course, the list of defeaters is bound to 
be much longer, and so is the list of corresponding unless-clauses. Some Kantians 
bite the bullet and endorse this so-called Fine Print Reading (see e.g. Wood 2008: 68, 
Cholbi 2013: 447). But this sort of view has its problems.83 According to Jonathan 
Dancy, there is no reason to think that such fully expanded principles will contain 
anything less than a description of the exact state of the world in which the case to 
be accounted for is embedded (a “supervenience base”). This, he thinks, is a reductio. 
First, these principles specify complexes of such a size and in such detail that 
there is ... no chance that they should be capable of recurring. A principle that 
has only one instance is worse than useless, for no such principle could ever be a 
guide for judgement. Second, these things do not really have the form of a prin-
ciple ... For they contain all sorts of irrelevancies. Principles are in the business of 
telling us which actions are wrong and why they are wrong. But the vast proposi-
tions generated by supervenience fail utterly to do this ... They do no doubt con-
tain the relevant information, but they do not reveal it. (Dancy 2004: 87) 
However, despite these issues, the second horn of the trilemma is often seen as 
worse. For if Kantians want to combine the view that breaking a promise in a stand-
ard case is impermissible solely in virtue of the fact that it is a promise-breaking 
(Asymmetry) with the view that the deontic import of promise-breaking can be cap-
tured in a principle of duty covering all cases (Universality), then they have to belie our 
moral intuitions and claim that in the allegedly exceptional Breaking a Promise to Help 
case it is in fact impermissible to break the promise after all (vs. Complexity). This, of 
course, is the rigorist position that we were hoping to get away from. Since we have 
shown that orthodox Kantians cannot account for exceptions without touching the 
content and structure of Kant’s principles of duty, the only choice they have left is to 
stick to their guns (Timmermann 2001: 65-7, Schüssler 2012: 3).  
Finally, there is a third option. If Kantians want to combine the view that break-
ing a promise in the Breaking a Promise to Help case is permissible in virtue of the fact 
that the action is not only a promise-breaking but also a helping (Complexity) with the 																																																								
83 The disadvantages of expanding Kant’s principles of duty in this manner will be addressed in sect. 
2.3.2 and 3.3.2 below. In ch. 4, we will discuss a related issue, namely the question of how much detail 
a principle of action (or maxim) should contain.  
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view that breaking a promise in a standard case is impermissible solely in virtue of 
the fact that it is a promise-breaking (Asymmetry), then they would have to admit that 
there is, in fact, no universal principle of duty that captures the deontic import of 
promise-breaking in all situations (vs. Universality). Instead, the import of promise-
breaking would have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, as particularists insist it 
must. However, as we shall see in sect. 3.3.1, particularism is not the only view that 
the combination of Complexity and Asymmetry leaves open – an account of pro tanto 
duties would be a further option. That these two views are grouped together follows 
from how we set things up: from the very beginning we assumed that, for Kant and 
Kantians, there is only one level, the overall, and that the phenomena for which con-
temporary metaethicists introduce a further level, namely the contributory, are “ab-
sorbed” in and handled via the overall. This assumption is reflected in the three de-
siderata listed above. Thus, if Kantians were to argue (as Herman seems to do at 
times, see sect. 3.3.1 below) that the contributory import of promise-breaking is stable, 
so that it could be codified in universal principles of pro tanto duty, and that the ex-
planatory asymmetry is due to the fact that, in the exceptional case, its import is out-
weighed by the import of the child’s needs, then, in our taxonomy, these Kantians 
would still end up on the third horn. This is because they would still deny that there 
are principles of overall duty that cover all cases, which is one of the claims that we 
are trying to accommodate.  
This, then, is what I meant when I said that Kantians encounter the particularist 
challenge in the form of a trilemma. We can summarize their specific challenge as 
follows: 
Particularist Challenge: Kantians have to explain how it is that our explanations of ex-
ceptional cases make reference to defeaters (Complexity) while our explanations 
of standard cases don’t (Asymmetry), even though both explanations are meant to 
appeal to one and the same explanatory principle, that is, to the same principle 
of duty (Universality).   
In the previous chapter we discussed the responses of Kantians who are impaled 
on the second horn, and we will come back to those impaled on the first (see sect. 
2.3.2 and 3.3.2) and the third (see sect. 3.3.1). For the most part, however, this chap-
ter will look at two Kantian views that, I think, are best understood as attempts to 
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satisfy all three desiderata at once and to escape the trilemma altogether: Korsgaard’s 
and Herman’s views. Both appeal to a version of the idea that principles of duty can 
be both universal and defeasible. In relating their views to the trilemma, I do not 
mean to suggest that they actually intend to escape this trilemma; all I want to say is 
that, given their commitments, the trilemma is a device that can help us to shed light 
on the structure of these two views and their flaws. In each case, I will outline the 
view (sect. 2.1, 3.1), highlight the aspects that indicate a commitment to our desidera-
ta, and then show that there is a tension between two elements of the view (sect. 2.2, 
3.2). These tensions, I will conjecture, reflect the struggle to satisfy all three desidera-
ta at once and the pressure to then introduce a “division of labour”. Subsequently, I 
will consider whether either of the two views could be saved by giving up one of the 
two irreconcilable elements and conclude that they cannot (sect. 2.3, 3.3). I will finish 
off with a brief discussion of the conceptions of defeasibility that they appeal to and 
the reasons why these are inadequate (sect. 4). 
2.  Korsgaard on Provisional Universality 
In a footnote in ch. 1, sect. 2, we briefly mentioned Korsgaard’s early response to the 
Rigorism Objection: her claim that, in circumstances of evil, we may have to deviate 
from the demand expressed by Kant’s Formula of Humanity, that we may have to lie 
and deceive, for instance, because, in such circumstances, living up to the ideal can 
mean becoming a tool of evil. Her more recent take on the problem of rigorism in 
Kantian ethics, as outlined in the fourth chapter of Self-Constitution, differs from her 
take in the early essay in that it is, quite explicitly, an attempt to meet the Particularist 
Challenge: an attempt to show that we must appeal to universal principles if we are to 
will at all, but also that we can appeal to such principles without being rigoristic be-
cause provisionally universal principles are enough. 
2.1 Against Particularistic Willing: An Argument with Two Concessions 
Korsgaard’s response to the Particularist Challenge consists of two parts, namely of a 
direct attack on particularism and of two concessions, which are supposed to indicate 
how her Kantian brand of generalism can accommodate the particularist’s concerns. 
Her project in the relevant chapter is to rule out competing accounts of the role and 
normativity of principles of practical reason on the basis that they cannot make any 
	 53 
sense of the unity of the will. One of the accounts rejected along the way is particu-
larism, defined as the view that it is “possible to have a reason that applies only to 
the case before you, and has no implications for any other case” (Korsgaard 2009: 
72-3). Korsgaard’s concern at this point is with acting for reasons or from principles 
of action in general, but we can relate her claims to the subject matter of our investi-
gation if we bear in mind that acting from moral reasons or principles of duty is but 
one specific instance of the broader kind that she is interested in.  
Korsgaard’s argument against particularism is the following (2009: 75-6).84 
1. Willing means determining yourself to be a cause, not being moved by the causal 
operations of incentives within you.  
2. Determining yourself to be a cause means following an incentive on the condi-
tion that doing so is representative of your practical identity.  
3. Willing particularistically, if possible, would mean following an incentive in its 
full particularity, i.e. 
a. as not “representative of any sort of type” of policy or standing commitment,   
b. or as “in no way […] further describable” (2009: 76). 
4. Following an incentive in its full particularity means not making your following it 
conditional on whether doing so is representative of your practical identity.   
5. Thus, it is impossible to will particularistically.  
An example might help to illustrate the key transitions.  
White Lie: A thin-skinned friend asks you for your opinion on a sensitive topic. You 
know that the truth will hurt their feelings unnecessarily and the very thought of 
it makes you cringe. After some toing and froing, you decide to tell a white lie.  
Since, in doing so, you exercise your will, your recoiling impulse does not simply 
make you spit out a lie (premise 1). If you do tell the lie, then this is because, having 
stepped back from the impulse and considered it in light of your practical identity, 																																																								
84 For now, I will use Korsgaard’s terminology, which reflects both her constitutivist reading of Kant’s 
ethics (her view that action is self-constitution through the reflective endorsement of incentives), and 
the specific aim that she pursues in the relevant chapter (demonstrating the importance of principles 
for securing the unity of the will). Later, when I articulate my criticism, I will rephrase some of her 
ideas in my own terms. 
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you have chosen to treat the prospect of hurting your friend, which made you recoil, 
as a defeater of the default deontic import of lying  (premise 2). Of course, particu-
larists do not want to say that your recoiling impulse simply makes you spit out a lie, 
and they might even agree that, in a sense, willing to lie or lying for a reason differs 
from compulsive lying in that it is conditional on your regarding the lie as representa-
tive of your practical identity (Dancy 1993: 55-6). However, according to Korsgaard, 
they cannot make good on this claim, because, in denying that a certain feature’s 
(your friend’s feelings) being a defeater here and now has any implications for how 
things stand in other cases (with further defeaters, contributory reasons, etc. present), 
they also deny that, in treating it as such, you have to appeal to any principle or poli-
cy or standing commitment to treat a certain feature as making a certain difference 
across the board (premise 3a).85 As a result, particularists rob themselves of the re-
sources needed to make sense of the very idea that your white lie represents your 
practical identity (premise 4). For what could such a practical identity possibly consist 
in, if not principles or policies or standing commitments that are robust across vary-
ing circumstances, and that make you the kind of person you are, e.g. someone who 
generally pays her debts, and keeps her promises, and lies to spare her friends’ feel-
ings? This is why, according to Korsgaard, if you did not “will[ ] [your maxim] as a 
universal law” (2009: 73), the distinction between you and the contingent play of 
incentives within you would collapse, leaving a “mere heap of unrelated impulses” 
(2009: 76).  
In arguing against the possibility of particularistic willing, Korsgaard aims to de-
fend Kant’s Formula of Universal Law and the idea that the principles on which we 
act, including principles of duty, must be universally valid. So part of her aim at this 
stage is to accommodate Universality. 
Of course, as it stands, this argument does nothing to address the problematic 
implications of Kantian ethics that particularists find fault with, and even though 
addressing these does not advance the dialectic of Korsgaard’s fourth chapter, she 
seems to think that they are sufficiently pressing to justify a diversion. As I noted at 
the outset, the diversion comes in the form of two concessions. Korsgaard notes 																																																								
85 As the above overview indicates, Korsgaard offers two versions of premise 3. In ch. 3, sect. 1, I will 
argue that there is an important difference between them, which escapes Korsgaard’s attention. But, 
for now, I shall focus on 3a, which suggests a reading of the overall argument that is quite common. 
See e.g. Stern 2015: 58. 
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that, in arguing against particularism, she is neither arguing that we cannot “will a 
new maxim for each new occasion”, nor that we cannot “will[ ] a maxim that [we] 
might have to change on another occasion” (2009: 75). These two points are con-
nected. The first one concerns the circumstance-sensitivity of our principles of ac-
tion.86 It is an acknowledgment that our principles have to be sensitive to the specific 
details of situations, including those that are not taken to have a deontic import by 
default. The second concerns the universality of our principles. Although the above 
argument shows that our principles of duty cannot be particular, Korsgaard allows 
that their universality might be merely provisional or, in other words, that they might 
be defeasible.87 The second concession is related to the first, for if it turned out that a 
given principle was not absolutely universal after all, then this would be because it 
was not fully sensitive to all the features whose presence would make a difference to 
what we ought to do.  
Let me illustrate the distinction between provisional and absolute universality by 
revisiting the White Lie case. Imagine that until today you held a strict principle of 
truthfulness, but now, faced with the prospect of unnecessarily hurting your friend’s 
feelings, you decide that the case at hand is an exception. It is an exception in the 
sense that it reveals that your principle of truthfulness, insensitive as it is to a morally 
relevant feature of the situation, is not absolutely universal. Does this mean that until 
today your willing was particularistic or that your principle was a mere rule of thumb? 
Korsgaard insists that is does not, because whenever we “encounter an exceptional 
case, we ... go back and revise [our principle], bringing it a little closer to the absolute 
universality to which provisional universality essentially aspires” (Korsgaard 2009: 
74). Since she assumes that we treat exceptions as signs that our principles stand in 																																																								
86 Korsgaard speaks of “generality” and “specificity”, saying that our principles might have to be quite 
specific. This is somewhat misleading, however. The specific principles she has in mind are principles 
with a range of unless-clauses. Such principles are indeed more specific than their counterparts with-
out unless-clauses in the sense that they cover a smaller number of cases. However, in addition to the 
number of cases covered, she seems to think of the difference between relatively specific and relative-
ly general principles in terms of being more or less tailored to a given situation, and that is misleading. 
Because, if circumstance-sensitivity is secured by adding a long list of all possible defeaters, then the 
resulting principle will be anything but tailored to a particular situation. This is an issue to which we will 
return in sect. 2.3.2. (She also uses “general” in the Kantian sense of “mere generality”, meaning non-
strict, empirical universality, but this need not concern us any further).   
87 When we say that a principle is defeasible, there are two things that we could have in mind. First, we 
could be saying that our credence in it is not absolute. This is something that a proponent of the re-
flective equilibrium method would say about any principle (Rawls 1999: 42-5). Second, we could be 
saying that there are, in fact, defeaters. In sect. 2.2, 2.3, and 4, we will see that Korsgaard’s argument 
runs into problems precisely because these two notions aren’t clearly distinguished.  
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need of revision, that they need to be supplemented with unless-clauses that render 
them more sensitive to the morally significant differences between situations, she can 
insist that we do not treat exceptional cases as if they had no implications for other 
cases.88 And this, she believes, shows that provisional universality is different in kind 
from particularity. 
Together these two concessions hold out the prospect of accomplishing the 
twofold task that generalists inherit from their particularist opponents. The first con-
cession can be read as an attempt to satisfy Complexity. In admitting that “every occa-
sion may be different in relevant ways from the ones we have previously encoun-
tered” (2009: 73), and that, therefore, our principles of duty have to be sensitive to 
the specifics of different situations, Korsgaard acknowledges that situational factors 
can affect whether a certain kind of action is permissible or impermissible or obliga-
tory in a given case. The second concession, in turn, can be construed as an attempt 
to satisfy Asymmetry. For the most plausible explanation of why Korsgaard says that 
provisional universality is enough, I think, is that she is trying to block a conclusion 
that her reader would otherwise feel entitled to draw from her first concession. This 
is the conclusion that our principles of duty, being circumstance-sensitive, come with 
a host of unless-clauses (with a fine print), which clutter our deliberation about and 
explanations of standard cases with a lot of unnecessary detail. The second conces-
sion goes some way towards blocking this conclusion because, if we incorporate de-
featers as we go along, then the content of our principles is at least to some extent 
controlled by the specifics of the exceptional situations that we actually encounter.89  
These two concessions provide a clue to Korsgaard’s brand of Kantian general-
ism. It is an account of principled agency that trades on the contrast between two 
standpoints: the standpoint of finite agents “on their way” who, over the course of 
their lives, learn more and more about how they ought to conduct themselves in 
different sorts of circumstances, and the standpoint of an omniscient agent, who has 
arrived at the ideal endpoint of this epistemic journey.90 Even at the end of our lives 																																																								
88 For a discussion of the common saying “The exception proves the rule” see Holton 2010. 
89 It does not go all the way because, on this account, our principles grow more and more complex 
over time. So when we return to standard cases after having experienced exceptional cases, the defeat-
ers built in on these occasions will show up, although there is no need to rule them out here and now.  
90 Note that this is not Kant’s notion of moral progress. For Kant, moral progress consists in progres-
sively aligning our willing with the demands of the Categorical Imperative, not gaining a more exten-
sive understanding of what the Categorical Imperative demands. In fact, one may doubt that his view 
leaves room for the latter kind of progress. 
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we will only have encountered and considered a tiny proportion of all possible situa-
tions, and so, depending on how complex the moral domain really is, we can assume, 
more or less safely, that we will never actually reach the endpoint: that, taken togeth-
er,91 our principles of duty will always remain provisionally universal, lacking the cir-
cumstance-sensitivity required to handle all possible scenarios appropriately. 
Korsgaard points out that we are well aware of these limitations of ours. We 
acknowledge them whenever we qualify our principles, saying that they hold “every-
thing else equal”, or that it is impermissible to do x “unless there is some good rea-
son why not”, etc., without being able to list all the conditions that have to be in 
place (2009: 74).92 (This remark suggests that she thinks of the list as open-ended. We 
will come back to this point in sect. 2.3.2 below). Because of its appeal to two stand-
points, I will refer to this generalist account as the “Two Standpoint View”.  
In the following section I will argue that the Two Standpoint View is untenable, 
but even if it wasn’t, it is in any case a significant deviation from Kant’s texts. So why 
does Korsgaard opt for this sort of view? If we bear in mind that her argument and 
her concessions can be construed as attempts to satisfy the three desiderata that give 
rise to the above Trilemma, then the distinction between two standpoints is important 
because it allows her to divide labour. The standpoint of finite agents allows her to 
satisfy Universality (via “provisional universality”) and Asymmetry, while the standpoint 
of the infinite agent allows her to satisfy Universality and Complexity. By keeping these 
standpoints apart, she can hope to avoid clashes and thus to escape the Trilemma. 
2.2 A Reductio Ad Absurdum of the Two Standpoint View 
The clashes cannot be avoided, however. Korsgaard’s Two Standpoint View implies, 
rather absurdly, that finite agents usually get it wrong: that, most of the time, when 
such agents exercise their will, they fall short of one of the norms constitutive of this 																																																								
91 Maybe for some principles, we could manage to reach absolute universality. This depends, in part, on 
the thickness of the concept(s) by which the feature(s) with deontic import are picked out. Think of 
the principle “Murder is impermissible”. If it is part of our understanding of the term “murder” that 
the killings to which this term applies are impermissible, then this principle might have very few, if 
any, exceptions. Whether and to which extent the evaluative content conveyed by thick terms is varia-
ble, and how this bears on whether this content is part of their meaning is a complicated question, 
which I cannot address here. For a discussion see Väyrynen 2013: 215-232. 
92 Actually, Korsgaard goes back and forth between saying a) that we are unaware of certain back-
ground conditions, and b) that, although we are aware of them, we do not explicitly think about or 
mention them in each and every case. This is an important ambiguity, which I will come back to in 
sect. 2.3.2. 
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faculty. This problem is easily overlooked, however, and that is due to the dialectic of 
the passage in which the view is first introduced. As we saw, the Two Standpoint View 
emerges in the context of an argument against particularism. The argument aims to 
show that a certain theory of the role of principles in practical reasoning, namely 
particularism, does not achieve what it purports to achieve. The theory purports to 
provide an account of what it means to act for reasons but, by denying principles 
their place in such an account, it misrepresents the nature of its explanandum. If we 
focus on the norms of philosophical enquiry appealed to in this argument, on the ques-
tion whether a given theory gets at the nature of its explanandum, then Korsgaard’s 
Two Standpoint View seems to have the upper hand: it seems to satisfy the demands to 
which such a theory is subject.  
However, if we abstract from the dialectical context in which the Two Standpoint 
View is introduced and focus, instead, on the norms that guide the activity that the 
relevant philosophical enquiry takes as its object, i.e. on willing, then we find that this 
dialectical advantage comes at a cost. For, among other norms, this activity is sup-
posed to be subject to the norm expressed by Kant’s Formula of Universal Law, 
which, according to Korsgaard, demands that we act from universally valid principles 
– from principles that hold in all cases or situations (see premises 3a to 5). However, 
if this is what it takes, then the Two Standpoint View implies that, at least most of the 
time, our day-to-day moral enquiry fails to achieve what it purports to achieve because, 
as finite agents, we tend to act on principles that fall short of the absolute universality 
to which we “essentially aspire”. More specifically, even when we do perform right 
actions and abstain from wrong ones (when we keep our promises, tell the truth, and 
so on), we do so for the wrong reasons and so our actions have no moral worth 
(Kant G 4:399-400).93 This suggests that Korsgaard avoids a philosophical error at 
the cost of accusing finite agents of constant moral error.  
Think of the White Lie case, for example. If this case is an exception to the strict 
principle of truthfulness that you held until today, then all the true statements that 
you made in the past may have been right, but they cannot have had any moral 
worth. They must have been unworthy because they were based on a principle that 
																																																								
93 Kant’s idea that our actions have no moral worth unless we act from duty will be discussed in detail 
in ch. 3, sect. 3.1. We will see that he has a very demanding view of what it means to act for the right 
reasons.  
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was only provisionally universal, on a principle that, upon reflection, you cannot will 
to become a universal law.  
Let us pause and ask why the Two Standpoint View has this absurd implication. 
Prima facie, it is not in any way absurd to distinguish between two epistemic stand-
points. Of course, we might say, our quests for knowledge, for example, for scientific 
knowledge, are never completed, we never reach the state of omniscience. But surely 
that does not mean that most of our beliefs are false. They are fallible, but that is very 
different from saying that most are de facto false. This is true, but it does not under-
mine what we said above. Instead, it serves to highlight a distinctive feature of the 
Two Standpoint View and its conception of the validity of moral judgments (which 
many Kantians share). According to this view, the mark of the ideal endpoint of our 
epistemic journey, namely having absolutely universal principles, is at the same time 
the norm on the basis of which every single act of cognition, i.e. every derivation of a 
moral judgment from a principle “on the way”, is assessed. It is treated as both an 
ideal endpoint that we strive to reach eventually and a norm that we aim to comply 
with in every single exercise of the will. As a result, falling short of omniscience 
amounts to making a false (not merely fallible) judgment.94 Korsgaard’s Two Stand-
point View has this absurd implication because it saddles absolute universality with 
two incompatible roles. However, that it has this implication is not immediately obvi-
ous, and that is partly because the distinction between two epistemic standpoint 
seems unproblematic and is unproblematic in many other contexts.  
2.3 Two Responses on Korsgaard’s Behalf 
The above reductio argument has brought to light that absolute universality can only 
play one of the two roles that Korsgaard assigns to it, not both. Accordingly, there are 
two responses that might be given on Korsgaard’s behalf. One response (to be con-
sidered in sect. 2.3.1) would be to insist that absolute universality was never meant to 
play the role of a norm that regulates every exercise of the will; the other (to be con-
sidered in sect. 2.3.2) would be to insist that it is not a distant ideal but rather an aim 
that is well within reach. Let us see if one of these responses can be made to work. 
																																																								
94 This is not, strictly speaking, correct. A judgment about the deontic status of a particular action that 
was derived from a non-universal principle could be correct, but it would be based on a false premise. 
As such, it would be based on bad reasons and would lead to an action with no moral worth.  
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2.3.1 The Voluntarist Response 
It might be thought that my objection rests on a misunderstanding of Korsgaard’s 
constructivist reading of the Formula of Universal Law. Perhaps I was wrong to as-
sume that her reading of this formula amounts to a commitment to Universality. In 
order to pursue this suggestion, we need to extend the scope of our discussion be-
yond principles of duty and consider maxims in general. 
Recall Korsgaard’s objection to the particularist. According to her, particularists 
fail to make sense of the idea that willing is a matter of following incentives on the 
condition that doing so is representative of our practical identity or, in other words, 
on the condition that it accords with the principles that we hold as universal. Now, if 
part of her aim in presenting this argument is to defend Kant’s Formula of Universal 
Law, then it seems that her reading of this formula is rather weak. On this reading, it 
expresses the demand that we ought to treat a given feature as having a certain nor-
mative import only if, at that time, we are committed to treating this kind of feature 
as having this kind of import across the board. Let us assume that this is how she 
sees things. In that case, Korsgaard’s being content with provisional universality 
would simply reflect her view, defended on other occasions (e.g. 1996b: 120), that 
most parts of our practical identity (most of our specific practical identities) are con-
tingent, optional and alterable, parts that we may adopt, develop, expand, and revise 
– in particular, when faced with new and unfamiliar circumstances, such as the ones 
encountered in the White Lie case. Let us call this reading of Korsgaard’s project the 
Voluntarist Reading.95 On the Voluntarist Reading, Korsgaard’s view does not imply 
that the judgments of finite agents are mostly wrong. For although new and unfamil-
iar circumstances can prompt us to decide that a principle of ours does not hold 
across the board after all, and thereby prompt us to revise it (to add an unless-clause, 
for example), this does not mean that we were not committed to its absolute univer-
sality before. We have changed our practical identity, and so it is only appropriate, 
the voluntarist will say, that the range of actions that count as representative of that 
identity should change as well. 
I doubt that this is how Korsgaard would like to be understood because, in the 
end, it would render her view incoherent. The Voluntarist Reading derives its initial 																																																								
95 The first in a long line of commentators who have read Korsgaard’s argument in this way is G.A. 
Cohen, in Korsgaard 1996b: 167-88.  
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plausibility from how well it seems to work in the realm of the merely permissible.96 
Consider, to begin with, how it fails to account for the White Lie case, where some-
thing moral is at stake. We said that the prospect of hurting your friend’s feelings 
makes you doubt your strict principle of truthfulness and eventually prompts you to 
revise it. Let us assume that you made the right choice: that telling this thin-skinned 
friend a white lie was the morally appropriate thing to do. According to the volunta-
rist, Korsgaard would argue that, in this case, seeing your friend vulnerable effects a 
change of heart: it makes you reconsider who you are, makes you modify parts of 
you practical identity, makes you want to become a more considerate person.97 Now, 
of course, this kind of thing can happen. But it better not be an example of the sup-
posed right to revise our principles as we please that was meant to help us resist the 
above reductio argument. After all, Korsgaard insists that our moral identity is a neces-
sary, non-optional, unalterable part of our practical identity (1996b: 120-5). In light 
of this, we would expect her to oppose the idea that someone might align their prin-
ciples with their moral identity without acknowledging that what they did before was 
wrong. Maybe there is a chance that your policy of truth-telling never actually hurt 
anyone, but if morality really demands that you revise your principle in the way you 
do, then your original principle must have fallen short of the norm expressed by the 
Formula of Universal Law.98 This is to say, we cannot re-interpret the Universality 
desideratum as saying that the deontic import of features can be captured in princi-
ples of duty that we treat as universally valid, for then moral requirements would not 
be objective – and that is a conclusion that Kantians are very anxious to avoid.99 
Prima facie, it might seem that, in the realm of the merely permissible, things are 
different. Consider the following example of a non-moral principle of action.  
Taste for Theatre: You’ve never had much of a taste for the arts, but one day your 
friends convince you to see a play. The play affects you so deeply that it brings 
about a change of heart. You start questioning your attitudes and modify parts 
of your practical identity. Among other changes, you revise your principle to al-																																																								
96 We will come back to this realm and the demands within it in ch. 3, sect. 3.2. 
97 Let us use the expression “change of heart” to distinguish the voluntarist account of principle revi-
sion from the account discussed in sect. 2.1 and 2.2, on which principle revision amounts to a “change 
of mind”.  
98 For now, I am ignoring Korsgaard’s distinction between the Categorical Imperative and the moral 
law (1996b: 98-100). I will come back to this distinction and its problems in ch. 5, sect. 2.1 and 3.1.  
99 We will come back to the question of what it would mean to “subjectivize” Kant’s ethics in ch. 4, 
sect. 2.3.  
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ways reject invitations to the theatre, deciding that, from now on, you intend to 
reject such invitations only if they clash with your professional obligations.  
Here it may seem that the original rejection policy not only succeeded in representing 
the person you were in the past, but also that it was perfectly legitimate. Thus, in the 
realm of the merely permissible, the Voluntarist Reading of Korsgaard’s account 
seems to accord with our intuitions. However, for all their contingency, optionality 
and alterability, our non-moral practical identities are not adopted at random. We 
adopt them for reasons, and these, Korsgaard argues, trace back to our moral identity 
(1996b: 121).100 If we realize that there are good reasons for adopting a certain specif-
ic practical identity, or for thinking about it in a certain way, we should admit that we 
would be failing to appreciate these reasons, if we did not do so. And if we had these 
reasons all along, then there is a sense in which we did go wrong. Arguably, your phil-
istine self, for example, missed out on many opportunities to enjoy themselves and 
to develop their sensibilities.   
These considerations, and especially the objectivity worry, suggest that it is more 
charitable to treat Korsgaard’s Two Standpoint View as a more or less self-contained 
element of her overall position, and to abstain from interpreting her contentment 
with provisional universality as an implication of her alleged voluntarism. But, in that 
case, the above reductio argument retains its force: the Two Standpoint View implies that 
most of our moral judgments are flawed and most of our actions devoid of moral 
worth.  
2.3.2 The Implicit Awareness Response 
The Voluntarist Response was an attempt to resolve the tension within Korsgaard’s 
account by denying that absolute universality was ever meant to play the role of a 
norm that applies to every single exercise of the will. According to the voluntarist, 
that role is played by a weaker norm, a norm that amounts to little more than the 
demand to be consistent. The response that we will consider now tackles the tension 
from the opposite direction. Perhaps we misunderstood Korsgaard’s talk of encoun-
tering exceptions and making revisions, perhaps this talk is not intended to character-
ize an ongoing epistemic journey towards absolute universality after all.  
																																																								
100 This point is also emphasized by Thomas Scanlon in his discussion of constructivism (2012: 238). 
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In sect. 2.1 we assumed that, when Korsgaard speaks of an agent discovering an 
exception to their principle, she is thinking of someone who has discovered that they 
made a mistake, and that when she speaks of revisions and addendums, she is think-
ing of someone who has changed their mind (as they should, given the mistake). I 
have to admit, however, that the textual evidence here is ambiguous. On some occa-
sions, Korsgaard’s phrasing suggests a rather different picture, a picture on which the 
“discovery” of an exception is really more of a recollection or a bringing to attention 
of something that one was implicitly aware of all along. At one point, for instance, 
Korsgaard discusses the example of “someone who decides to become a doctor in 
the full light of reflection” (2009: 74). What she seems to have in mind is that, 
through reflection, this person could concentrate their attention on something that 
they knew all along, namely that a principle according to which one is allowed to 
enter a profession when one desires to do so is subject to a range of background 
conditions, e.g. the condition that there is a social need. To encounter an exception, 
on this account, is not to discover a counterexample to a principle that is insufficient-
ly circumstance-sensitive, but to be prompted to foreground (in deliberation or in a 
conversation) part of the hidden structure of an adequately sensitive principle, to be 
prompted to attend to one of its unless-clauses because, for once, the defeater that it 
specifies is present. Accordingly, to “revise” a principle is not to change one’s mind, 
but to think about or cite something that was in the back of one’s mind all along, and 
to say that a principle holds “everything else equal” is not to acknowledge one’s epis-
temic limitations or, worse, one’s fallibility, but rather to simply indicate that one has 
not spelled out which conditions the principle is subject to. If this is indeed what 
Korsgaard’s talk of exceptions and revisions amounts to, then finite agents are not 
necessarily “on their way”. They may already know everything they need to know, 
and thus there is no reason to think that they are constantly making mistakes.   
In ch. 3, I will argue that we can and should regard our principles of duty as de-
feasible in the sense intended here, so, in my criticism of the Implicit Awareness Re-
sponse, I want to focus on why Korsgaard can’t avail herself of the resources needed 
to maintain this view. In particular, I will argue that she cannot avail herself of the 
distinction between foreground and background. But first we need to think about the 
point of this distinction: how would it help if it could be upheld? The answer to this 
question becomes apparent once we rephrase it: why is Korsgaard unwilling to say 
	 64 
that we have to act from absolutely universal principles without any hidden struc-
ture? Why does she introduce the notion of provisional universality in the first place?  
In sect. 2.1, we explained this unwillingness by appeal to Asymmetry. Opting for 
such a view, we said, would allow her to satisfy Universality and Complexity, but leave 
her unable to explain why it is that, in standard cases, our explanations and justifica-
tions seem to make no mention of defeaters at all. She would be unable to explain, 
for instance, why it is that, in a standard situation, I can justify my decision to tell the 
truth without mentioning that the addressee of my utterance has a thick skin or that 
they are not a murderer, or some such. That I do not need to mention these things is 
important for several reasons. Some have already come up when we cited Dancy in 
sect. 1 above. First, depending on how much variability there is, the list of defeaters 
that one would have to rule out might be extremely long or even open-ended. In this 
case, complete explanations and justifications would be a matter of impossibility. 
Second, even if it the list was “merely” long, the resulting explanations and justifica-
tions would not be very good ones. After all, it is their job to reveal why something is 
or is taken to be the case. As such, they should not be cluttered with irrelevancies: 
with considerations that could make a difference on some other occasion, but are not 
actually pertinent here and now.101  
The problem of irrelevancies is particularly pressing when it comes to justifying 
our actions to others. Normally, we would think that standard cases of truth telling 
should not leave much room for disagreement: I ask why you said x, you respond 
that x is true, and that is it. But now imagine your response had to feature a long (if 
not open-ended) list of defeaters. The chances of disagreement would increase 
enormously. Is the fact that some chatty acquaintance might tell your thin-skinned 
friend what you really think a defeater of the defeating import of the prospect of 
hurting your friend with respect to whether you should lie? Who knows. You might 
think it is, I might think it is not. If we had to agree on these sorts of details, then 
successful justificatory exchanges would be hard to come by. (Note that this inter-
personal dimension of the problem of irrelevancies is more of a threat to Kantian 
Constructivists than to their realist opponents, because constructivists maintain that 
a moral judgment is correct precisely in virtue of being justifiable in light of an inter-																																																								
101 If principles contained long lists of unless-clauses, this would affect their ability to serve as guides 
as well (Dancy 2004: 87), but, as I said in the introduction, I am focusing on their role as explanatory 
standards, at least for now. 
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subjectively intelligible procedure of construction or scrutiny (Korsgaard 2008: 321-
4).102 That might be why this dimension does not come up in Dancy’s critique; after 
all, he is a moral realist.)  
Here the foreground-background distinction might seem to come in useful. For 
if there is such a distinction, then Korsgaard can argue that there are indeed absolute-
ly universal principles of duty that cover all cases, standard as well as exceptional, but 
that, in explaining and justifying ourselves, we only have to explicitly appeal to the 
pertinent elements of these principles, with the other elements remaining implicit. 
On the face of it, this is a viable response to the Trilemma, as summed up in the Par-
ticularist Challenge (sect. 1), and it seems all the more convincing when the argument 
for it draws on an analogy with the inexact sciences (Korsgaard 2009: 74). It is a 
commonplace that the inexact sciences, e.g. clinical medicine or economics, trade in 
ceteris paribus laws, whose validity is subject to a wide range of conditions (Brandom 
2000: 88).103 In these sciences, to say that a given generalization is a genuine law is not 
to say that one could fully specify the whole range of conditions to which it is sub-
ject. In fact, the list of conditions can be treated as open-ended. Rather, to say that a 
generalization is a law, and hence a source of genuine explanations, is (at least, i.a.) to 
say that it is counterfactually robust or, in other words, that its truth is not merely 
accidental. To put it crudely: there must be a causal connection. Similarly, Korsgaard 
could argue that what we take to be a principle of duty can be a genuine “practical 
law” (Kant CPrR 5:19), a law that we can appeal to when justifying our actions or 
explaining the obtaining of a deontic status, even if we are not in a position to fully 
specify the whole range of conditions on which its validity depends. (We will return 
to this comparison of principles of duty to laws of nature in ch. 3).  
Unfortunately, the analogy does not hold up. It does not hold up because, ac-
cording to Korsgaard’s reading of the Categorical Imperative, a principle of duty is 
valid precisely in virtue of being robust across not only an unspecifiable range of cases 
but absolutely all cases (anticipating a distinction to be drawn below, we could say: in 
virtue of being Case-Scope universal). That is what “absolute universality” means in 
the context of her account, and that is the role that it plays if we treat it as a norm of 																																																								
102 In ch. 5, I will argue that this is how Kantian Constructivism should be understood.  
103 Marc Lange argues that all sciences appeal to laws that are only robust across a certain range of 
possible worlds (2000). For a discussion of how his view bears on the generalism-particularism debate 
see Lance and Little 2007. 
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good wiling rather than an ideal endpoint of a epistemic journey – as we chose to in 
setting up the present defence. The norm of correctness in the inexact sciences is a 
different one. There a generalization counts as lawful (and the explanations it yields 
as correct) if it captures a necessary connection rather than an accidental one or, 
again, if it captures a causal nexus rather than a mere correlation. The explanatory 
import of an alleged cause is not constituted by and doesn’t depend on its being em-
bedded in an absolutely universal law, but, for Korsgaard and many other Kantians, 
the deontic import of a feature is and does. This is why ruling out all potential de-
featers, and hence explicating what is supposed to remain implicit, is precisely what it 
would take for you to justify telling the truth or to explain to me why telling the truth 
was obligatory. And if this is right, if Korsgaard cannot avail herself of the distinction 
between foreground and background,104 then the Implicit Awareness Response fails. 
It fails in the sense that it leads to the Fine Print Reading, according to which princi-
ples of duty are indefeasible and cumbersome.  
3.  Herman on Deliberative Presumptions 
Over the course of her engagement with Kant’s ethics, Herman has made a number 
of proposals for how to defend Kant against the charge of rigorism. In this section, I 
want to focus on a very influential proposal developed in her 1993 paper “Moral 
Deliberation and the Derivation of Duties”. Of course, this paper does not address 
itself to the Particularist Challenge (after all, it was published in the very same year as 
Dancy’s Moral Reasons), but, like Korsgaard’s view, her view can also be understood as 
an attempt to meet this challenge, and to meet it by appeal to defeasible principles. 
Herman’s central idea in this piece is that Kant’s Categorical Imperative yields so-
called deliberative presumptions that can be defeated by competing moral concerns. 
3.1 The Categorical Imperative as a Source of Deliberative Presumptions 
Herman’s declared aim in the above paper is to develop a new account of the role 
that Kant’s Categorical Imperative plays in moral judgment and deliberation. In her 
view, there are problems with both received accounts: with the view that it is a pro-																																																								
104 Even if there was no “deep” distinction between foreground and background, something along 
those lines could still exist as a pragmatic phenomenon. Imagine you justified your saying x simply by 
appeal to the fact that x is true. Strictly speaking, you would have failed to satisfy my demand. If I 
accepted your justification nonetheless, this could be because I chose to treat the claim that none of 
the potential defeaters are present as an implicature of your utterance.  
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cedure for the derivation of duties and with the view that it is an algorithm for moral 
deliberation. These are the problems to which her account is meant to provide a so-
lution and, on closer consideration, they pose a challenge that is strikingly similar to 
the Particularist Challenge. 
The view that the Categorical Imperative is a source of universal principles of 
duty that prescribe or prohibit certain kinds of actions (e.g. promise-keeping or lying) 
exposes Kant’s ethics to the Rigorism Objection (Herman 1993: 133). Part of the task 
that Herman sets herself is therefore to develop an account of principles of duty that 
acknowledges that circumstances can be relevant, i.e. to satisfy Complexity. The view 
that the Categorical Imperative is an algorithm for moral deliberation that takes us 
from principles of action (maxims) to judgments about the deontic status of particu-
lar actions is immune to the Rigorism Objection (after all, maxims can refer to all sorts 
of details and specifics), but faces another problem instead. Given that, on this view, 
moral deliberation starts from maxims, i.e. from subjective principles of action, there 
seems to be no way of ensuring that the resulting judgments take account of all and 
only the morally relevant features of the case (Herman 1993: 135).105 The other part 
of Herman’s task is thus to develop an account of moral deliberation on which the 
classification of circumstantial features as relevant is not just presupposed but regu-
lated. In order to accomplish this twofold task, Herman needs to distinguish between 
default principles from which moral deliberation can begin, and which we can draw 
on when judging standard cases, and the more complex principles in which delibera-
tion concludes in exceptional cases. This is to say, she needs to accommodate Asym-
metry. Let us consider the details of her account.  
According to Herman, the role of the Categorical Imperative is to supply default 
principles. These so-called “deliberative presumptions” make up our pre-deliberative 
moral knowledge and inform the formation of our actual maxims without necessarily 
determining their content.106 More specifically, her proposal is this:  
The idea is that we are to think of the Categorical Imperative procedure as apply-
ing not to actual maxims of action but to a type of action-justification pair: to do 																																																								
105 This raises a host of worries, such as the worry that, on this view, Kant’s ethics looks suspiciously 
subjectivist, and the worry that his so-called universalisability test won’t be reliable unless the maxims 
fed into it have the right content (Herman 1993: 135-43). I will return to these issues in ch. 4, when 
discussing the so-called Problem of Relevant Descriptions. 
106 Actually, Herman’s comments on maxims (1993: 144) suggest that it would be more accurate to 
speak of maxim explication than of maxim formation.  
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x-type action for y-type reason. I call these pairs “generic maxims”... The rejec-
tion of a generic maxim by the Categorical Imperative procedure shows that a 
certain kind of action may not be done for a certain kind of reason ... The delib-
erative presumption can be rebutted by reasons ... of a different sort. (Herman 
1993: 147-8) 
What should we make of this talk of different kinds of reasons? Herman notes 
that “the standard form of a deliberative principle is derived from a generic maxim of 
self-interest” (1993: 148).107 This suggests that we can replace the phrase “for y-type 
reason[s]” with “for reason[s] of self-interest” or better still: “on self-interested 
grounds” (a phrase that Herman uses as well).108 If this is right, then the rejection of a 
generic maxim will yield a principle of duty of the following form: “Performing an x-
type action (or simply: ϕ-ing) on self-interested grounds is impermissible”, for exam-
ple, “Deceiving on self-interested grounds is impermissible”. It is important to note 
that this principle itself is universally valid: it holds in all circumstances. So in positing 
these kinds of grounds-relative principles of duty, Herman satisfies Universality. But, 
according to her, such principles contain defeasible presumptions of the following 
form: “Ceteris paribus, ϕ-ing is impermissible”. Herman argues that, in standard cases, 
we can draw on these presumptions to simply judge, while, in exceptional cases, we can 
use them as starting points for moral deliberation (1993: 145-7).  
In the above passage, Herman explains that a “deliberative presumption can be 
rebutted by reasons ... of a different sort” or, again, by grounds of a different sort. 
According to Kant, there are two kinds of grounds on which our interest in an action 
or end may be based: self-interested and moral grounds (see e.g. CPrR 5: 79). Kant’s 
distinction is meant to be exhaustive, so if we assume that Herman is following his 
lead, then any pursuit that is not based on self-interested grounds is ipso facto based 
on moral grounds. This means that a deliberative presumption (e.g. against lies or 
acts of deception) can be rebutted or defeated if the agent’s interest in the action or 
																																																								
107 What Herman says in other places (e.g. 1993: 148, at the bottom) suggests that this is not just the 
“standard form” of a generic maxim, but rather the only form there is. In light of this, one might 
wonder why actions on self-interested grounds are being treated as standard cases. We will come back 
to this question in sect. 3.3.2.  
108 When Herman speaks of kinds of reasons she is usually referring to Kant’s distinction between two 
kinds of grounds. When she speaks of reasons per se, her usage of the term is not quite as consistent. 
Sometimes she uses “reason” to refer to grounds of interest, sometimes to ends, and sometimes to 
circumstantial features that are included in the maxim.  
	 69 
end is based on moral grounds.109 However, according to Herman, having moral 
grounds is not sufficient. It is only one of two conditions of defeat. In addition, the 
agent’s end or concern must “outweigh”110 the end or concern behind the relevant 
presumption. In short, she argues that a deliberative presumption is defeated if and 
only if  
(i) the agent’s interest in the action or end is based on moral grounds, and 
(ii) the agent’s end or concern “outweighs” the end or concern that lies behind the 
presumption. 
Consider the following example.  
Deceit for Aid: You deceive A in order to save B’s life. Your interest in the action is 
based on moral grounds and your end, the end to save B’s life, “outweighs” the 
concern for truthfulness that underlies the presumption against deceit. So, in this 
case, the presumption against deceit is defeated and it is therefore permissible or 
even obligatory for you to deceive.  
Taken together, the two conditions of defeat regulate moral deliberation. The 
first condition determines whether a feature of the circumstances should be taken 
into consideration at all, that is, whether it should be included in the actual maxim 
that we consider acting on.111 A circumstantial feature is worthy of consideration and 
inclusion only if it brings to bear some competing moral end or concern. In the Deceit 
for Aid case, for example, you might have to consider and include the fact that B’s life 
is at stake and the fact that you are in a position to help. The second condition de-
termines whether the feature thus included is genuinely relevant, with its relevance 
being a function of whether the moral end or concern that it brings to bear is 
“weighty” enough to defeat the presumption. But how do we decide whether it is?  
																																																								
109 Herman speaks of presumptions being “rebutted”, but since I am using the notion of defeat very 
broadly (see introduction, sect. 1.2), I take whatever particular mode of defeat she has in mind to fall 
under it.   
110 In my exposition of Herman’s view, I will put all terms that are associated with weight and weigh-
ing in inverted commas in order to indicate that Herman is anxious to distance herself from this sort 
of talk (1993: 53). However, as we shall see in sect. 3.3.1, it is doubtful that she can steer clear of it. 
111 Commenting on this point, Herman says: “The maxim relevant to deliberation must include the 
special justificatory features of the end or circumstances … that the agent takes to warrant acting 
against the presumption. Inclusion of detail in the maxim description is controlled by the structure of 
deliberation. [A feature] … may not be introduced for purposes of deliberation unless it is supported 
by reasons not already excluded by the deliberative presumption” (1993: 150).  
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Herman acknowledges that we need some “way to rank or compare or weigh 
different moral considerations” (1993: 153). Her suggestion is that we should turn to 
Kant’s theory of value: his view that rational agency is a value constraint on willing. 
Using this as a basis, we can compare the “weights” of competing ends or concerns 
by asking ourselves whether a given moral end or concern is more or less essential to 
respecting rational agency than the concern behind the relevant presumption. In sect. 
3.3.1, I will suggest that this criterion is empty, but for now the main point to keep in 
mind is this: Herman specifies two independent conditions of defeat, namely that the 
agent’s interest in the action or end must be based on moral grounds and that their 
end or concern must “outweigh” the concern underlying the relevant presumption. 
This point will play a crucial role in my objection, which I will now present.  
3.2 Two Independent Conditions of Defeat? An Inconsistency 
The above presentation of Herman’s account glosses over two ambiguities. The first 
ambiguity has to do with the fact that Herman speaks of the Categorical Imperative 
and the two conditions of defeat in largely procedural terms,112 associating them with 
stages of decision making. First, we recognize the action that we are contemplating as 
an instance of a presumptively impermissible kind, then we ask ourselves whether 
our grounds are self-interested or moral, and then we either simply judge or enter 
moral deliberation in order to weigh our end or concern against the end or concern 
that lies behind the presumption.  
Although very common, it is notoriously unclear how this talk of the Categorical 
Imperative (in particular, the Formula of Universal Law) as a “test” or “procedure” is 
to be understood. If taken literally, it suggests a decision tool reading: the view that 
the Categorical Imperative is primarily a decision tool that agents can use to navigate 
an independent moral reality (Timmons 1997). If taken as a metaphor or illustration, 
then it is compatible with the more common view that the Categorical Imperative is 
primarily a norm that determines the deontic status of actions,113 and only secondarily, 																																																								
112 Among other procedurally-sounding expressions, she refers to the Categorical Imperative as the 
“CI procedure” (see e.g. Herman 1993: 132). 
113 Rawls, whose John Dewey Lectures “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” and other writings 
have played a major role in entrenching this procedural jargon in the debate, is explicit about using the 
procedural terminology metaphorically, as a way of illustrating a norm (see 1980: 571, where he speaks 
of his “model-conception”). Contemporary Kantian Constructivists follow him in this regard. I will 
come back to these two ways of understanding the talk of the Categorical Imperative as a procedure 
in ch. 4, sect. 2.2 and 4.2. Kantian Constructivism will be the topic of ch. 5. 
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if at all, also a decision tool.114 In my view, the latter reading is more plausible because 
it takes seriously Kant’s idea that the Categorical Imperative is the supreme principle of 
morality and that it has to be sought out in a metaphysical investigation. In light of this, 
it seems more charitable to resolve the first ambiguity (call it the “norm-vs.-decision-
tool ambiguity”) in Herman’s discussion in favour of the view that the Categorical 
Imperative is primarily a norm and to also extend this view to the two conditions of 
defeat with which she supplements Kant’s highest principle. However, it is important 
to keep in mind that, occasionally, Herman’s comments and remarks may well pertain 
to their secondary function, their function as decision tools. We will return to this 
point in sect. 3.3.2.  
There is a second, more important ambiguity. In commenting on the distinction 
between self-interested and moral grounds, Herman is anxious to point out that we 
should not confuse the ends being pursued with the grounds of the agent’s interest in 
these ends (1993: 148). Pursuing an end on self-interested grounds, be it a morally 
praiseworthy end or a self-serving end, is a matter of pursuing it merely because it is 
something that we happen to want; pursuing an end on moral grounds is a matter of 
making sure that, in our pursuit, be it what it may, we are appropriately sensitive to 
moral constraints. Herman notes that this distinction between ends and grounds of 
interest entails a conception of “morality ... [as] the regulative norm for our interests” 
(1993: 148). On this conception (we can call it “Morality as a Limit”), the distinctive 
feature of actions on moral grounds is that they reflect an appropriate sensitivity to 
the limits of morality, not that they aim at certain ends rather than others.115 Here is 
an example. 																																																								
114 Note that this question arises for Herman’s own account as much as it does for the two received 
accounts that she considers. In her case, the question is, strictly speaking, whether the Categorical 
Imperative is primarily an element of a decision making tool or a norm that determines the default 
deontic status of certain action kinds.  
115 Herman changes her mind on this point. In her recent writings (e.g. her 2006, 2007: 254-275, 2011, 
2013), she argues that acting on moral grounds is a matter of formally good reasoning (reasoning in 
accordance with the Categorical Imperative) on the basis of good premises (obligatory ends). If this is 
how acting on moral grounds is understood, then pursuing an obligatory end is a necessary condition. 
There are two aspects of this more recent account of Herman’s that are worth highlighting. First, in 
her recent work, she speaks of obligatory ends rather than morally good or morally praiseworthy or 
other-regarding ends. This suggests that she is thinking of Kant’s notion of an obligatory end (MM 
6:382-7). If this is right, then the ends in question are not morally contingent ends (like the ones we are 
discussing in the main text above), but rather morally necessary ends: ends whose pursuit is per definition 
morally worthy, ends which one wouldn’t count as pursuing if one wasn’t sensitive to moral demands.   
This brings me to the second point. My main objection to Herman’s more recent account is that there 
is a problematic duplication of norms. As I said, actions in pursuit of obligatory or morally necessary 
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Sick Aunt: You take time off from work in order to go and visit your sick aunt. You 
do this in order to cheer her up and get her back on her feet. 
The ends you pursue in visiting your aunt are certainly the kinds of ends we tend to 
consider morally laudable. After all, you are concerned with her well-being. But from 
what we know, we cannot rest assured that your action is based on moral grounds. 
Perhaps you would not have cared about her well-being and would not have visited, 
if she was not your favourite aunt, or perhaps you would have dropped everything at 
work and left your colleagues in the lurch, even if all your aunt had was a harmless 
cold. If some such counterfactual was true, then your visit would not exhibit a proper 
sensitivity to moral constraints.116 According to the conception of Morality as a Limit, 
the moral character of our actions cannot be determined on the basis of a description 
of our ends,117 it cannot be read off the label, as it were.118 Instead, it hinges on what 
we would be disposed to do in various kinds of circumstances. Your end of getting 
your aunt back on her feet, for instance, could be the manifestation of a healthy con-
cern for a relative or of an anxiety disorder, depending on what you would do if all 
she had was a harmless cold.119 																																																																																																																																																							
ends are ipso facto morally worthy, so when we say that someone acted in pursuit of an obligatory end, 
it is no longer an open question whether they complied with the Categorical Imperative. The two 
notions represent different perspectives on one and the same norm (ch. 1, sect. 4.1), not two norms 
that work together. Herman fails to acknowledge this when she says that we need to both start from 
obligatory ends and reason in accordance with the Categorical Imperative. Since Herman’s latest re-
sponse to the Rigorism Objection (2013) draws on the same duplication, I do not find it very convincing. 
In ch. 4, sect. 3, I will explain why this kind of duplication must undermine any attempt to defend the 
Categorical Imperative against its critics.  
116 Of course, we may not know what we would have done. This is the whole point of Kant’s so-called 
opacity thesis, his view that we are intransparent to ourselves in the sense that we cannot be certain of 
the grounds of our maxims. See e.g. G 4:407 and R 6:63. 
117 The reverse is true as well: we cannot determine whether an action is directed at a morally laudable 
end, in the ordinary sense of that term, merely on the basis of whether it is based on moral grounds. 
After all, it is possible to pursue one’s own happiness on moral grounds. More generally, this suggests 
that the two are more or less independent: that we can pursue our own well-being on moral grounds 
and other people’s well-being on self-interested grounds. I say “more or less” because I want to leave 
open the possibility that some of the terms or labels that we use to pick out ends pick them out as 
morally good or evil. To describe someone’s end in this way would be to imply that their action is 
based on moral grounds or self-interested grounds, respectively.  
118 This is true if the labels do not stand for necessary or obligatory ends (see fn. 115), so when I speak 
of ends as labels, I am assuming that the commitments that lie behind these labels are not necessarily 
in line with moral demands. 
119 One could opt for a weaker reading of Herman’s talk of grounds. I have assumed that acting on 
moral grounds requires appropriate sensitivity to moral constraints in the strong sense that, if things 
had been different, one would still have done what morality demands. In ch. 3, sect. 3.1, I argue that 
this is what Kant means when he speaks of acting on moral grounds or acting from duty. However, 
when Herman says that “the designation ‘self-interest’ signals the moral or justificatory status of the 
reason in question” (1993: 148), this might suggest that she has in mind a weaker requirement. On this 
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Despite the fact that Herman insists on the Kantian distinction between grounds 
and ends, and despite the fact that she appreciates its implications (the conception of 
Morality as a Limit), she repeatedly collapses this distinction.120 One example is her talk 
of motivational overdetermination: the idea that it is possible to act on moral and on 
self-interested grounds at the same time (1993: 150). If acting on moral grounds was 
a matter of pursuing certain ends rather than others (we can call this conception the 
conception of “Morality as Pursuit of Ends”), this would be possible indeed. It could 
be, for example, that you visit your aunt in order to both cheer her up and get some 
extra cash. But if acting on moral grounds is a matter of being properly sensitive to 
moral constraints, then motivational overdetermination is not a possibility. For what 
would it mean for your pursuit to be and also not be sensitive to moral constraints?121 
(Of course, if you visit your aunt to get some extra cash, you are still within the limits 
of morality in the sense that you are not doing anything impermissible, but this is not 
enough for your action to be based on moral grounds, as we defined it. The critical 
question is whether, if you did not expect her to give you any cash, you would still be 
going – and here the answer is either yes or no.) This confusion or ambiguity about 
whether ends are distinct from grounds or whether they are the same (the grounds-
ends ambiguity), and the corresponding mix-up of two conceptions of morality is, in 
fact, a confusion that runs very deep in Herman’s account.  
Recall that we concluded the previous section by highlighting the independence 
of Herman’s two conditions of defeat. We can capture the sense in which the two are 
taken to be independent in the following thesis.  
																																																																																																																																																							
reading, acting on moral grounds requires sensitivity to moral constraints only in the weak sense that 
one is sensitive to whether treating a certain consideration as a reason is licensed by morality. E.g., on 
this weaker reading, if your aunt’s illness justifies taking time off, then, in treating it as such, you’d be 
acting on moral grounds. This leaves open whether you would have taken time off even if your aunt 
had a harmless cold, and therefore whether you meet the stronger requirement as well. The important 
point, for my purposes, is that, even on the weak reading, acting on moral grounds entails that you did 
the right thing. I will get to this point shortly. 
120 In this respect, the account of moral motivation that Herman advocates in her recent writings is 
more consistent. See e.g. Herman 2007: 1-28.  
121 Of course, you might be sensitive to some moral constraints but not others. But this is not what 
people mean when they speak of motivational overdetermination.   
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Independence Thesis: The fact that a presumptively impermissible action is performed 
on moral grounds (that condition (i) is satisfied) does not entail that it is per-
missible or obligatory (that condition (ii) is satisfied as well).122 
My main objection to Herman’s account is this: if we assume that she endorses the 
Independence Thesis and take seriously her explicit remarks on ends and grounds, which 
point towards Morality as a Limit, then her account is inconsistent. Both antecedents 
will be scrutinized below, but for now let us proceed on the assumption that they are 
true and explore the inconsistency.  
According to Morality as a Limit, whether we act on moral grounds or not is a 
function of whether we are appropriately sensitive to the moral constraints that regu-
late actions of the relevant kind across different circumstances. With this in mind, let 
us revisit the Deceit for Aid case. If you deceived A on moral grounds, then, in doing 
so, you were sensitive to the moral constraints that apply to acts of deception across 
different circumstances. This implies that you were sensitive to the kind of difference 
that the fact of B’s life being at stake makes to the deontic status of deception. But if 
this is true, then it is no longer an open question whether your concern for B’s life 
“outweighs” the concern for the value of truthfulness. If it did not, then you could 
not be said to have acted on moral grounds, even if you were driven by a concern for 
B’s life, which is prima facie a morally laudable concern. In more general terms, if 
Herman’s first condition of defeat is satisfied, then it is no longer an open question 
whether her second condition of defeat is satisfied as well. An action that is per-
formed on moral grounds, be it presumptively impermissible or not, is ipso facto an 
action that is permissible or obligatory. So if Herman endorses the Independence Thesis 
and the conception of Morality as a Limit,123 then her overall account is inconsistent.  																																																								
122 Note that this is simply a reversal of the claim that motivational overdetermination is possible. The 
notion of motivational overdetermination is supposed to convey that one can act on self-interested 
grounds while being properly sensitive to moral constraints (which is impossible because, qua properly 
sensitive, one is ipso facto acting on moral grounds). The Independence Thesis says that one can act on 
moral grounds while failing to be properly sensitive to moral constraints (which, again, is impossible 
because, insofar as one’s action is based on moral grounds, one is ipso facto properly sensitive to moral 
constraints).  
123 I say “if” because it is not entirely clear whether she really subscribes to these doctrines. On the 
one hand, given how we resolved the first ambiguity in her essay (the norm-vs.-decision-tool ambigui-
ty), one could argue that her distinction between two conditions of defeat pertains only to the second-
ary level, the decision tool level. In that case, the distinction would be a distinction between two stages 
of decision making, so that, on a deeper level, the conditions wouldn’t have to be independent after 
all. I will come back to this deflationary reading of the Independence Thesis in sect. 3.3.2 below. On the 
other hand, one could argue that the second ambiguity (the grounds-ends ambiguity) should be re-
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Of course, if she endorsed the conception of Morality as Pursuit of Ends instead, 
then the Independence Thesis could be upheld. For, on this conception, acting on moral 
grounds is a matter of pursuing morally laudable ends, and surely it must be possible 
to pursue such an end and do something impermissible in the process. Imagine you 
abstained from deceit despite the fact that B’s life was at stake. According to Morality 
as Pursuit of Ends, if your end or concern was a morally laudable one, e.g. if it was a 
concern for truthfulness, then you acted on moral grounds, even if what you did was 
impermissible because B’s life was more important. In sect. 3.3.1, we will see why the 
conception of morality under consideration leaves room for this possibility.  
But before we move on, let us ask why Herman’s account takes the form that it 
does. The hypothesis that helped us to make sense of the structure of Korsgaard’s 
Two Standpoint View comes in useful once again. If we abstract from the specifics of 
Korsgaard’s case, the hypothesis was the following: the fact that the view contains 
incompatible elements can be understood as an unwanted side effect of an attempt 
to escape the Trilemma by dividing labour. In the following sections, we will find that 
the same explanation is available here, because, taken together, the two competing 
conceptions of morality that are mixed up in Herman’s account can satisfy all three 
desiderata. More specifically, we will see that Morality as a Limit satisfies Universality 
and Complexity, but not Asymmetry, while Morality as Pursuit of Ends satisfies Complexity 
and Asymmetry, but not Universality. If this is indeed what each of the two conceptions 
can and cannot accomplish, then we can understand why Herman tries to combine 
elements of both, at least implicitly. That she does so is, once again, not immediately 
obvious, however, and that has to do with the grounds-ends ambiguity: with the fact 
that she goes back and forth between distinguishing ends from grounds and collaps-
ing that distinction. 
3.3. Two Responses on Herman’s Behalf 
Since, once again, the problem here takes the form of an inconsistency, we can, once 
again, try to abandon either one of the two incompatible elements, to see if one of 
the two resulting accounts satisfies all three desiderata after all. In sect. 3.3.1, I will 
																																																																																																																																																							
solved in favour of the conception of Morality as Pursuit of Ends, in which case Herman would not be 
committed to the conception of Morality as a Limit. I will explore this option in sect. 3.3.1. 
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consider a defence of Herman’s account that is based on a rejection of Morality as a 
Limit, and in sect. 3.3.2 a defence that deflates the Independence Thesis.   
3.3.1 The Competing Moral Concerns Response 
Recall the grounds-ends ambiguity discussed in the previous section: the ambiguity in 
Herman’s use of the terms “moral grounds” and “self-interested grounds”. How we 
resolve this ambiguity bears on the conception of morality that we take her to be 
presupposing. Her explicit remarks on this issue suggest that she endorses Morality as 
a Limit, but some of her other commitments point towards a different conception, a 
conception of Morality as Pursuit of Ends. In this section, I want to explore the merits 
and demerits of taking these other commitments and the concomitant conception of 
morality more seriously.  
In ch. 1, sect. 3, we considered Timmermann’s claim that Kant’s comments on 
grounds of obligation contain a theory of pro tanto duties. The conception of Morali-
ty as Pursuit of Ends, as characterized above, is exactly the kind of theory that he has in 
mind. According to this theory, there is a plurality of potentially competing moral 
ends or concerns with corresponding pro tanto duties to pursue those ends or hon-
our those concerns. We already noted some of the advantages of such a view: that it 
makes room for moral residues and for the idea that moral concerns can outweigh 
each other. Now, with Herman’s arguments on the table, we can add a further item 
to this list. A theory of pro tanto duties can accommodate the common intuition 
that, even when we misjudge what morality demands in a given situation, it is still 
possible that we are driven by a moral concern and not by self-interest. In the Deceit 
for Aid case, for example, where someone’s life is it at stake, it is impermissible to tell 
the truth, and if you told the truth out of a concern for truthfulness, you would be 
mistaken about which moral concern takes precedence in the case at hand. However, 
surely, one might say, you would still be driven by a moral concern, surely your 
grounds for being honest, i.e. your aspiration to be truthful, were not in any way self-
interested. This line of thought suggests that Herman might be better off fully embrac-
ing Morality as Pursuit of Ends and the elements of her account that go along with that, 
such as the Independence Thesis and the possibility of motivational overdetermination.124 																																																								
124 That Herman is attracted to these advantages of Morality as Pursuit of Ends comes out most clearly in 
the final section of her essay (1993: 151-7). There she speaks of the “weight or gravity” of considera-
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As I indicated earlier, this would allow her to satisfy the Complexity desideratum and 
the Asymmetry desideratum. Let me explain how Morality as Pursuit of Ends satisfies the 
former, and postpone the discussion of the latter to the following section. Think of 
the presumption against deceit, which says that deceiving is by default impermissible. 
According to Morality as Pursuit of Ends, this presumption expresses only one of many 
moral concerns. In an exceptional case, where additional moral concerns are at stake, 
e.g. the concern for someone’s life, the concern behind the presumption against de-
ceit might be outweighed and hence defeated. In such a case, it would be permissible 
or even obligatory to deceive, and that would be because of features other than the 
ones that make the act an act of deception. So this is how Morality as Pursuit of Ends 
satisfies Complexity. But what about Universality? 
Recall Herman’s take on the deliverances of the Categorical Imperative: when a 
generic maxim is rejected, there is a presumption against actions of the designated 
kind. This presumption, though not itself universally valid, is embedded in a univer-
sally valid principle of duty, which says that it is impermissible to perform actions of 
this kind on self-interested grounds. So far, so good. The problem arises when we try 
to say the reverse: that it is always obligatory, or at least permissible, to perform pre-
sumptively impermissible actions on moral grounds or, more generally, that it is al-
ways, in all cases, obligatory, or at least permissible, to perform actions on moral 
grounds. If “on moral grounds” means “in pursuit of a moral end or concern”, then 
these claims are false because moral ends and concerns can be outweighed by other 
moral ends and concerns. Think of a version of the Deceit for Aid case where an addi-
tional moral concern is at stake: the person you would have to deceive is the very 
person whose life is at risk because they want to kill themselves. Here one might 
argue that the concern for this person’s autonomy strengthens the case for being 
honest and that, together with the concern for truthfulness, these two outweigh the 
concern for their life. Thus, the only universally valid principles of duty specifying 
what we are allowed or not allowed or required to do on moral grounds would be 
principles of pro tanto duty, i.e. principles located on the contributory level. The 
kinds of principles that are needed to satisfy Universality, namely universally valid 
principles of overall duty, are out of reach. Of course, it could be said that Herman is 																																																																																																																																																							
tions, mentions the need for a “way to rank or compare or weigh different moral considerations”, and 
takes herself to have reached “a conclusion ... in terms of relative value”. 
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free to reject the Universality desideratum, especially because she has provided an al-
ternative account of the role of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. So the question is: is 
there any substantive reason, any non-exegetical reason that speaks against such a 
move? 
When Kantians criticize theories of pro tanto duties, they often argue that judg-
ments about weight are ultimately subjective, that such judgments lack criteria of 
correctness, and hence that they cannot be shared or fruitfully disputed (see e.g. 
Schüssler 2012: 3).125 Herman is aware of this worry and of the fact that “any talk of 
weighing or comparing is supposed to be out of court in Kantian ethics” (1993: 153). 
Her attempt to show that her own account escapes this worry and avoids this talk is 
not entirely convincing, however. For although she introduces a criterion for ranking 
moral concerns (namely their relative significance with respect to the goal of respect-
ing rational agency), and although she insists that this criterion honours the idea that 
moral concerns are not scalar (Herman 1993: 155), she ultimately fails to explain how 
this criterion would help: e.g., how it could be used to adjudicate disputes about the 
“weight” or significance of truthfulness, on the one hand, and other’s needs, on the 
other. In fact, she admits that translating such a question into value terms “does not 
make the answer obvious” (1993: 155). Thus, one is left with the sense that her 
judgments of “relative value” (1993: 155) are not intersubjectively intelligible after all, 
and that invoking such judgments threatens the objectivity of moral judgments. (We 
will return to the connection between Universality and objectivity in the following 
chapter.)  
Before we move on, we should revisit the intuition that made the conception of 
Morality as Pursuit of Ends seem appealing in the first place: the intuition that overes-
timating the importance of a certain moral concern in relation to another (e.g. the 
importance of truthfulness in relation to the importance of someone’s life) does not 
make the resulting action self-interested. According to proponents of Morality as a 
Limit, acting on self-interested grounds is doing something merely because one feels 
like doing it. On the face of it, this is not what is going on in our example. But let us 
dig deeper and think about the kind of person, the kind of character who would pri-																																																								
125 If this is true, if they lack criteria of correctness, then the problem is, in fact, more fundamental: 
not only can such judgments not be shared, they cannot even be thought of as consistent or incon-
sistent with one’s other judgments. This line of thought calls to mind Wittgenstein’s private language 
argument (1953: §§244–271). We will return to this point in ch. 3, sect. 2.3. 
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oritise being truthful over someone else’s life. What kind of person would that be? 
Perhaps they are a cold-hearted person, someone who lacks empathy and so does 
not feel like helping other people, or maybe they are a pedantic person, a stickler for 
principles who feels discomfort at the thought of violating a rule that was hammered 
into their head when they were young. Whichever story we tell, it will be a story that 
makes reference to some kind of bias or vice, to some flaw in their affective disposi-
tions. So once we fill in all the details, it is no longer implausible to say that our pro-
tagonist refuses to help merely because they don’t feel like helping. For while their 
concern for truthfulness may appear like a moral concern when considered superfi-
cially (recall the above point about ends as mere labels), this appearance does not 
stand up to scrutiny.126    
3.3.2 The Deflationary Response 
If abandoning Morality as a Limit threatens the objectivity of our moral judgments, 
then there is only one alternative: we have to re-interpret the remarks that suggest 
that Herman endorses the Independence Thesis. We already insinuated how this could be 
done. In sect. 3.2, we resolved the norm-vs.-decision-tool ambiguity in Herman’s text 
in a way that allowed that Kant’s Categorical Imperative and her own conditions of 
defeat might have two functions. Their primary function, we said, must be to serve 
as norms that determine the deontic status of actions. However, in settling on this 
reading, we left open the possibility that they could have a secondary function as 
well: that they could also serve as decision tools. With this in mind, we noted that 
some of Herman’s claims might concern this secondary function only. What if this 
was true of the Independence Thesis? What if this thesis should be read in a deflationary 
way? 
Recall why we thought that Herman’s account was inconsistent: given Morality as 
a Limit, the satisfaction of the first condition of defeat entails the satisfaction of the 
second, so, at bottom, the two must be one – they cannot be independent. But per-
haps we misunderstood her, perhaps Herman isn’t actually saying that they are. Per-
haps the distinction between two conditions is in fact a distinction between two de-
liberative steps, two steps that help us to determine whether the one and only condi-																																																								
124 I think that this line of thought could be developed into an argument for why it is appropriate to 
reduce one of the two modes of defeat distinguished above (introduction, sect. 1.2) to the other, i.e. to 
treat cases of outweighing as cases of undermining.  
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tion of defeat is met.127 On this deflationary reading of the Independence Thesis, the se-
cond step is a way of reassuring ourselves of the outcome of the first: by reflecting 
on the relative weight of the moral concern that seems most important, we seek to 
confirm our hunch that there are moral grounds for pursuing the corresponding 
course of action. We try to reassure ourselves that a prima facie defeater128 is a genu-
ine defeater. For example, knowing full well that a threat to someone’s life tends to 
call for radical measures, you might guess that this fact defeats the default deontic 
import of deception, but in order to reassure yourself that this is how things stand, 
you might find it useful to ask yourself whether the concern for this person’s life 
really is more essential to respecting rational agency than the concern for truthful-
ness, or whether it only seems to you that way, e.g. because you two have some spe-
cial bond. At bottom, there is only one condition, but two methods for finding out if 
it is met.  
As we have seen, the Deflationary Response does away with the inconsistency. 
But how does it fare in relation to the Particularist Challenge? Here we need to pick up 
where we left off in sect. 3.1. According to Herman, the rejection of a generic maxim 
yields a universal principle of duty of the form “ϕ-ing on self-interested grounds is 
impermissible” (Universality). This principle contains a defeasible principle (a delibera-
tive presumption) of the form “Ceteris paribus, ϕ-ing is impermissible” (Complexity). 
When considering this account of the deliverances of the Categorical Imperative, we 
wondered why cases of actions on self-interested grounds were being treated as if 
they were simpler. Why is it, for example, that, on Herman’s account, when it comes 
to acts of deception on self-interested grounds, we can simply judge without having 
to think about potential defeaters, whereas, when it comes to acts of deception on 
moral grounds, we need to deliberate? How has Herman earned the right to make 
these claims that suggest that Asymmetry is satisfied? Now that we have disentangled 
the different threads that run through her argument, we are in a position to see that 
she has this right only if she insists on a non-deflated Independence Thesis and the con-																																																								
127 There is plenty of textual evidence for a distinction between two stages or steps. Herman says, for 
example: “Prior to deliberation the agent must both identify her proposed action as of a particular 
moral kind and determine the nature of her interest in the action (or its end)” (Herman 1993: 151). 
But since she uses procedural terms all the way through, it is difficult to tell whether it is merely a 
distinction between stages or also a distinction between conditions or norms.  
128 In this context, “prima facie” means prima facie, and not pro tanto, as it does in Ross’ writings. See 
fn. 44 above.  
	 81 
comitant conception of Morality as Pursuit of Ends. Notably, this is true despite the fact 
that the alternative view that emerges from the deflationary reading allows us to talk 
of defeaters.    
According to Morality as Pursuit of Ends, each deliberative presumption refers to a 
moral end or concern. The presumption against deceit, for example, refers to the 
concern for truthfulness. So in saying that acts of deception on self-interested 
grounds are impermissible, we are basically saying that they are impermissible in a 
certain respect (qua untruthful) and that, in standard cases, where the only other ends 
or concerns at stake are self-interested ends or concerns, they are also overall im-
permissible. This is why the deliberative and explanatory burdens in standard cases 
are relatively light: in order to grasp or explain why an act of deception is overall im-
permissible, we only need to think about or mention that it is deceptive and, as such, 
untruthful. We do not need to think about or mention other moral ends or concerns. 
In saying that a given act of deception on moral grounds is permissible or obligatory, 
by contrast, we are already invoking further moral ends or concerns. We are saying 
that the deontic import of deceit-qua-untruthfulness is defeated. This is why the de-
liberative and explanatory burdens in exceptional cases are heavier: in order to grasp 
or explain why a given act of deception is overall permissible or obligatory, we need 
to think about or mention the moral ends or concerns that function as defeaters.129  
So if Herman endorsed Morality as Pursuit of Ends, she could explain why there is 
an asymmetry in deliberative and explanatory burdens, but if she opts for Morality as a 
Limit – as we are currently assuming – then no such explanation is forthcoming. Re-
call that, according to the deflationary reading, her two conditions of defeat are, at 
bottom, one and the same. The only question is whether, in performing a certain 
action, one would be acting on moral grounds (in which case the action is permissi-
ble or obligatory) or on self-interested grounds (in which case it is impermissible). 
But if this is right, then Herman’s take on the deliverances of the Categorical Impera-
tive is in need of revision. On the revised account, the rejection of a generic maxim 
yields a universal principle of duty of the form “ϕ-ing is impermissible on self-
																																																								
129 Actually, the burdens are heavier whenever an additional end or concern is at stake, even if and when 
it turns out that this end or concern does not defeat the end or concern behind the presumption, 
meaning that the case is not exceptional after all. In such cases, we still have to at least deliberate about 
the additional end or concern, if not mention it in an explanation of the action’s deontic status. This is 
exactly what the Independence Thesis would predict.  
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interested grounds and permissible or obligatory on moral grounds”. Taking into 
account what we said in sect. 3.2, this means: ϕ-ing is impermissible if, in ϕ-ing, one 
would fail to be properly sensitive to the absence of defeaters, and, vice versa, permis-
sible or obligatory if, in ϕ-ing, one would be properly sensitive to their presence. But 
this, of course, is nothing but an overcomplicated way of saying that ϕ-ing is imper-
missible unless there are defeaters.130 And if this is what principles of duty really say, 
then whether or not they contain actual lists of defeaters (cf. the Fine Print Reading 
horn),131 the explanatory and deliberative burdens are the same across the board.132 
4. Taking Stock: A Comparison and a Note on Defeasibility 
In discussing Korsgaard’s and Herman’s attempts to escape the Trilemma and meet 
the Particularist Challenge, we discovered many structural similarities between their 
accounts: both appeal to the idea that, despite being universally valid, principles of 
duty are (or contain) defeasible principles and both end up with views that are not 
entirely consistent. More specifically, they both commit themselves to the claim that 
certain actions both do and do not violate the Categorical Imperative.133 Moreover, in 
each case, the inconsistency is concealed. In Korsgaard’s account, the inconsistency 
is inconspicuous, in part, because the discussion is conducted on a metaethical level 																																																								
130 Why is it overcomplicated? As my discussion has brought out, acting on moral grounds entails that 
one is doing something permissible or obligatory, but it is, in fact, more demanding than that (see fn. 
119). Hence, in order to explain why an action has the deontic status that it has, we do not need to 
refer to whether the agent has a good character or will, which goes beyond the question of whether 
they did what they ought to have done in this case. 
131 If they do not, if they are hedged rather than unhedged principles, then the worry would be a dif-
ferent one, namely that the hedging clause “unless there are defeaters” seems to be the kind of hedg-
ing clause that renders the principle to which it is attached trivially true. For a discussion of this objec-
tion see e.g. McKeever and Ridge 2006: 121-3. Note that there is actually some evidence that Herman 
is advocating unhedged principles with a long list of unless-clauses or a fine print. For, like Korsgaard, 
she tries to distinguish between parts of principles that lie in the foreground and parts that lie in the 
background (1993: 144-5). To the extent that she does, she exposes herself to the criticism that we 
levelled against the Implicit Awareness Response in sect. 2.3.2. 
132 It could be argued that there is an asymmetry nonetheless. After all, such principles do honour the 
idea that certain features have their deontic import by default and that this import can be defeated. 
This is true, but they honour it in name only. To say that defeaters are absent is to say that the case is 
a standard case; to say that defeaters are present is to say that the case is an exceptional case – but if, 
having said that, one goes on to treat their presence and absence symmetrically, one hasn’t really done 
justice to the difference between them.  
133 In Korsgaard’s account, this is true of actions from provisionally universal principles: they are not 
supposed to be morally problematic, but in the end they must be. In Herman’s account, this is true of 
impermissible actions that are based on moral grounds: insofar as they are impermissible, they must 
be violations of the Categorical Imperative, but insofar as they are based on moral grounds, they can-
not be violations – at least on her official understanding of the notion of moral grounds, i.e. the Moral-
ity as a Limit understanding.  
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and, in part, because de facto false moral views are treated as if they were merely fallible 
or incomplete. In Herman’s account, the inconsistency is inconspicuous because her 
use of the distinction between moral and self-interested grounds is ambiguous in a 
way that evokes two different conceptions of morality. In both cases, we suggested 
that the endeavour to hold together two elements that are ultimately incompatible is 
nonetheless understandable, because, given the inability of any one element to satisfy 
all three desiderata on its own, this endeavour can be understood as an attempt to 
divide labour. That such a division of labour is indeed what Korsgaard’s and Her-
man’s accounts would require was confirmed by our unsuccessful attempts to defend 
them. We saw that abandoning Universality in its original form (2.3.1, 3.3.1) would 
saddle them with views that cannot make sense of the objectivity of our moral judg-
ments (a worry to which we shall return in ch. 3), whereas abandoning the element 
that is in contradiction with Universality would leave them impaled on the Fine Print 
horn of the Trilemma.  
In the following chapter, I will argue for a response to the Particularist Challenge 
that shares an important feature with Korsgaard’s and Herman’s accounts: like theirs, 
mine is an account of our principles of duty as both universal and defeasible. For this 
reason, I want to conclude the present chapter with a brief note on the two concep-
tions of defeasibility discussed above. Philosophers’ reasons for presenting certain 
rules, claims or statuses as defeasible are many, and thinking about why someone 
chooses to appeal to defeasibility is usually a good guide to what they mean by it. 
One such reason is the wish to highlight the fallibility of our judgments, beliefs and 
theories, the wish to do justice to the common sense idea that what we take to be 
true at a given time may well turn out to be false later. Which conception of defeasi-
bility is appropriate for this purpose? Think about a scientific hypothesis: a scientific 
hypothesis is defeasible in the sense that there might be counterexamples that dis-
prove it. When such a counterexample is found, we have to admit that our hypothe-
sis was wrong and hence reject or revise it. Korsgaard’s remarks on the appropriate 
reaction to an exception (namely, going back and revising the original principle) sug-
gest that this is the conception that she has in mind. On reflection, this is surprising, 
however. After all, her aim is not to highlight the fallibility of our moral judgments 
but rather to accommodate the idea the deontic purport of features varies with cir-
cumstances (of course, we can be mistaken about how they vary as well, but that is 
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not the point). Herman’s choice is similarly curious. In sketching the problem and 
discussing rival accounts, she is very clear that her concern is with how to arrive at 
principles that mention all and only morally relevant features, given how that varies 
with circumstances (1993: 132-46). But the conception of defeasibility that her solu-
tion draws on is a conception that we would usually associate with a different aim. 
Hers is a conception of pro tanto defeasibility, according to which the default deon-
tic import of a feature is defeasible not in the sense that it varies with or depends on 
circumstances, but in the sense that it can be outweighed by the default import of other 
features. This conception is, in my view, a more natural choice for someone who 
aims to accommodate the phenomena discussed in ch. 1, sect. 3, e.g. the idea that an 
obligation retains its force and leaves a residue even when it is defeated and that, 
therefore, there are reasons for regret.  
The moral of the above story is this: if we are to give an account of defeasible 
principles of duty, we need to make sure that it is fit for purpose. In the following 
chapter, I hope to develop such an account.134     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
																																																								
134 Of course, my account of defeasible principles is not the only one that was ever designed with a 
view to accommodating the idea that the normative purport of features varies with circumstances. 
Another example is the account presented by H.L.A. Hart in “The Ascription of Responsibilities and 
Rights”. In this paper, Hart argues that “there are characteristics of legal concepts which make it often 
absurd to use in connection with them the language of necessary and sufficient conditions” (1948: 
173). Instead, he argues, we should distinguish between initial conditions and defeaters. Under normal 
circumstances, the satisfaction of the initial conditions is sufficient for the applicability of the relevant 
legal concept; under exceptional circumstances, in which defeaters “bring[ ] the case under some rec-
ognized head of exception” (Hart 1948: 174), it is not. We can see how this account is fit for purpose.  
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Chapter 3 
Case-Scope or Agent-Scope?  
The Inferentialist Response 
1. Korsgaard’s Anti-Particularist Argument Revisited  
In the previous chapter, we considered Herman’s and Korsgaard’s attempts to escape 
from the Trilemma that the Particularist Challenge was shown to generate. Both aim to 
show that Kant’s principles of duty can admit of exceptions, and both hope to ac-
complish this by reinterpreting Universality such that universal validity and defeasibil-
ity come out as compatible. We found that these attempts are unsuccessful because 
they appeal to the wrong conceptions of defeasibility. The conceptions they appeal 
to, we said, are not fit for purpose: not fit for the purpose of accommodating the 
idea that our moral obligations vary with circumstances. In the present chapter, I will 
argue for a reinterpretation of Universality that, I think, is better suited for this task. In 
order to motivate this reinterpretation, let us first revisit Korsgaard’s anti-particularist 
argument. Recall how the argument proceeds: 
1. Willing means determining yourself to be a cause, not being moved by the causal 
operations of incentives within you.  
2. Determining yourself to be a cause means following an incentive on the condi-
tion that doing so is representative of your practical identity.  
3. Willing particularistically, if possible, would mean following an incentive in its 
full particularity, i.e. 
a. as not “representative of any sort of type” of policy or standing commitment,   
b. or as “in no way […] further describable” (2009: 76). 
4. Following an incentive in its full particularity means not making your following it 
conditional on whether doing so is representative of your practical identity.   
5. Thus, it is impossible to will particularistically.  
This argument aims to both refute particularism and to defend a Kantian brand 
of generalism – the brand that Universality is intended to capture. Let us consider how 
the argument is supposed to achieve the latter aim. In ch. 2, sect. 2.1, we noted, but 
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did not dwell on the fact, that Korsgaard offers two versions of the third premise. 
When fleshing out what it would mean to follow an incentive in its full particularity, 
she says, on the one hand, that it would mean following an incentive as not “repre-
sentative of any sort of type” (of policy, say) and, on the other, that it would mean 
following it as “in no way ... further describable”. Focusing on the former (3a), we 
thought that she was making a point about the constitutive function of practical 
identities: since it is by adopting a practical identity that I constitute myself as a cer-
tain kind of person, as a person who does certain kinds of things and abstains from 
doing others, such an identity has to consist of standing commitments that are robust 
across the board. Accordingly, to follow an incentive on the condition that it is rep-
resentative of such an identity must be to follow it as an instance of a form of con-
duct that we are committed to in this robust way. Let us call this the “standing-
commitment thread” of her argument.135 There is another thread, however. For if we 
focus on premise 3b, then Korsgaard’s main point seems to be a different one: if 
there was such a thing as particularistic willing, it would not be a conceptual state or 
activity136 because, just in virtue of drawing on concepts, we already connect the par-
ticular case before us to other cases. But if we followed incentives non-conceptually, 
then we could neither succeed nor fail to act in a way that is representative of our 
practical identity, because practical identities are essentially conceptual entities.137 
After all, a practical identity is a “description under which you find your life to be 
worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking” (Korsgaard 1996b: 101, my 
emphasis). Let us call this the “willing-is-conceptual thread” of Korsgaard’s argu-
ment. Superficially, these two argumentative routes lead to the same conclusion, but 
we will see that the brands of Kantian generalism that they establish are very differ-
ent. 
The standing-commitment thread of the argument via premise 3a lends support 
to the view that willing is following incentives as instances of principles that hold for 																																																								
135 For a reading of Korsgaard’s argument in the Sources along these standing-commitment lines see 
Stern 2015: 58. 
136 We will briefly return to the question of whether willing is a state or an activity in connection with 
its temporal structure in sect. 3.2 below.  
137 This is a rough outline of an argument that we will elaborate on in sect. 2.1 below, albeit in a slight-
ly different form. Instead of asking what character a choice would have to have so that it be able to 
agree or disagree with a practical identity, we will ask a more general question, namely, what character 
a representation of an object would have to have so that it be able to agree or disagree with other 
representations of that object. 
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all cases or in all circumstances, and, relatedly, that good willing is willing in accordance 
with principles that really are universally valid in this sense. Since this is a claim about 
willing in general, a claim that extends to willing in accordance with principles of 
duty (e.g. ignoring an incentive to say something because it would be lying), it implies 
that the possibility of morally good willing rests on there being principles of duty that 
really do hold for all cases or in all circumstances. As such, the standing-commitment 
thread of the argument is a consideration in favour of what I will call the Case-Scope 
Reading of Universality – the reading that, despite all their attempts to tone it down, 
still figures as a benchmark in Herman’s and Korsgaard’s accounts and, ultimately, 
saddles them with the Trilemma.  
Universality(CS): The features in virtue of which actions have their deontic statuses can 
be captured in principles of duty that hold for all cases or in all circumstances.  
In addition, Universality(CS) draws support from what Dancy calls the “subsumptive 
conception of rationality” (1993: 84). According to this conception, we achieve con-
sistency in moral judgment by subsuming particular cases under general principles.138 
Thus, to morally judge a particular case in a way that is consistent with one’s other 
moral judgments, and hence to judge rationally, is to base one’s moral judgment on 
an argument of the following form: 
P1 All actions with features a, b, c, ... are impermissible. 
P2  This action has features a, b c, ...  
C Thus, this action is impermissible.  
The subsumptive conception presupposes that there is a comprehensive set of true 
Case-Scope universal principles of duty because, without them, arguments of this 
form would not be formally valid.139  
There is broad agreement that Kant subscribes to the subsumptive conception, 
and the textual evidence does indeed suggest as much. For not only does he define 
reason as the capacity to “cognize the particular in the universal” (CPR A300), he 
also identifies the will with practical reason on the grounds that “reason is required for 																																																								
138 For a more detailed explanation of why this conception is tempting, see McDowell 1998: 57-65.  
139 The set has to be comprehensive in the sense that, for any true judgment about the deontic status 
of a given action, we must be able to construct such an argument. If the set was not comprehensive, 
then some such judgments could not be adopted on a rational basis. 
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the derivation of actions from laws” (G 4:412). In developing an alternative reading 
of Universality, we will have to be sensitive to the fact that this idea of deriving actions 
from laws lies at the heart of Kant’s account of what it is to act for a reason. What 
we will not deal with, in the present chapter, is the specifically Korsgaardian concern 
that animates the standing-commitment argument. This concern will be addressed in 
ch. 5.  
What about the willing-is-conceptual thread of the argument via premise 3b? In 
what sense of “universally valid”, if any, does the claim that willing is a conceptual 
state or activity presuppose that the way in which features determine the deontic 
status of actions can be captured in universally valid principles? In other words, 
which brand of Kantian generalism does this claim support? This is the question that 
we will seek to answer in sect. 2. And although we will approach this question from 
within Kant’s texts rather than Korsgaard’s, we will discover some parallels between 
Kant’s reflections on concepts and universality, on the one hand, and the willing-is-
conceptual thread of Korsgaard’s anti-particularist argument, on the other (especially, 
if we see Korsgaard’s talk of describability there as anticipating her arguments for the 
publicity of reasons that is inspired by Wittgenstein’s arguments for the publicity of 
meaning (Korsgaard 2009: 196-206 and 1996b: 139-40, 144)).  
2.  The Agent-Scope Reading of Universality  
In the present section, following the methodological approach outlined in sect. 2 of 
the introduction, I will try to uncover Kant’s most fundamental reasons for thinking 
that, in order to acquire objective knowledge of a given domain, we need to grasp the 
goings-on in that domain through concepts, serving as universal rules. For once we 
know which role universal rules play in Kant’s account of cognition, we will be in a 
better position to decide which form such rules must exhibit in order to play this role 
– i.e. in which sense they must be universal. 
 I will begin by tracing one of Kant’s arguments in the Transcendental Deduc-
tion (sect. 2.1) in the hope to clarify the role of concepts, qua universal rules, in cog-
nition. Then I will show that a rule can play this role, and therefore count as strictly 
universal in the relevant sense, even if it does not hold in all circumstances, but only 
in a certain range of them, i.e., even if it is defeasible and admits of certain exceptions 
(sect. 2.2). Next I will exploit similarities between Kant’s view and inferentialism in 
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the theory of meaning in order to explain how it is possible to subsume particulars 
under defeasible rules (sect. 2.3). From there I will move on to the moral domain and 
draw on these insights about defeasible rules in order to make room for exceptions 
to Kant’s principles of duty in a way that is sensitive to the aim of accommodating 
the circumstance-dependence of our moral obligations (sect. 2.4). I will conclude by 
proposing a reading of Universality that reflects these insights and show how this 
reading does away with the Trilemma (sect. 2.5).  
2.1  Why Do We Need Concepts-Qua-Universal-Rules? 
In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant sets out to establish that the categories140 are 
objectively valid by showing that their objective validity is the condition of the possi-
bility of experiencing objects, and therefore also the condition of the possibility of 
the objects of experience themselves (CPR A84-130/B116-169). According to one 
line of argument in the Deduction,141 the manifold of sense, as an aggregate of merely 
subjective modifications of the mind, could not amount to representations of objects, 
of entities existing independently of our awareness of them, if it was not for the fact 
that we combine the elements of the manifold in accordance with concepts, serving 
as universal rules. Here is a trenchant formulation of the basic idea from the Second 
Analogy.142  
How do we come to posit an object for these representations, or ascribe to their 
subjective reality, as modifications [of the mind], some sort of objective reality?... 
If we investigate what new characteristic is given to our representations by the re-
lation to an object, and what is the dignity that they thereby receive, we find that it 
does nothing beyond making combinations of representations necessary in a cer-
tain way, and subjecting them to a rule. (CPR A197/B242) 																																																								
140 The categories are pure concepts of the understanding, such as the concept of a substance or the 
concept of a cause, which we cannot derive from experience but which we must draw on in experience, 
or so Kant argues. Kant’s table of categories can be found in CPR A80/B106. 
141 Since there are two versions of the Transcendental Deduction (A and B), each consisting of more 
than one line of argument, and since it is controversial how to best parse the text, the following sketch 
of the argument should not be seen as an attempt to do justice to the whole of Kant’s argument in the 
Deduction.  
142 Of course, this is not to say that the idea is not also articulated in the Transcendental Deduction 
itself. Here is an example: “We find ... that our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object 
carries something of necessity with it, since namely the latter is regarded as that which is opposed to 
our cognitions being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily ..., since insofar as they are to relate to an 
object our cognitions must also necessarily agree with each other in relation to it, i.e., they must have 
that unity that constitutes the concept of an object” (Kant CPR A105). 
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Kant says that the same rules “that give[ ] unity to the mere synthesis of different 
representations in an intuition,” namely concepts which serve as universal rules, also 
“give[ ] unity to the different representations in a judgment” (CPR A79/B104-5). And 
it is through this unity, that they bestow “the dignity” of a “relation to an object” on 
our representations. Our guiding question is this: in which sense must rules be universal 
in order to bestow this dignity on our moral judgments, i.e. our judgments that a 
given action has a certain deontic status? We shall answer this question indirectly, by 
asking why they need to be universal in order to bestow this dignity on intuitions.  
So let us focus on the passage where Kant answers the latter question: a section 
from the A-Deduction entitled “On the Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept” 
(CPR A103-10). I want to offer a brief reconstruction of Kant’s argument in the first 
part of this section, along with supporting textual evidence. However, before we can 
delve into the main argument, we need to review some background assumptions 
carried over from foregoing sections. Earlier, in the beginning of the “Transition to 
the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories”, Kant observes that the kind of 
non-accidental correspondence or coming-together of representation and object that 
make for an objectively valid representation – or, as we might say: knowledge – is 
possible only in two cases: if either the object grounds the possibility of the represen-
tation or the representation grounds the possibility of the object (CPR A92/ B124-5). 
Now, in the present section, he reminds us why, with regard to how the manifold of 
sense (as the matter of intuition) is combined (or formed), it is the latter grounding 
relation that explains any non-accidental correspondence, not the former.  
We have said above that appearances themselves are nothing but sensible repre-
sentations, which must not be regarded in themselves, in the same way, as objects 
(outside the power of representation) ... outside of our cognition we have noth-
ing that we could set over against this cognition ... we have to do only with the 
manifold. (Kant CPR A104-5) 
By the time he reaches the Transcendental Deduction, Kant has established that 
empirical objects are appearances, and that sensations are the only thing that we ever 
receive. So while, in Kant’s view, it is right to say that, in the good case, the combina-
tion of the manifold of sense in intuition corresponds to the combination of the 
parts or aspects of the object represented, and that it does so non-accidentally, it 
would be wrong to say that the former combination is grounded in or is the way it is 
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because of the latter. In making this kind of statement, we would betray a longing to 
“step outside” of our experience. For this reason, his argument in the Transcendental 
Deduction presupposes the following assumption:  
Background Assumption: With regard to the form or the manner of combination of the 
manifold, a non-accidental correspondence between object and representation is 
possible because the representation grounds the possibility of the object, not vice 
versa.  
Of course, this doesn’t mean that we can combine the elements of the manifold 
of sense in any way we like. In fact, it means the exact opposite, for to say that the 
very possibility of the object of experience hinges on something about how we com-
bine the manifold of sense is to say that the objective validity of a given combination 
– its correctness, its being what it ought to be – is determined by a criterion that lies 
within the bounds of experience. According to Kant, this formal criterion of correctness is 
the agreement of the resulting representation with other representations of the object 
or, in other words, unity among our representations of an object.    
We find ... that our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object carries 
something of necessity with it, since ... the latter is regarded as that which is 
opposed to our cognitions being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily ... insofar 
as they are to relate to an object our cognitions must also necessarily agree with 
each other in relation to it, i.e., have that unity that constitutes the concept of 
an object. (Kant CPR A104-5) 
When Kant says that the very thought of an object “carries something of necessity 
with it”, he means that the thought of something that is independent of us is the 
thought of something that we can get right or wrong, of something that we ought to 
represent in certain ways and not others.143 But how do we know whether we are 
getting it right, if we cannot step outside of our experience to compare our represen-
tations to the objects as they are in themselves? Kant’s suggestion, to put it crudely, 
is that we know that something has gone awry when our various representations of 																																																								
143 This reading is certainly not uncontroversial. Kant could also be thinking of a more specific kind of 
necessity, namely causal necessity, and not just of the generic kind of necessity that we find wherever 
there is normativity. My reading has an important advantage, however. It brings out that being related 
to an object or being objective is something that all cognitive judgments, including practical judgments, 
have in common. The way in which this more generic notion of necessity figures in Kant’s account of 
cognitive and aesthetic judgments has been explored in the work Hannah Ginsborg (see e.g. her 2006 
and 2011).  
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an object do not fit together, for example, when an object appears to us as being a 
certain way even though it cannot possibly be that way, given what we know about 
objects of this kind. If an apple tree that I saw a moment ago suddenly disappeared, 
or changed its colour or its size, or moved whenever I move, then I would know that 
something is wrong: that I am misrepresenting it in some way, perhaps imagining it, 
or hallucinating it or being tricked.144   
Premise 1: An intuition of an object could not correspond to that object non-
accidentally (i.e., be objectively valid or correct), if the manifold of sense in it 
was not combined in such a way that the intuition can agree or disagree with 
other representations of the object.  
On this basis, Kant goes on to establish the need for concepts, for, in his view, 
there could be no such agreement if the manifold of sense was not combined in ac-
cordance with concepts, serving as universal rules.145 Consider another experiential 
event that would make me suspicious:  
Apple Tree: I approach an apple tree to touch its trunk, only to find that it gives in, 
allowing my hand to go right through to its core.  
In which sense, if any, does the representation of this part of the object as penetrable 
fail to agree with my representation of the whole object as an apple tree? It fails to 
agree with the latter representation in the sense that it defies my expectations, given 
what I know about apple trees in general.  
Recall that intuitions, as such, are representations of particulars: of this or that 
object (CPR B377). Kant realized that, if an intuition, as the representation of a par-
ticular, did not contain anything that, as it were, “reaches beyond” the particular item 
intuited, it could neither agree nor disagree with other representations of that item.146 
So in order for my representation of the relevant part of the object as penetrable to 
conflict with my representation of the whole object as an apple tree, I have to know 																																																								
144 James Van Cleve articulates this idea in the following way: “If a red, round apple lies on the table 
before me, the course of my experience will not be a matter of ‘anything goes’; rather, experiences of 
grasping and turning will be followed by further experiences of redness and roundness, experiences of 
lifting and biting by experiences of crispness and tartness, and so on” (1999: 92). 
145 Kant uses the term “representation” very broadly. His discussion of judgments, concepts, and 
intuitions and their relation to one another can be understood as an attempt to fill in the details: to say 
how our representations must be structured to afford objective knowledge.  
146 Now we can see that the argument under consideration is a more general version of the argument 
contained in the willing-is-conceptual thread of Korsgaard’s anti-particularist argument (see sect. 1).  
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something general about how things stand with apple trees under circumstances of 
this kind. I have to know a rule, e.g. that, unless someone or something has tampered 
with it, an apple tree has a completely impenetrable trunk. This rule is supplied by the 
concept. It is by seeing the object in front of me as an apple tree, by interpreting and 
combining the patches of green and brown, the rustling sound, etc., in accordance 
with that concept, that I form the expectation that I would feel something coarse and 
resistant if I were to touch a certain part of it. If things turn out otherwise, then my 
actual sensations will defy my expectations, and I will have reason to suspect that 
something has gone awry and to abstain from judgment.  
We have seen why there could be no agreement or disagreement without rules. 
But why do the rules have to be strictly universal? After all, it is perfectly common to 
form expectations on the basis of mere generalizations or observational patterns, 
where the possibility of exceptions is left open. Nevertheless, Kant clearly insists on 
the strict universality of the rules in question or, as he also puts it, on the necessity of 
the connections that these rules assert. He says, for example: 
The concept of body serves as the rule for our cognition of outer appearances by 
means of the unity of the manifold that is thought through it. However, it can be 
a rule of intuitions only if it represents the necessary reproduction of the mani-
fold of given intuitions ... Thus in the case of the perception of something out-
side of us the concept of body makes necessary the representation of extension, 
and with it that of impenetrability, of shape, etc. (Kant CPR A106)   
It is true, of course, that, even without any strictly universal rules, our manner of 
combining the manifold of sense would not have to be entirely random: we could 
pick up on patterns in the succession of sensations and form habits of association.147 
What is noteworthy, however, is that no distortion of such a pattern could ever 
amount to a real disagreement or contradiction, which is what we are trying to ensure 
is possible. If we did not regard the rules that constitute our concepts of empirical 
objects as strictly universal, as laws of nature that are valid for all actual and possible 
objects and events,148  if, instead, we viewed them as something that holds true most 																																																								
147 This is how David Hume would explain the unity or coherence of our experiences: by appeal to 
customs or habits of the mind (2007: 5.1.5-6). 
148 When Kant says that a rule is “strictly universal”, he means that it is not just contingently universal 
but rather necessarily universal. This is the kind of universality that is characteristic of laws. We will 
come back to this distinction in ch. 5, sect. 1. 
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of the time, we could not say that certain ways of representing an object are ruled out 
by representing it as falling under a certain concept. So in order to play the role that 
Kant assigns to them, concepts have to do more than merely generalize over our past 
experiences. They have to set standards that determine what has to be true of objects 
falling under them in circumstances of a certain kind, no matter how we happen to 
experience these objects.149 This brings us to the second premise of Kant’s argument. 
Premise 2: An intuition of an object could neither agree nor disagree with other repre-
sentations of that object if the manifold of sense in it was not combined in ac-
cordance with a concept serving as a universal rule. 
From these two premises, Kant can infer the conclusion that he is after: 
Conclusion: An intuition of an object could not correspond to that object non-
accidentally (i.e. be objectively valid or correct), if the manifold of sense in it 
was not combined in accordance with a concept serving as a universal rule.  
 Relatedly, an intuition could not have objective purport (i.e. be of an object), if, in 
combining the manifold of sense in it, we were not subject to a universal rule 
supplied by a concept.     
For our present purposes, the main point of the argument is this. The significance of 
the criterion of agreement and, by extension, of concepts qua universal rules, lies in 
the fact that they ensure that “our cognitions [are not] determined at pleasure or arbi-
trarily” (CPR A104). We have to rely on universal rules because they alone make it 
possible, in principle, to distinguish from within between combinations of the manifold 
of sense that are thoroughly objective and those that reflect an undue influence of 
merely subjective factors, e.g. the perspective of the subject or their cognitive limita-
tions. Accordingly, a combination is objectively valid insofar as it accords with the 
relevant rule, and subjectively distorted insofar as it does not. This is why Kant says 
that, in order to acquire knowledge of an objective world, we must represent objects 
in this world as governed by universal laws (CPR A114, A125, A127, B160-1, B163-
5). Having explored Kant’s argument for this conclusion, we can now focus on what 
he means when he says that a rule is universally valid. 																																																								
149 Note that, at this point, I do not mean to commit myself to any claim about the content or internal 
structure of such rules or any claim about the way in which they interact with one another. Speaking 
of strict universality, I only mean to indicate that these rules must differ from habits of association in a 
way that secures the possibility of agreement and disagreement.   
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2.2  Two Kinds of Counterfactual Robustness 
In discussing the Apple Tree example, I said that my various representations of the 
apple tree could neither agree nor disagree with one another if they contained no 
general knowledge of what to expect of an apple tree under these kinds of circumstances. 
With this addendum, I was hinting at a point that it is now time to make explicit, 
namely that the significance accorded to universal validity in Kant’s argument lends 
no support to the claim that the rules that we rely on in synthesising the manifold of 
sense in intuition must be robust across variations in circumstances insofar as these 
affect how things stand with the object. We can add some detail to the Apple Tree case 
to illustrate the point. 
Imagine, once again, that, contrary to my expectations, the tree trunk gives in 
when I touch it. I could come up with various different explanations. Some of these 
explanations will disqualify (a subset of) my perceptions as grounds for perceptual 
judgment: perhaps there is actually no apple tree, so that my haptic perception of 
penetrability is veridical, whereas my visual perception of the tree is hallucinatory; or 
perhaps there is a tree, so that my visual perception of the tree is veridical, but my 
haptic perception of its trunk as penetrable is illusory; or perhaps it is dark and the 
object that I mistook for an apple tree is in fact a piece of clothing on a clothes line. 
However, there might be other explanations, explanations that do not disqualify any 
of my perceptions as grounds for perceptual judgment. After all, there are certain 
circumstances in which trunks of apple trees do have penetrable parts – for example, 
when woodpeckers have bored holes in them. In this case, all my representations of 
the object, taken individually, would be correct.  
Given what we have said so far, this is a somewhat puzzling possibility. On the 
one hand, my perceptual expectations seem to have been generated on the basis of 
the rule “If x is an apple tree, x has a completely impenetrable trunk”, so the fact that 
my actual sensations fail to agree with the sensations that this rule makes necessary 
suggests that some of my representations of the object are incorrect or subjectively 
distorted. On the other hand, all my representations of the apple tree seem correct or 
objectively valid. If we want to make sense of the veridicality of my representations, 
while staying within the Kantian framework that we sketched above, we have three 
options. Either we argue 1) that the rule that I purportedly relied on, the one cited 
above, is not truly universal and therefore flawed, or 2) that my expectations were 
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actually generated by a different rule, or 3) that a rule can be universal, in the sense 
that matters to Kant, despite allowing for certain exceptions. For reasons that are 
similar to those that led us to reject Korsgaard’s appeal to provisional universality 
(ch. 2, sect. 2.2) and those that we cited in support of the Asymmetry desideratum (ch. 
2, sect. 1), I favour the third account.  
Regarding the first account, it is worth noting that the mere fact that my actual 
sensations fly in the face of my initial expectations does not show that I did not 
know that this sort of thing can happen. Initially, I may not have been fully aware of 
the circumstances, not aware that the tree had become the nesting site of a wood-
pecker, but upon noticing the hole, I might say to myself: “Oh, wow, a woodpecker 
nest!”. If that was my reaction, it would seem inappropriate to say that my perceptual 
experience was guided by a flawed concept of an apple tree, that it relied on a rule 
that fell short of the universality needed to establish unity among my representations, 
or that it was based on a misconception of the laws of nature that govern apple trees 
in their interaction with other things and beings. The reason why I had the wrong 
expectations is not that my perception of the tree was guided by a flawed concept, but 
that I was not aware of all the relevant facts, that I was not aware of the applicability 
of additional concepts.150 In order to appreciate the difference between these two 
explanations, compare this version of the Apple Tree example to an example where 
the experiencing subject really is relying on a rule that is not properly universal: 
someone who has never seen or heard of black swans, for instance, and, therefore, 
assuming that all swans are white, misperceives a black swan as an odd-looking black 
cormorant. Here the perceptual experience is subjectively distorted. The lesson to be 
learned from this comparison is that it is one thing to think of the goings-on of a 
certain kind of object as sensitive to the presence of other objects and states of af-
fairs, and another thing to be wrong about what those goings-on are in the first 
																																																								
150 This example illustrates that Kant commentators are wrong when they say either that concepts-qua-
universal-rules are to be understood as criteria for classifying experiences as veridical or non-veridical 
and that Kant was confused when he thought that, for objective knowledge, these rules had to play a 
role in synthesising the manifold (Bennett 1966: 61-2; Strawson 1966: 88-9); or when they maintain 
that these rules are imperatives that we ought to follow in synthesising the manifold, and that our 
experiences are veridical to the extent that we do (Beck 1998: 103; for this distinction see, i.a., Van 
Cleve 1999: 94). The truth lies in the middle: the veridicality of our experiences depends on whether 
we synthesise the manifold of sense such that our experiences can be unified in accordance with con-
cepts-qua-universal-rules, no matter whether we manage to thus unify them on any given occasion, 
e.g. whether or not we realize that we have found a woodpecker nest.  
	 97 
place. The woodpecker version of the Apple Tree case falls into the former category, 
so the rule relied on is universal.151  
Having ruled out the first account, we can now compare the second and third. 
Proponents of both accounts accept that the rule used to generate my perceptual 
expectations is universal, both trace the lack of agreement between expected and 
actual sensations to my initial ignorance of the nesting activity, and both agree that 
my appreciation of the causal impact of the woodpecker on the apple tree restores 
the agreement between my representations, thus rendering them fully intelligible. The 
point of disagreement between them is only whether the fact that the rule is universal 
entails that the knowledge required to grasp the goings-on as a causal interaction 
between woodpecker and apple tree is encoded in the very rule relied on in combining 
the manifold of sense in the intuition of an apple tree, or whether it doesn’t, whether 
that knowledge could instead be knowledge of how this rule operates in different 
circumstances, e.g. knowledge of when it is valid and when it is not. According to the 
second account, it does. On this account, if my expectations were generated on the 
basis of a universal rule, the rule would have to read: “If x is an apple tree and x has 
not become the nesting site of a woodpecker, then x has a completely impenetrable 
trunk”.152 According to the third account, it does not. On this account, a rule can be 
universal, in the sense relevant to Kant, even if its validity is circumstance-dependent. 
The question that we have now arrived at is the question from which we began, 
namely: can a rule be universal, in the relevant sense, if it does not hold in all cases or 
in all circumstances, if it is a defeasible rule that admits of exceptions? (This, recall, is 
what we need in order to reconcile our three desiderata. If we were to build all poten-
tial defeaters into the rule itself, as the second account has it, we would violate 
Asymmetry. So if both accounts are viable, the third is to be preferred).153    																																																								
151 This is the lesson that we accused Korsgaard of ignoring. The reductio argument against her Two 
Standpoint View (ch. 2, sect. 2.2) brought out that we should not treat the acknowledgment that there 
are defeaters as mistakes.   
152 Of course, since the whole point of this move is to be able to insist that I relied on an appropriate 
concept or fully universal rule, the list of exceptional cases that would have to be ruled out would be 
much longer. 
153 My aim here is limited. It is merely to show that, given the role that universality plays in Kant’s 
account, he can say that a rule is universal despite admitting of exceptions, not that he should say this. If 
I wanted to argue that he should favour this view over the second account, I would adduce the kinds 
of considerations that I presented in ch. 2, sect. 1 to motivate the Asymmetry desideratum. I would 
note, for example, that proponents of the theoretical counterpart of the Fine Print Reading would 
have us believe that it is part of mastering the rule that first enables us to perceive trees that we know 
about the nesting practices of a certain bird species, and that, if we did not possess this understanding, 
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Now that we know why universality matters to Kant, we can reformulate the 
question as follows: could we rely on the rules that constitute our concepts of objects 
to distinguish, from within experience, between objectively valid and subjectively dis-
torted ways of synthesising the manifold of sense, if these rules did not hold in all 
circumstances? The answer to this question, I would argue, is yes. For the possibility 
of agreement and disagreement between my different representations of an object is 
secured by the standards set by all the rules that make up my understanding of the 
objective world together, not by any one rule on its own. So as long as an exception to 
a given rule can be justified from within the relevant system of rules as a whole, it is 
not the kind of exception that, if deemed legitimate, would erode the distinction be-
tween objectively valid and subjectively distorted ways of combining the manifold of 
sense and, as such, undermine the very possibility of agreement and disagreement.154 
(Of course, this claim raises questions about the logical form of these defeasible rules 
and about how they restrict each other; we will address these questions in a moment).  
Given the cognitive role that Kant attributes to universal rules, it is thus unprob-
lematic to say that the rule “If x is an apple tree, x has a completely impenetrable 
trunk” is universal, even though the woodpecker version of the Apple Tree example 
constitutes an exception to that rule; or that the concept of an apple tree, on its own, 
makes necessary the representation of a completely impenetrable trunk but that, in 
combination with the concept of a nesting woodpecker, it does not; or, again, that 
the operation of the laws that govern apple trees depends on circumstantial features 
insofar as these are deemed relevant by the system of laws that govern nature as a 
whole.155 What the operation of these laws cannot and does not depend on are cir-
cumstantial features which appear to be relevant to the subject because of a distorting 
factor that bears on how they combine the manifold of sense, but which, according 
to the system in which these laws are embedded, are not. Think of someone who has 
taken a hallucinatory drug that makes them feel as if they can walk through walls. If it 																																																																																																																																																							
this knowledge gap would prove that none of our perceptions of trees are ever veridical – which is a 
rather implausible thing to say.  
154 In this respect, it differs from the kinds of exceptions that would be deemed legitimate within a 
framework like Hume’s, in which the combination of the manifold of sense is thought to be based on 
mere habits of association. See fn. 147.  
155 This point is worth stressing: the above rule is strictly universal despite being defeasible and, unlike a 
Humean generalization (see fn. 147), it qualifies as a proper law, although it is a ceteris paribus law (see 
ch. 2, sect. 2.3.2). It is strictly universal or a proper law in the sense that, whichever conditions must 
obtain for the relevant link to obtain, whenever they do obtain, the link obtains as well.  
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was the drug intake that explained why they found themselves having the kinds of 
sensations that would otherwise indicate that the object that they are touching is 
penetrable, then their perception of penetrability would be non-veridical. And any 
attempt on their part to restore agreement between their representations by appeal to 
circumstantial features that are taken to bear on the object, e.g. the “fact” that it is 
witching hour, would result in a false judgment.156 We can capture the sense in which 
conceptual rules have to be universal more precisely by distinguishing between two 
kinds of counterfactual robustness. A universal rule, such as “If x is an apple tree, x 
has a completely impenetrable trunk”, needn’t be robust across variations in objectively 
relevant circumstances (i.e. circumstances that bear on how things go with the object that 
is represented). But it must be robust across both actual and possible variations in 
merely subjectively relevant circumstances (i.e. circumstances that merely appear to bear on 
how things go with the object because of some distorting factor that bears on the 
subject that is doing the representing).157 This means that universal rules can be defea-
sible in the sense that there can be objectively relevant features of the circumstances 
that function as defeaters.158 In the next section, I will elaborate on this conception of 
defeasibility and examine whether rules that are, in this sense, defeasible can do the 
kind of work that motivates proponents of the subsumptive conception of rationality 
to posit Case-Scope universal rules. This is important if we want to make sense of 
Kant’s claim that we derive actions from laws. 																																																								
156 What they could do, however, is restore agreement between their representations by appeal to the 
distorting factor and its impact on their capacities: they could realize that they are intoxicated and on 
this basis discount the perception of penetrability as not indicative of the character of the tree. 
157 In bad cases the third-personal explanation of why a subject judged the way they did differs from 
the explanation or justification that the subject themselves would offer if challenged. The third-
personal explanation would appeal to the relevant distorting factor, e.g. the drug intake, whereas the 
first-personal explanation or justification would appeal to the purportedly objective but in fact merely 
subjective circumstantial feature, e.g. the “fact” that it is witching hour. In good cases, by contrast, the 
two explanations coincide.  
158 It seems to me that Stephen Engstrom is expressing the same idea when he says: “A judgment has 
objective universal validity just if ... the act of predication ... is valid for all objects falling under its 
concept ... Such objective universality does not, however, imply that the cognition of each object 
falling under the judgment’s concept would actually agree with the cognition of every other in assert-
ing the judgment’s predicate of its object. Such actual agreement cannot be assumed in the case of 
contingent judgments, such as those of experience ... In the case of such judgments, objective univer-
sal validity implies only that all the objects that can be brought under the judgment’s concept would 
have its predicate asserted of them in the cognition of them provided that they were in such conditions as is 
the object of the judgment. The judgment that the water in the pond is frozen, for example, in relying on 
the concept water, implicitly involves the universal judgment that any bit of water, when in the conditions 
of the water in the pond, must be frozen – a judgment in which such conditions, though unspecified in 
the judgment itself, are implicitly regarded as sufficient to determine the water to be frozen” (2009: 
116, my emphasis). He does not explore the implications of this idea any further, however. 
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2.3 Defeasible Rules and Subsumption 
If the rules that our concepts supply are defeasible in ways that are not encoded or 
anticipated in the rules themselves, then it seems that consistency in judgment – or, 
in Kant’s terms, agreement or unity – cannot be secured by subsuming particular 
cases under such rules. Consider how we might try to secure consistency in the Apple 
Tree case. 
P1   If x is an apple tree, x has a completely impenetrable trunk. 
P2  This is an apple tree. 
C This has a completely impenetrable trunk.  
If the rule in P1 is defeasible, if it holds in some but not all cases, then the inference 
is formally invalid: the conclusion does not follow from the premises.159 So from the 
point of view of those who accept the subsumptive conception of rationality, those 
who think that there is no consistency without formally valid inferences, our account 
of conceptual rules as defeasible must look problematic. But, as we will see, the sub-
sumptive conception is not without alternatives. It is not the only way to make sense 
of Kant’s idea that we “cognize the particular in the universal through concepts” in 
order to secure “the highest unity of thinking” (CPR A299-300/B355-357). 
Note that the subsumptive conception of rationality rests on an assumption. It 
assumes that, in saying “This is an apple tree”, I am not committing myself to any 
claim about the penetrability of its trunk. For if I did, if, in thinking “This is an apple 
tree”, I already thought “This has an impenetrable trunk”, then I would not need P1 
to derive C from P2. So, according to the subsumptive conception, P2 (even when 
combined with the claim that the circumstances are objective suitable) does not entail 
C. Instead, whether C is true is independent of whether P2 is true, each being a matter of 
whether they correctly represent the properties of the object referred to. Knowing 
the rule in P1 might make it easier to figure out whether the trunk-part of the object 																																																								
159 At this point, we might be tempted to add a hedging clause and restate the rule such that it does 
hold in all cases after all, e.g. as follows: “In objectively suitable circumstances, if x is an apple tree, x has a 
completely impenetrable trunk”. In that case, one would need a further premise to reach a determinate 
conclusion about whether one’s judgment about a particular (“This has a completely impenetrable 
trunk”) is consistent with one’s other judgments. One would need the premise that the circumstances 
at hand are objectively suitable. However, the rule itself provides no criterion on the basis of which 
one could decide whether a set of circumstances is objectively suitable or not. So this hedging strategy 
does not seem to get us closer to our goal.  
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in front of me is penetrable if I already know that it is an apple tree and cannot be 
bothered to touch it, or it might help me to predict what I will feel if I touch it, but 
none of this is required for either of the judgments to be true or objectively valid.  
This assumption is in direct opposition to Kant’s view, as outlined in sect. 2.1 
above. Recall that, according to Kant, we can only make objectively valid judgments, 
judgments that refer to and are true of objects, because we intuit and cognize these ob-
jects through concepts, such as the concept of an apple tree, which, all by itself, serves 
as a rule, allowing me to infer what else can, cannot or must be true of an object that 
falls under it, given the circumstances in which it is embedded.160 This view, the view 
that inference comes before reference, is a view that Kant shares with so-called infer-
entialists in the theory of meaning.161 For this reason, it should not come as a surprise 
that it is in their writings that we find an account of how defeasible rules can figure in 
valid inferences that secure consistency in judgment.    
According to inferentialists, we have to extend the inferential role account of 
meaning, which is usually taken to cover logical terms only, to non-logical terms, i.e., 
to terms whose meaning is usually understood in referential terms (see e.g. Peregrin 
2014: 25). Consider the material conditional as an example. There is broad agreement 
that the meaning of the material conditional can be articulated by saying that “If x is 																																																								
160 Kant makes this point over and over again. He says, for example, that an “object is no more than 
that something, the concept of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis” (CPR A106) and that 
“an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united” (CPR B137). 
Some commentators have read these remarks as indicating that Kant is a phenomenalist. James Van 
Cleve, for example, moves from the claim that “Kant defines an object as something the concept of which 
plays a certain role” – a claim I agree with and highlight above – to the claim that Kant endorses a 
“reductive account of objects”. On this account, “to say that there is an apple before me is equivalent to 
saying that I am having certain sorts of experiences (intuitions), and that if I (or other observers simi-
larly placed) were to perform certain actions, they would have further experiences of predictable 
sorts” (1999: 92-3). What Van Cleve is missing here is the normativity that concepts bring into the 
picture. To apply a concept, e.g. to say that the object before me is an apple, is not to predict that, if I 
perform certain actions, I will have certain experiences, but to say that, if I perform these actions, I 
ought to have these experiences, and that, if I don’t, something must have gone wrong. As I said earlier, 
this is precisely how concepts make it possible for us to have experiences of objects.  
161 The view that Kant is an inferentialist has recently been defended by David Landy (2015). Landy 
argues that this reading allows us to make sense of Kant’s case against Hume. In his view, Kant raises 
two objections against Hume’s theory of representation, namely, first, that Hume cannot account for 
the possibility of representing complex states of affairs as complex (Landy 2015: 62) and, second, that 
he cannot account for the unity of the proposition (2015: 91-2). Landy shows that, given these points 
of criticism, it is only be interpreting Kant as an inferentialist that we can see how his own theory of 
representation solves the problems that he finds in Hume. On this reading, Kant thinks of concepts as 
rules or functions that place intuitions in inferential relations, thus locating them in an inferentially 
structured system of cognitions (Landy 2015: 64-80, 92-101). Landy’s reading is inspired by Wilfrid 
Sellars’ reading of Kant and his talk of counterpart relations (see Sellars 1968: 26-30, 63-67). For other 
inferentialist readings of Kant, see Rosenberg 2005: 91-4 and O’Shea 2012: 128-32. 
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F, then x is G” is false, unless whenever “x is F” is true “x is G” is true as well. But 
many philosophers would argue that this is not how we should articulate the meaning 
of terms such as “apple tree”. Instead, they would suggest articulating the meaning of 
“apple tree” by citing the conditions that have to obtain in order for the claim “x is 
an apple tree” to be true. Here inferentialists disagree. In their view, we can articulate 
the meaning of “apple tree” by saying things like the following: in objectively suitable 
circumstances, “x is an apple tree” is false unless “x has a completely impenetrable 
trunk” is true.162 To say that the meaning of both logical and non-logical terms consists 
in their inferential role is to say that inference (2) below is just as self-contained as 
inference (1), that it is not an enthymeme, and that we should not assume that there 
is some additional premise that has been omitted (see Sellars 1953, Brandom 1994: 
95-105, 2000: 52-4, Peregrin 2014: 27-9).163 
(1) If x is F, then x is G. 
 x is F. 
 Therefore, x is G. 
(2) x is an apple tree. 
 Therefore, x has a completely impenetrable trunk. 
If we think that (1) is valid as it stands, then this is only because we take the meaning 
of “if ... then ...” to be fixed. By the same token, we can treat the meaning of “apple 
tree” as fixed and regard (2) as valid and self-contained. Following Wilfrid Sellars 
(1953), inferentialists call the rule underlying (1) a formal rule of inference and the rule 
underlying (2) a material rule of inference. We need to highlight two implications of 
this broader conception of rules of inference.  
The first concerns the issue that brought us here: the nexus between being an 
apple tree and having a completely impenetrable trunk is defeasible, so if we call the 
rule governing the inference in (2) a rule of inference,164 then we have to abandon the 
idea that rules of inference are generally indefeasible. (However, as inferentialists are 
keen to emphasize, we might have good reasons to abandon this idea anyway, even 																																																								
162 This, of course, is just a different way of saying what Kant says: that concepts serve as rules. 
163 In fact, according to inferentialists, if we thought that (2) relied on an implicit premise (as stated by 
Bertrand Russell in his 1914: 66), we would ultimately face the same infinite regress that Lewis Carroll 
(1895) cautioned against when reflecting on formal inferences such as (1).   
164 The alternative would be to call it a (supressed) major premise.  
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when it comes to purportedly bulletproof rules of inference such as the rule in (1), 
i.e. modus ponens (McGee 1985)). Relatedly, we must abandon the idea that good 
inferences, i.e. inferences by means of which we can “cognize the particular in the 
universal” and thus secure consistency in judgment, have to be indefeasible, that they 
must survive the addition of any further premise whatsoever. I believe that we can 
abandon this idea. Recall what it takes for a judgment about a given particular to be 
consistent (in agreement, in unity) with our other judgments: it must fit in with what 
we know about objects of this kind. Note, further, that understanding which premises 
render a material inference (e.g. (2)) invalid is part of understanding the inferential 
role of the relevant term (e.g. “apple tree”). Thus, for an inferentialist, articulating the 
meaning of (at least) ordinary, non-logical terms, such as the term “apple tree”, is a 
matter of “construct[ing] ... inferential hierarchies with oscillating conclusions like 
[the following]” (Brandom 2000: 88). 
(2) x is an apple tree. Therefore, x has a completely impenetrable trunk. 
(3) x is an apple tree. And x has become the nesting site of a woodpecker. There-
fore, x does not have a completely impenetrable trunk. 
(4)  x is an apple tree. And x has become the nesting site of a woodpecker. And x 
has been patched up by a gardener. Therefore, x has a completely impenetrable 
trunk. 
 Etc. 
This hierarchy expresses some of what we know about apple trees, namely what we 
know about the penetrability of their trunks, and therefore it is only in light of this 
hierarchy as a whole that a judgment about the penetrability of a particular apple tree 
trunk can be assessed for consistency. 
With this in mind, we can restate a point from sect. 2.2 above in inferentialist 
terms. There we observed that the woodpecker exception is an exception that does 
not erode the distinction between objective and merely subjective combinations of 
the manifold of sense, because it is an exception that is intelligible from within the 
relevant system of rules as a whole. Now we can give the same explanation of why 
this exception is innocuous, albeit in slightly different terms: it is innocuous because 
the rule that “having become the nesting site of a woodpecker” is a defeater is part of 
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our shared understanding of the term “apple tree”, part of the meaning of this term. 
As such, it binds anyone who uses it. It is, in other words, not up to the individual user 
to treat this feature as a defeater. They ought to treat it as such, no matter what subjec-
tive condition they are in (no matter if they have taken drugs or if they are having 
hallucinations, etc.). 
The second implication of the view that the inferential role account of meaning 
should be extended to non-logical terms is that there is no sharp distinction between 
analytic and synthetic truths, at least not in the contemporary sense. In the context of 
an interpretation of Kant, this might seem particularly problematic, given that he is 
the one who first introduced the distinction. The attempt to examine this implication 
in full detail would take us far beyond the scope of this thesis, but let me indicate 
how one could go about overcoming this concern. To begin with, we should note 
that, for Kant, the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments is not that the 
former are made true by language, while the latter are made true by the world. Instead, 
he defines analytic judgments as those where “the predicate B is (covertly) contained 
in [the subject] concept A”, and synthetic judgments as those where “B lies entirely 
outside ... A, though to be sure it stands in connection with it” (CPR A6). This way 
of understanding the analytic-synthetic distinction leaves open the possibility that the 
manifold of sense (the “world-element”) enters into cognition not only as material 
that we synthesise in accordance with ready-made concepts (as a “truth-maker”),165 
but also as something that shapes the formation of concepts (Sellars 1953: 336-7).166 
Accordingly, we can attribute a given nexus, e.g. the nexus between apple trees and 
completely impenetrable trunks, to the world, without having to deny that this nexus 
has made its way into our language and become part of our shared understanding of 
a term.167 The judgment expressing this nexus will be synthetic, in Kant’s sense, if it 
																																																								
165 Strictly speaking, we should not use the term “truth-maker” in connection with Kant’s theory. This 
term is misleading because, for Kant, the manifold of sense, simply as such, has no objective purport 
at all. Prior to being synthesised, it cannot make anything true or false.   
166 In fact, this is exactly what Kant says when he discusses the formation of empirical concepts. In his 
view, it is by comparing, reflecting on, and abstracting from our intuitions of particulars that we form 
concepts of empirical objects (JL 9:94). 
167 For a detailed discussion of how it is possible that our empirical concepts are both derived from 
experience and presupposed in perceptual synthesis, see Newton 2015.  
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can only be established on the basis of a ground (or reason) that is not already con-
tained in it, and analytic if it can be established without any such external ground.168 
 In fact, what initially seemed like a major drawback of the inferentialist reading, 
namely the blurring of the line between language-based and world-based truths, will 
turn out to be one of its most important advantages. For once we realize that even 
binding semantic norms are open to challenges, and that, in fact, we often challenge 
each other’s views about what to believe and how to live by challenging each other’s 
ways of speaking, we can see how it is possible to maintain that the intersubjective 
intelligibility of a domain depends on its being law-governed without denying that 
there is open-endedness and disagreement around the edges.169 
2.4 The I That Judges and the I That Acts 
It is now time to come back to the moral domain and carry over what we have 
learned so far. Recall our starting point: at the end of sect. 1, we set out on a lengthy 
excursion into Kant’s theoretical philosophy because we were hoping that, if we re-
think Kant’s talk of universality in light of the idea that, like perception, willing is a 
conceptual state or activity, we might come closer to a more suitable conception of 
defeasibility that dissolves the Trilemma. We found that a conceptual rule can be de-
feasible in the sense that it can play its role in cognition without being robust across 
objectively relevant variations in circumstances, as determined by the system of rules 
as a whole or, more precisely, by the inferential hierarchy that articulates the relevant 
aspect of the concept’s meaning. In the following, we will draw on these insights to 
explain how Kant’s principles of duty can be universally valid despite being defeasible 
and admitting of certain kinds of exceptions. In order to do this, we need to conceive 
of principles of duty as hierarchically nested rules of inference that articulate the 
meanings of what we might call “deontic concepts”: concepts that mark the action 
kinds they designate as impermissible or obligatory by default, e.g. the concept of a 
lie or the concept of a promise.170 (Note that, in doing so, we pick up where we left 																																																								
168 For a more text-based discussion of how an inferentialist interpretation of Kant can accommodate 
his synthetic-analytic distinction, see Landy 2015: 68-9. 
169 It is by admitting that there is this open-endedness (which I highlighted in ch. 2, sect. 2.3.2, when 
motivating the Asymmetry desideratum) that we earn the right to blur the line between language-based 
and world-based truths without committing ourselves to the absurd view that mastering an empirical 
concept requires complete scientific knowledge of the relevant phenomenon. 
170 I should clarify two points. First, it is worth noting that we can formulate principles of duty that 
contain no deontically loaded terms. Here is an example: “Making a believed-false statement to anoth-
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off at the end of sect. 1: following the lead of Korsgaard’s premise 3b, we explicate 
what it means to think of willing as a conceptual state or activity). Furthermore, we 
need to assume that these deontic-concepts-qua-principles-of-duty enable us to ac-
quire objective knowledge. The first question is this: which objects do deontic-
concepts-qua-principles-of-duty enable us to acquire knowledge of? 
 Principles of duty tend to be formulated in the following way: “Lying is imper-
missible”, “Breaking promises is impermissible”, “Helping people in an emergency is 
obligatory”, etc. This suggests that deontic concepts enable us to acquire knowledge 
of actions, that, by bringing a particular action under a deontic concept, we acquire 
knowledge of its deontic status. If we were to adopt this view, then we could use the 
inferentialist framework outlined above to say all the things that we wanted to say: 
that these principles are defeasible, that they have to be robust across variations in 
circumstances that are merely subjectively relevant but not across variations that are 
objectively relevant, that they admit of certain exceptions, namely exceptions that are 
licensed by our shared understanding of the relevant deontic concept, etc. This is not 
Kant’s view, however, and it is a view that, I think, is in various ways inferior to 
Kant’s.171 Let me begin by citing some textual evidence – the more substantive reason 
for rejecting the idea that we acquire knowledge of actions will come into view when 
the details of my interpretation are in place.  
When drawing the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge, Kant 
characterizes the former as knowledge of “what is” and the latter as efficacious 
knowledge of “what ought to be” (CPR Bix-x, A633/B661, CPrR 46). That practical 
knowledge is supposed to be causally efficacious, that it is supposed to make its object 
actual (CPR Bx), means that it must be knowledge not merely of what ought to be 
but, more specifically, knowledge of what I ought to do. After all, if I did not take my 																																																																																																																																																							
er person with the intention that the other person believe that statement to be true is impermissible”. 
(This is the traditional definition of lying (see Mahon 2008a: §1)). However, far from disproving our 
hypothesis that principles of duty articulate the meanings of deontic concepts, this merely goes to 
show that the inferential role of a concept can be articulated without using it. In the case of a deontic 
concept, this can be achieved by simply linking the conditions of its application directly to the deontic 
consequences of its application. On this point see Peregrin 2014: 21-5. Second, for the time being, we 
are interested in principles of duty, so we can leave aside the question of whether there are concepts 
that mark actions as by default permissible. For to say that an action is permissible is simply to say that 
there is neither a duty to perform it nor a duty to abstain from it. We will come back to the domain of 
the permissible in sect. 3.2. 
171 This indicates that my response to the Particularist Challenge consists of two potentially independent 
parts. I hope that my discussion will make clear why both parts are important and why they should be 
combined.  
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judgment that things ought to be thus and so to stand in any relation to me, then that 
judgment would not play any role in making it the case that things are thus and so 
(Engstrom 2009: 118-21). Other aspects of Kant’s discussion confirm the idea that, 
for him, judging practically (and thus: judging morally) is a matter of predicating of 
oneself what one ought or ought not to do. Think of how he goes about establishing 
the possibility of hypothetical and categorical imperatives. In both cases, he aims to 
show that we have the right to say of certain agents that they ought to do something. In 
the former case, this is meant to be easy: that an agent who wills a certain end ought 
to take the means to this end is thought to follow analytically from their willing the 
end (G 4:417-20). In the latter case, the task is more difficult: that any rational agent, 
simply as such, ought to do what morality demands is a synthetic a priori judgment 
to which Kant devotes a whole section of the Groundwork (G 4:446-63). This, again, 
suggests that practical judgments are judgments of the form “I ought to do x” and, 
thus, that the deep structure of principles of duty qua general moral judgments is: “I 
ought not to lie”, “I ought not to break promises”, “I ought to help people in an 
emergency”, etc. (In sect. 3.2, we will see that moral judgments differ from other 
practical judgments in that they are judgments about me simply as a rational being). 
  If principles of duty enable us to acquire knowledge of ourselves, if, as subjects 
who judge, we are also the objects about whom we judge, then it might seem that, in 
the moral domain, there are no objectively relevant features of the circumstances that 
could serve as defeaters at all. This is because, in the theoretical domain, we were 
able to classify features of the circumstances as objectively relevant, i.e. as genuine 
defeaters, by asking ourselves whether the judging subject figured in the explanation 
of why their judgment about the allegedly exceptional case was what it was. In the 
bad Apple Tree case, for example, the fact that the relevant explanation made refer-
ence to the subject and her drug intake was a sure sign that the alleged defeater was a 
merely subjectively relevant feature. However, given the identity of subject and ob-
ject in the moral domain, any explanation of why a judgment is what it is will make 
reference to the judging subject. Does this mean that principles of duty are indefeasi-
ble after all?  
No, it does not. We can see that it does not if we pay attention to the distinction 
between the subject as the one who is judging and the subject as the one who is acting (or 
object), for then we can appreciate that it’s only in the former capacity that they should 
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not figure in an explanation of why they judged the way they did. With this in mind, 
we can reformulate the distinction between two kinds of counterfactual robustness as 
follows: a principle of duty need not be robust across variations in objectively relevant 
circumstances (i.e. circumstances that bear on what the subject as the one acting ought 
to do), but must be robust across actual and possible variations in merely subjectively 
relevant circumstances (i.e. circumstances that merely appear to bear on what the subject 
as the one acting ought to do because of some distorting factor that bears on the 
subject as the one judging).  
2.5 Universal and Defeasible: The Agent-Scope Reading of Universality 
Now that we know what Kant’s principles of duty, as articulations of the meanings 
of deontic concepts, enable us to acquire knowledge of – namely, what we, as rational 
agents, ought to do – we are in a position to understand in which sense they have to 
be universally valid and how their being so is compatible with their defeasibility. To 
begin with, let me illustrate in which sense they are defeasible. Afterwards, I will 
elaborate on the sense in which they are universally valid (which, of course, is not the 
Case-Scope sense) and show how this alternative understanding of universal validity 
allows us to dissolve the Trilemma. 
Let us compare three inferences or derivations of actions from laws. Suppose 
that the first occurs in a standard situation, the second in a situation that differs from 
the standard situation in objectively relevant respects, and the third in a situation that 
differs from the standard situation only in subjectively relevant respects. The cases 
that I have chosen are hopefully intuitive, but, for now, nothing hinges on whether 
my account of these cases is correct. (An account of how to determine the content of 
Kantian principles of duty will be given in sect. 3.3 below). I should note, further, 
that the below example serves to illustrate only one of the two kinds of principles of 
duty that Kant discusses: principles that prescribe or prohibit the performance of 
actions, not principles that prescribe or prohibit the adoption of ends or maxims.172   
																																																								
172 Roughly speaking, principles of duty that concern ends or maxims could be defeated by a broader 
range of features than principles of duty that concern action kinds. Among other features, the former 
could be defeated by facts about what else the agent has done or plans to do. For example, if one had 
to explain why one is not obligated to show one’s gratitude to a particular benefactor on a particular 
occasion, one might have to refer to the fact that one has already used the money that was available to 
support one’s parents. We discussed this example in ch. 1, sect. 3.2, and the distinction between two 
perspectives on our moral lives which bears on the issues just noted in ch. 1, sect. 4.1. 
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1) In saying x, I would be lying. I ought not to say x. 
2) In saying x, I would be lying. And in saying x, I would be saving a life. I am  
allowed or obligated to say x.173 
3) *In saying x, I would be lying. And in saying x, I would be benefitting a friend. I 
am allowed or obligated to say x. 
Given that all our practical judgments, including moral judgments, are judg-
ments about what we ourselves ought to do, any feature that we take to be a defeater 
is a feature that we predicate of ourselves. As the one who is lying, I would also be the 
one who is saving a life (as in 2)) or the one who is benefitting a friend (as in 3)). This 
bears out what we observed above: that, in the moral domain, any explanation of why 
a judgment is what it is will make reference to the subject. The decisive question, as 
we noted, is whether it makes reference to him as the one who is judging. Arguably, 
in case 2), it does not. Arguably, it is part of our shared understanding of the rules 
that govern our practices of information exchange, that, ceteris paribus, having the 
chance to save a life makes it permissible or obligatory to lie. (In other words, it is 
part of the meaning of the concept of lying, which, qua meaning, is essentially public 
(Korsgaard 2009: 196-206, 1996a: 139-40, 144)). As such, this feature is objectively 
relevant: something that any judging subject could agree is relevant to what one ought 
to do in this sort of situation. Accordingly, there is nothing about me as the one judging 
or my perspective in particular that would have to be mentioned when explaining why I 
judged the way I did. This is not how things stand in case 3). Here it seems that my 
treating the opportunity to benefit my friend as a defeater is not licensed by our 
shared understanding of when it is and isn’t legitimate to lie. As such, this feature is 
only subjectively relevant: something that only I (and others with a similarly biased 
perspective) could take to be relevant to whether I am allowed to lie. Anyone else 
would be unable to share in this biased judgment because part of the explanation of 
why I judged the way I did is that my fondness for my friend influenced me as the one 
judging. My judgment is, quite literally, an instance of my “cognitions being deter-
mined at pleasure” (CPR A104-5). 
																																																								
173 As above, I am ignoring the question of whether and when the presence of a defeater makes a by 
default impermissible action permissible and whether and when it makes it obligatory. 
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The comparison of these two cases reveals that, corresponding to the distinction 
between two kinds of counterfactual robustness, there is a distinction between two 
kinds of exceptions. On the one hand, there are morally legitimate exceptions that 
are either called for or at least licensed by the circumstances of action, and, on the 
other hand, there are morally illegitimate exceptions, exceptions that we might be 
tempted to make “for ourselves (or just this once) to the advantage of our inclina-
tion” (G 4:424). It is because of our propensity to make exceptions of this latter kind 
and to treat ourselves as special that Kant feels the need to repeat, again and again, 
that principles of duty are strictly universal. With this in mind, we can appreciate that 
there are not just textual but also substantive grounds for regarding agents, and not 
actions, as the objects which principles of duty enable us to acquire knowledge of. For 
while treating an action as exceptional when it is not exceptional does not seem like a 
distinctively moral failure, treating oneself as exceptional when one is not exceptional 
most certainly does.  
Now it is time to examine in which sense Kant’s principles of duty have to be 
universally valid in order to play their role in cognition. We said that they have to be 
robust across variations in circumstances that only appear to bear on what we, as 
agents, ought to do because of some distortion in how we, as judging subjects, look 
at the case. But, pace Case-Scopers, they do not have to be robust across variations in 
circumstances that really do bear on what we, as agents, ought to do. Thus, we have 
earned the right to abandon the Case-Scope Reading of Universality in favour of what 
I shall call the “Agent-Scope Reading”, which relativizes the validity of principles of 
duty to the circumstances of action. Here are both, for comparison.  
Universality(CS): The features in virtue of which actions have their deontic statuses can 
be captured in principles of duty that hold for all cases or in all circumstances.  
Universality(AS): The features in virtue of which actions have their deontic statuses can 
be captured in principles of duty that can be agreed to hold by all rational agents 
(qua subjects) and for all such agents (qua objects) insofar as they are in the 
same circumstances.174 
																																																								
174 Jochen Bojanowski draws a similar distinction when he says that “the categories of quantity [in 
Kant’s table of the categories of freedom] quantify not over cases but over agents” (2015: 215-6). My 
distinction is indebted to his. 
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How does this re-interpretation of Universality bear on the Trilemma? According 
to the Agent-Scope Reading, a Kantian principle of duty (e.g. “I ought not to lie”) 
can be universally valid and thus binding in some situations (standard situations), but 
not in other situations (exceptional situations), which call for different principles (e.g. 
“I am allowed to/ought to lie when I can save a life”). As such, the Agent-Scope 
Reading accomplishes the feat of dissolving the Trilemma: it allows that the kinds of 
actions that Kantian principles of duty are usually taken to strictly prohibit (e.g. lying, 
promise-breaking) can be permissible or obligatory when and because defeaters are 
present (Complexity), but without implying that, when they are impermissible, this is 
partly because these defeaters are absent (Asymmetry).  
It accomplishes this feat, in part, because it avails itself of the inferentialist con-
ception of defeasibility outlined above. For inferentialists, the defeasibility of material 
rules of inference reflects the fact that we organise our knowledge in generalizations 
that are implicitly understood to rest on a whole range of conditions. Because this 
dependence on conditions is always already understood and (ideally)175 understood by 
anyone who has mastered the relevant concepts, the concomitant defeasibility does 
not cast a poor light on the judgments that such concepts-qua-universal-rules allow 
us to infer or derive. Pace proponents of the subsumptive conception of rationality, 
this account of our principles of duty as defeasible does not leave us puzzled as to 
how, in deriving actions from such principles, we can do something that is either 
consistent or inconsistent with our overall moral outlook or indeed with the moral 
outlook of others. In this, the inferentialist conception of defeasibility differs from 
both the view that defeasibility is a marker of fallibility (Korsgaard) and the view that 
it points to a plurality of competing concerns that we have to balance (Herman).  
With this in mind, let us consider the broader implications of the Agent-Scope 
Reading, beginning with other aspects of Kant’s ethics.   
3.  Re-Interpreting Kant’s Ethics 
The Agent-Scope Reading was introduced to deal with a specific range of problems: 
with Kant’s alleged failure to appreciate the normative significance of circumstances, 																																																								
175 I say “ideally” because, as we mentioned in sect. 2.3 above, the present account does not draw a 
sharp distinction between our views about the meaning of terms and our views about the world. So to 
the extent that we have disagreements about the latter, we will also have disagreements about the 
former, e.g. disagreements about whether the validity of a given principle really depends on a given 
condition or not.  
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to accommodate exceptions, and so on. However, even the sympathetic reader might 
worry that, with regard to other difficulties that exercise Kant commentators, this 
reading raises more questions than it answers. To allay this suspicion, I will now go 
through some of these questions, though not with the aim of offering solutions. My 
aim is less ambitious: it is merely to highlight how the Agent-Scope Reading bears on 
certain existing debates.   
3.1  Acting from Duty 
In the first section of the Groundwork, Kant introduces the distinction between acting 
from duty and acting merely in accordance with duty to explicate the concept of a good 
will (G 4:397-8). This distinction has provoked a lot of controversy, not least because 
Kant’s Neo-Aristotelian critics have treated it as evidence of yet another variety of 
rigorism in Kant: motivational rigorism. The critics take issue with Kant’s claim that 
only actions performed from duty have moral worth. In their view, Kant is not only 
wrong to deny that actions from certain other-regarding emotions such as love or 
sympathy can be morally worthy, he is also guilty of neglecting that, in many cases, 
expressing emotions is precisely what morality demands (Williams 1973: 225-9, and 
Stocker 1976: 453-5).  
The most influential response on Kant’s behalf is the so-called non-accidentality 
response.176 According to this line of response, Kant’s opponents misunderstand his 
objection to dutiful action from inclination. Kant’s complaint is not that inclinations 
are essentially partial, nor that they are unreliable guides to dutiful conduct. His issue 
is rather that, even if someone’s inclinations were such that they did lead to moral 
outcomes with perfect regularity, this would be a mere accident. It would depend on 
a “fortuitous alignment of motives and circumstances” (Herman 1993: 6). On this 
basis, Kantians can refute the charge of motivational rigorism by, on the one hand, 
allowing that emotions can be involved in various ways as long as their involvement 
does not render dutiful conduct accidental, and, on the other hand, debunking the 
critics’ idea that anything more than this is required for a plausible account of moral 
worth. They can admit, for example, that acting from duty is compatible with being 																																																								
176 For statements of this response, see Herman 1993: 3-6 and Baron 1995: 130, 173. This is not the 
only Kantian line of response to the above objection, however. Among other strategies, Kantians have 
also appealed to a distinction between motive and manner of performance (Tannenbaum 2002: 324-
7). 
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inclined to act in this way, with relying on one’s affective dispositions to determine 
what exactly the situation demands, and even with acting from a sensible incentive, if 
the incorporation of that incentive into one’s maxim is sensitive to moral demands.177 	
My aim in this section is to show that this response will not satisfy the critics, 
unless it is modified so as to reflect the distinction between two kinds of counterfac-
tual robustness that I introduced as part of the Agent-Scope Reading in sect. 2.2. We 
can begin by looking at Kant’s discussion of dutiful action in the Groundwork. Having 
set aside all actions that are contrary to duty, he distinguishes between two kinds of 
actions that accord with duty but are not performed from duty: actions from mediate 
inclination and actions from immediate inclination. The former, he claims, are easily 
recognized for what they are, whereas, with respect to the latter, we are prone to 
confusion. For example, if a shopkeeper “keeps a fixed general price for everyone” 
when “there is a good deal of trade” (G 4:397) but overcharges his inexperienced 
customers when he considers himself to be unobserved, it is safe to assume that he is 
not acting from duty. Since he is only inclined to charge fair prices when the circum-
stances make this policy an efficient means to profit-maximisation, since he is only 
mediately inclined to do so, his conduct when unobserved will attest to his unworthy 
motives. By contrast, if someone is “so sympathetically attuned that, without any 
further motive of vanity or self-interest they find an inner satisfaction in spreading 
joy around them” (G 4:398), that is, if someone is immediately inclined to beneficence, 
then it is far more difficult to discern whether their actions are performed from duty 
or from inclination. It is harder to assess the worthiness of their motives because 
they have a more stable tendency to act in conformity with duty. So the hypothesis 
that they are acting from duty is harder to falsify.  
 According to proponents of the non-accidentality response, the two cases are 
alike in that, in both cases, the agents’ dutiful conduct is a mere accident: it is a mere 
accident that the shopkeeper and the philanthropist do what duty demands. It seems 
to me that this account underestimates the difference between the two cases and, in 																																																								
177 For Kant’s thesis that incentives have to be incorporated into maxims, see R 6:24. This thesis is 
known as Kant’s “Incorporation Thesis” – a term coined by Henry Allison (1990: 39-40). Note, also, 
that, according to Herman, non-accidentality is necessary but not sufficient for an action’s being done 
from duty and, thus, for its having moral worth. This is because, in her view, there are some actions – 
permissible actions – that are not done from duty, despite being in non-accidental conformity with 
moral demands. In these cases, the motive of duty operates as a limiting or secondary motive. Herman 
1993: 13-7. 
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order to bring out how it does, it will be useful to briefly consider Herman’s version 
of the response. Herman is alive to the fact that sympathy is a more reliable guide to 
dutiful action than greed (Herman 1993: 4), but, in her view, the difference is a dif-
ference in degree: 
Is the motive of sympathy only fortunate when it hits on a right action? Doesn’t 
it necessarily prompt a person to help others? Suppose I see someone struggling, 
late at night, with a heavy burden at the backdoor of the Museum of Fine Arts. 
Because of my sympathetic temper I feel the immediate inclination to help him 
out. (Herman 1993: 4)  
Herman leaves it to the reader to fill in the gaps here. Her point is: at first glance, it 
might seem as if the philanthropist’s dutiful action is not a mere accident because 
sympathy is a disposition to help others and, as such, a disposition to fulfil a wide 
duty. However, on closer examination, she finds that it is a mere accident after all, 
because, even for a philanthropist with a perfect “moral record”, we can imagine 
circumstances in which their sympathy, their willingness to help, would lead them 
astray. For example, as someone who enjoys helping other people, any other people, 
the philanthropist would be as willing to cover for an art thief as they would be to 
rescue a child. What does this line of thought tell us about Herman’s conception of 
(non-)accidentality? Presumably, she would not feel the need to show that there are 
circumstances in which sympathy leads us astray, if she did not think that a failure to 
come up with such examples was tantamount to a concession – to the concession 
that actions from sympathy are non-accidentally dutiful and hence morally worthy.  
However, if this is right, the above line of thought commits her to a conception 
of non-accidentality that is grist to the mill of the critics. It is grist to the mill of the 
critics because, as Neo-Aristotelians, they agree that morally worthy actions cannot 
be accidental in this sense: such actions have to result from a proper responsiveness 
of motives to circumstances, not from a mere fortuitous alignment between the two. 
When these critics say that someone exhibits the virtue of sympathy or beneficence, 
they mean that this person is disposed to help others in circumstances where doing 
so is appropriate, and not in circumstances where it is not. As a virtuous person, the 
philanthropist is someone who has the right affective dispositions in this area; they 
are someone who would never help art thieves or any other criminals. Since sympa-
thy in this sense cannot lead its bearer astray, Herman’s non-accidentality response 
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would fail to convince the virtue ethicist that helping actions from sympathy have no 
moral worth. It is not convincing because it seems to overlook the possibility of 
someone having perfectly virtuous inclinations.         
I believe that we can salvage the non-accidentality response if we pay attention 
to the above distinction between objectively relevant variations in circumstances and 
merely subjectively relevant variations. In fact, Kant himself implicitly draws on this 
distinction when he contrasts actions from mediate inclination with actions from 
immediate inclination. As many commentators have observed (e.g. Baron 1995: 146-
7, Timmermann 2009: 46), each of his examples of actions from immediate inclina-
tion features a protagonist who goes through a change: we are asked to imagine, for 
example, that “the mind of [the] philanthropist [is] overclouded by his own grief, 
which extinguishe[s] all sympathy with others” (G 4:398). This thought experiment, I 
submit, serves the same function as the unobserved shopkeeper case. It is meant to 
draw attention to a set of circumstances in which we could judge the agent’s motives 
on the basis of their outward conduct. If, having lost all sympathy with others, the 
agent stopped helping, then we would have reason (though perhaps not conclusive 
reason)178 to believe that he used to help others from inclination, not from duty. This 
scenario is importantly different from the unobserved shopkeeper scenario, however, 
because, in this case, the grieving agent would not be led astray by his sympathy 
(whereas the unobserved shopkeeper is led astray by his greed). Before he was struck 
by grief and lost his sympathy, he may well have had perfectly virtuous inclinations 
that disposed him to do his duty in each and every situation – as the Neo-Aristotelian 
insists. But the fact that he conformed with duty would still have been a mere acci-
dent. For although, for some time, his disposition was “virtuous” in the sense that it 
was properly responsive to how the circumstances bear on what he, as an agent, 
ought to do (e.g. to the import of whether the recipient of his helping action is a 
thief), it only took a distorting factor like grief to throw him, as a judging subject, off 
balance.179 Once this factor prompted a change in his inclinations (or, as a Neo-																																																								
178 Herman points out that he could have become a bad person overnight. This is a possibility that 
Kant seems to rule out when he says that revolutions of the heart can only go one way: from bad to 
good (R 6:47). 
179 I have put the term “virtuous” in inverted commas because Kant would not call such a person 
virtuous – and perhaps a virtue ethicist wouldn’t either. It is worth keeping in mind that Kant is not 
arguing against virtue ethicists here, but rather against sentimentalists. If and to the extent that virtue 
ethicists maintain that we are responsible for our affective dispositions and for failures to retain them 
in the face of adverse circumstances, their view is quite close to Kant’s. Note, also, that there is an 
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Aristotelian might say: in his moral sensibility), his moral judgments and actions 
changed as well.  
This conception of accidentality is not only better suited to refute the charge of  
motivational rigorism, it also makes better sense of what Kant says. For if Herman 
was right that actions from mediate and immediate inclination differ only in degree, 
and, importantly, that their being in accord with duty is accidental in the same sense, 
then Kant’s discussion of changes in inclinations would seem rather odd. In order to 
make his point, he would not have had to imagine a philanthropist who goes through 
a change; instead, he could have imagined a philanthropist who is confronted with an 
art thief or some other criminal.  
3.2  Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives 
Of all the claims and doctrines that make up Kant’s ethics, his use of the distinction 
between categorical and hypothetical imperatives as a way of marking the difference 
between how agents are bound by moral norms and how they are bound by instru-
mental norms is perhaps the most widely accepted (G 4:414-6).180 Nonetheless, there 
is far-reaching disagreement about each of the constituents of this distinction. In this 
section, I want to focus on one of the main controversies concerning hypothetical 
imperatives: the controversy about the scope of the “ought” that figures in them.181 
This question is very important, partly, because it is, at bottom, a puzzle about how 
Kantians can make sense of the relation between moral norms, on the one hand, and 
norms of instrumental rationality, on the other.  
The controversy goes back to a seminal essay of Thomas Hill’s, entitled “The 
Hypothetical Imperative”. In this essay, Hill argues that, despite never having said so 
explicitly, Kant must have assumed that there is a “fundamental rational principle” 
(1973: 430), the Hypothetical Imperative, that enjoins all rational agents as such to 
either take the necessary means to their ends or abandon these ends. Although en-																																																																																																																																																							
interesting parallel between someone who is “virtuous” is this deficient sense and someone whose 
representations of the world are accurate due to a pre-established harmony – a possibility that Kant 
entertains in the much discussed §27 of the first Critique. In both cases, the judgments or representa-
tions are perfectly accurate throughout, but only accidentally so.   
180 At least, this distinction seems to have found its way into contemporary debates in metaethics that 
are otherwise quite independent of debates in Kantian ethics. See e.g. Wallace 2001 and Setiya 2007.  
181 This question has been discussed in tandem with a further question, namely the question whether, 
besides the Categorical Imperative, there is also a principle called the Hypothetical Imperative, in the 
singular. See e.g. Schroeder 2005. I shall leave this second question aside.  
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dorsed by many (e.g. Korsgaard 1997: 234, Darwall 1983: 16, 47), this wide-scope read-
ing of the dictum “If you will the end, then you ought to take the necessary means” 
has also met with some resistance.182 Hill’s opponents argue for a narrow-scope (or con-
sequent-scope) reading, according to which hypothetical imperatives enjoin subsets 
of rational agents, namely those who will certain ends, to take the means to these 
ends. In a nutshell, the disagreement between the two camps concerns both whom 
hypothetical imperatives enjoin to do something and what they enjoin them to do. 
The difference between them can be represented as follows.   
HI(ws) I ought (If I will end e, then I take the necessary means m to e). 
HI(ns) If I will end e, then I ought (I take the necessary means m to e). 
One reason why Hill’s wide-scope interpretation has met with resistance is that 
it seems to lack textual support. As Hill’s opponents have noted, the narrow-scope 
interpretation is much easier to square with what Kant says (Schroeder 2005: 359-61, 
Siyar 2013: 445-53). Their main point is the following: if we take Kant at his word 
and assume that hypothetical imperatives differ from categorical imperatives in that 
the former apply to agents under a condition (this is thought to be the condition of 
willing an end),183 while the latter apply unconditionally, to all finite rational agents as 
such, then, by Kant’s lights, HI(ws) is a categorical imperative.184 This suggests that the 
wide-scope reading blurs the very distinction that it purports to shed light on. Relat-
edly, it makes “complete nonsense” (Schroeder 2005: 361) of Kant’s claim that there 
is a special difficulty in demonstrating the possibility of moral imperatives because, 
qua categorical, they are synthetic, whereas hypothetical imperatives are taken to be 
analytic. To say that hypothetical imperatives are analytic is, roughly speaking, to say 
that, in willing an end, we already commit ourselves to willing the means to this end. 
Establishing the possibility of such imperatives is trivial because, in thinking of an 
agent as someone who wills an end e, we already think of them as someone who is 
committed to taking the means to e, and so there is nothing puzzling about the fact 																																																								
182 The term “wide-scope” is supposed to convey the idea that the scope of the “ought” is wide in the 
sense that it ranges over both the antecedent and the consequent of the above dictum. See the con-
trast of HI(ws) and HI(ns) below.  
183 I think that this is not, strictly speaking, correct. I would argue that the bindingness of hypothetical 
imperatives is conditional on the correctness of the agent’s judgment that the end is good. Of course, 
in part, this judgment is based on the agent’s perception of the end as pleasurable. See Newton 2013.   
184 In fact, this point is already acknowledged in Hill’s classic discussion (1973: 440). 
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that they are required to take the relevant means. To say that categorical imperatives 
are synthetic is accordingly to say that there is nothing in our thought of a finite ra-
tional agent as such that would suggest that they are required to only act on maxims 
that can be willed as universal laws. This is why the possibility of such imperatives is 
a puzzle and why establishing it is so difficult. But if Hill was right, if the Hypothet-
ical Imperative was a wide-scope requirement that applied unconditionally to all finite 
rational agents as such, then its possibility would pose the very same difficulty, be-
cause, surely, there is nothing in our thought of a finite rational agent as such that 
would suggest that they are required to either abandon their ends or take the means 
to them. In light of these problems, we must ask why so many Kantians opt for a 
wide-scope reading anyway. 
The motivation for interpreting hypothetical imperatives as wide-scope require-
ments is that the narrow-scope reading seems to have unacceptable implications. For 
if we suppose that agents can will evil ends, e.g. the end of murdering someone, then, 
using an instance of HI(ns), we can deduce (or “detach”) the claim that they ought to 
take the necessary means to this end, e.g. load their gun, point it etc. – and that is 
plainly false. This is where the wide-scope reading is thought to come to the rescue. 
When combined with the Categorical Imperative, HI(ws) says that, in such a case, the 
agent ought not to take the means to their evil end. What they ought to do, instead, is 
abandon the end. In response, proponents of the narrow-scope interpretation reject 
the supposition from which their opponents begin. Given that Kant identifies the 
will with practical reason (G 4:412), and that the Categorical Imperative is meant to 
be a constraint on willing (and not a constraint on the decision to follow through with 
what one already wills), it is, in their view, simply impossible to will an evil end, in the 
Kantian sense of “will”. As finite rational agents, we can certainly choose such ends, 
but we cannot will them (Engstrom 2009: 44-9 and Schroeder 2005: 367-70).185 Now, 
all of this is right (after all, Kant does have a normative conception of willing), but it 
leaves us with the feeling that a potentially substantive disagreement has been settled 
by sheer stipulation. Let me explain why this worry might arise. 
Consider Simon Rippon’s (2014) objection to the narrow-scopers’ response that 
one cannot will an evil end. In his view, this response cannot completely defuse the 
detachment objection to the narrow-scope reading because, even if we grant that 																																																								
185 For Kant’s account of the free power of choice, see MM 6:213.  
	 119 
willing impermissible ends is impossible, there are still other false ought claims that 
this reading allows us to detach. This additional detachment problem arises because 
many of our ends are merely permissible rather than obligatory. If I will an end that is 
merely permissible, e.g. to make myself a cup of tea, then it seems to follow from 
HI(ns) that I ought to take the necessary means, e.g. take out a cup, boil water, etc., 
and that doing so is the only rational thing for me to do. If this were true, it would be 
a problem indeed. After all, Rippon is right when he says that “it would be highly 
implausible to claim that you would always be irrational to revise your ends” (2014: 
785). But does the narrow-scope reading really have this implausible implication? On 
the face of it, there is, once again, a simple way of showing that the objection rests 
on a misunderstanding. In this case, the misunderstanding concerns the temporal 
structure of willing. As Hill observes, willing an end is not deciding or resolving to 
pursue it. Willing is not a momentary occurrence, it is an ongoing commitment (Hill 
1973: 433-4). With this in mind, proponents of the narrow-scope interpretation could 
reply that it is only as long as the fickle tea drinker is committed to making a cup of tea 
that they satisfy the condition under which they are subject to the relevant instance 
of HI(ns), which enjoins them to take out a cup, boil water, etc. Once they abandon 
this commitment, which they are free to do at any time, they are no longer required 
to take the necessary means. However, the fact that Hill adduces this consideration 
when arguing for the wide-scope reading should make us pause.  
It seems to me that Rippon’s objection touches on a deeper issue, and that, in 
light of this, the temporal structure response only makes things worse, not better. 
The deeper issue is that the narrow-scope reading seems to distort our understanding 
of instrumental reasoning by modelling it on moral reasoning. Let us consider how it 
represents our reasoning from ends to means. When I will an obligatory end, e.g. to 
help someone in need, and do so for the right reasons, there is something that I am 
getting right. My judgment that I ought to pursue this end is based on objective 
grounds. As such, this judgment is a perfectly good basis for other ought judgments, 
such as the judgment that I ought to take out some cash. When I will a merely per-
missible end, by contrast, e.g. to have a cup of tea, then part of what I am responding 
to are purely subjective sensible desires – and this, we want to say, is how it should be. 
But the involvement of sensible desires seems to change the character of my state. 
Unlike willing to help someone, willing a cup of tea seems like a state that I just hap-
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pen to be in. So if it were to serve as the basis for another judgment, e.g. the judg-
ment that I ought to take out a cup, it could only be a deficient basis: a cause, not a 
valid ground. In light of this, the appeal to the temporal structure of willing only 
makes things worse because it actually highlights this apparent deficiency of my 
judgment that I ought to take out a cup, that is, its lack of valid grounds. For, on 
reflection, to say that I can make and then abandon this judgment like a passing fan-
cy is simply to concede that it does not have the temporal structure of a judgment 
proper, which, as such, is meant to be sustained.186  
Now we can see that, although Rippon’s objection is not strictly speaking valid, 
he is nonetheless onto something: the narrow-scope interpretation exerts a certain 
pressure to conceive of our commitments to permissible ends as obligations. This is 
also what Robert Brandom has in mind when he complains that Kantians “assimi-
late[ ] all reasons for action to [moral reasons]” and that, in their view, desires have to 
always be “accompanied by the acknowledgment of some corresponding obligation 
or commitment” (2000: 92). These considerations make the wide-scope reading and 
its account of the involvement of sensible desires seem very appealing. For what this 
reading seems to get right is the idea that, within the realm of the permissible, we can 
choose to pursue or abandon our ends as we please without thereby violating any 
imperatives of reason. Does this mean that the narrow-scope interpretation should 
be abandoned?  
In my view, it does not. To see why, we need to consider the above concern in 
light of the distinction between the Case-Scope and the Agent-Scope Reading of the 
Universality desideratum. First, it is worth noting that the idea that our commitments 
to permissible ends are in some sense binding follows very naturally from the kinds 
of considerations that Korsgaard seems to cite in support of Case-Scope universal 
principles, namely the thought that our ability to determine ourselves depends on our 
having standing commitments or being persons of principle (see her premise 3a, as 
cited in sect. 1).187 The Agent-Scope Reading helps us to see how proponents of the 
narrow-scope reading can evade this implausible commitment and how they can ac-
commodate the intuition that the fickle tea drinker does not violate any imperatives 																																																								
186 Engstrom 2009: 103-4. The state that we are considering would have the form of the “I feel”, not 
the form of the “I think”. See Newton 2013.  
187 Of course, this is not to say that proponents of the Case-Scope Reading could not possibly evade 
this commitment. Instead of considering this question any further, I will limit myself to showing how 
narrow-scopers who advocate the Agent-Scope Reading can evade it.  
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of reason. The key to understanding why they don’t is the aforementioned distinction 
between the subject as the one who is judging, on the one hand, and the subject as 
the one who is acting, on the other. 
In sect. 2.4, we considered this distinction in relation to how circumstances can 
enter into an explanation of why someone judged the way they did, and in this con-
text – notably: in the context of a discussion of moral rules – feelings seemed to come 
in only as distorting factors, e.g. as part of the explanation why the fact that a given 
lie would benefit my friend made me inclined to tell it. However, in fact, we can draw 
the very same distinction with respect to how feelings themselves can enter into our 
explanations of why someone judged the way they did. If they enter as features of the 
subject as the one acting without affecting the subject as the one judging, then their 
bearing on the judgment is, again, harmless: it does not reflect a distortion or lack of 
valid grounds; it does not attest to the violation of an imperative of reason. Instead, it 
reflects a preference, considered as a property of the object being judged, and, as 
such, it has every right to enter into a judgment about this object. It is one of the three 
conditions under which it is appropriate to judge, of oneself, that one’s pursuit of a 
certain end is overall good, that is, to adopt the end – the other conditions being that 
it is permissible and realizable. And it is as someone of whom this judgment is true that one 
is bound by the narrow-scope hypothetical imperative to take the necessary means to 
this end.188  
With this in mind, we can now clarify how Universality(AS) relates to Kant’s For-
mula of Universal Law, which will be the topic of the next section. According to the 
latter formula, we ought to act only in accordance with maxims of which we can at 
the same time will that they become universal laws, i.e. in accordance with maxims 
which are universalisable. Kant uses the term “maxim” to refer to our principles of 																																																								
188 In addition to dispelling the concern that the narrow-scope reading allows us to detach false ought-
judgments, the above account of hypothetical imperatives has the great advantage of making sense of 
Kant’s belief that hypothetical imperatives are analytic, whereas categorical imperatives are synthetic. 
Recall what we said about Kant’s analytic-synthetic distinction in sect. 2.3: a judgment is analytic if the 
nexus between subject and predicate can be established without appeal to an external ground or third 
term, and synthetic if it can’t. Now consider the judgment “I ought to take out a cup”. If the “I” in 
this judgment refers to me as someone who ought to make themselves a cup of tea (which is simply a different 
way of saying that it is overall good for me to make myself a cup of tea), we can see that this judgment is 
true without appealing to any additional ought-judgments – although, of course, we do need to appeal 
to an is-judgment, namely the judgment that taking out a cup is a necessary means to making a cup of 
tea. Next consider the judgment “I ought not to lie”. The “I” in this judgment refers to me as a finite 
rational agent. Clearly, in this case, we cannot establish that the judgment is true without appealing to a 
further ought-judgment that says something about what finite rational agents as such ought to do.  
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action. Principles of action capture our reasons for action. Some of these reasons are 
moral reasons. They are the reasons we have independently of our feelings, and, as 
such, they can be captured in universal principles of duty: in principles that bind all 
rational agents in the same circumstances (as Universality(AS) says).189 Other reasons of 
ours are non-moral reasons. Which non-moral reasons we have depends, in part, on 
our feelings. Since some maxims specify non-moral reasons, it would not make sense 
to demand that maxims, as such, should be universal, in the sense that others in the 
same circumstances would necessarily have to have the same reason that we have.190 
What they do have to be is universalisable: they must specify reasons that anyone else 
in the same circumstances would be allowed to treat as such. 
3.3  Applying the Formula of Universal Law  
It is now time to turn to the most famous component of Kant’s ethics: the so-called 
Formula of Universal Law, and its close relative, the Formula of the Law of Nature 
(G 4:421). 
Formula of Universal Law: Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you 
can at the same time will that it become a universal law.  
Formula of the Law of Nature: Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by 
your will a universal law of nature.  
To illustrate how these formulas are to be applied, Kant provides four examples, 
which have prompted a long-standing debate consisting of cycles of counterexamples 
and re-interpretations.191 Among the questions discussed in the context of this debate 
are the following: can we derive substantive moral precepts from these formulas and, 
if so, how? Or are these formulas actually empty, as Hegel contends?192 What is the 
nature of the two kinds of contradictions, contradictions in conception and in will-																																																								
189 This is why, in our discussion of principles of duty in sect. 2.4, feelings figured only as distorting 
factors: because they have no bearing on what moral reasons we have.   
190 Only some maxims have to be universal, namely those that specify moral reasons or, to put it in 
Kant’s own terms, those that specify obligatory ends. 
191 For an overview, see Allison 2011: 176-203. 
192 Hegel’s famous objection to Kant’s Formula of Universal Law has come to be known as the Emp-
ty Formalism Objection (see e.g. 2011: §135). According to Hegel, the universalisability test cannot be 
applied without presupposing moral content. For example, in order to show that there is a contradic-
tion in willing a maxim of theft together with its universalised counterpart, we need to presuppose 
that there ought to be property. But if we presuppose this, then we do not need the universalisability 
test to tell us that others’ property should be respected. In this section, I hope to indicate why the 
Empty Formalism Objection may not be warranted. 
	 123 
ing, to which the so-called universalisability test is supposed to give rise? Is there a 
unified account of these two kinds of contradictions that preserves the difference 
between them? And do the results of Kant’s test accord with our moral intuitions? 
These questions are, of course, closely intertwined – to provide a satisfactory answer 
to one is to provide satisfactory answers to all.  
Even among Kantians it is generally acknowledged that a fully satisfactory set of 
answers to these questions is yet to be given, and this is certainly not the place to 
close this gap. My aim in this section is far more limited: I want to defuse the worry 
that the Agent-Scope Reading makes things worse. This is an understandable worry, 
given that most of the interpretations on offer – including the strongest contender, 
Korsgaard’s so-called practical contradiction interpretation – do not merely happen 
to involve a commitment to the Case-Scope Reading, but actually depend on this 
commitment to generate contradictions.193 Take Korsgaard’s practical contradiction 
interpretation as an example. According to Korsgaard, the contradiction involved in 
willing an immoral maxim together with its universalisation is practical in the sense 
that, in so willing, the agent wills a world in which her action is no longer a means to 
her end – either the end specified in the maxim itself (contradiction in conception) or 
an end that is essential to her will as a finite rational agent (contradiction in willing) 
(Korsgaard 1996a: 92-4). Consider Kant’s example of a maxim of false promising.   
False Promising: “When I believe myself to be in need of money, I shall borrow money 
and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen” (G 
4:422). 
“Promises,” Korsgaard notes, “are efficacious in securing loans only because they are 
believed, and they are believed only if they are normally true” (1996a: 92). If they 
were normally false, then the practice of promising would break down and promises, 
true or false, would no longer be means to securing loans. So, in Korsgaard’s view, 
both kinds of contradictions arise, in part, because willing an immoral maxim as a 
universal law means willing that an existing practice be violated or abused with such 
frequency that it would inevitably break down.194  
																																																								
193 In this regard, Engstrom’s reading of the Categorical Imperative is an exception (2009: 188-9, 195). 
194 This is why she struggles to show that acts of natural violence are ruled out (Korsgaard 1996a: 97-
101). 
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Note that, in order to generate Korsgaard’s practical contradictions, the Formula 
of Universal Law would have to be interpreted along Case-Scope lines. For if, by 
“universal law”, we meant that a principle should hold for all agents in the circumstances 
under consideration (Agent-Scope Reading), then universalising a maxim wouldn’t be a 
matter of imagining that the relevant action is performed whenever someone has the 
relevant end, nor that it is performed with any high frequency. No two situations are 
exactly alike, so even if my maxim was deeply immoral, willing that any rational agent 
in the same situation be allowed to act on it would not mean willing the collapse of 
any practice or convention on which I have to rely – either in this very action or oth-
erwise. These observations suggest that proponents of the Agent-Scope Reading are 
left without any account of how contradictions are meant to arise, let alone an ac-
count that could satisfy the Hegelian critic. For how are we supposed to determine 
whether one can will a given maxim together with its universalization in the Agent-
Scope sense without presupposing any moral content (e.g. that the practice of prom-
ising is valuable)?  
In what follows, I will offer a reading of the universalisability test that takes its 
cue from the reading offered by Stephen Engstrom (2009: 185-229), but that also 
goes beyond the latter, especially in its appeal to the inferentialist framework outlined 
above.  
 First, it is important to appreciate that, within the framework introduced in sect. 
2, the Empty Formalism Objection takes on a different form. Let us recall what we 
said about concepts and their role in securing the possibility of agreement and disa-
greement between our representations of objects of experience. The role of con-
cepts, we said, is to set standards that determine what has to be true of objects falling 
under them under various kinds of circumstances, and to thereby secure the distinc-
tion between how things are with the object and how a particular subject may experi-
ence them as being. If a given object falls under the concept of an apple tree, for 
example, and the circumstances are such that no woodpecker or other animal has 
tampered with it, then it will have a completely impenetrable trunk. To judge that it 
does not – for instance, because, when touching it, one has the illusion that it gives in 
– is to treat merely subjective grounds as objective and, thus, to misjudge. It is to 
judge on the basis of a rule (“If this is a tree, it has a partly penetrable trunk”) that 
contradicts one of the universal rules that make up the concept of a tree (“If x is a tree, 
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x has a completely impenetrable trunk”). Can we exploit these observations to shed 
light on the kinds of contradictions that the universalisability test is meant to reveal?  
There is an obstacle: the content of deontic concepts cannot be derived from 
experience. Deontic concepts are artefacts of our ways of life which are arguably as 
ever-changing as these ways of life themselves.195 So while we can learn by observation 
that, if they are not tampered with, apple tree trunks are completely impenetrable, the 
question of whether someone in need is allowed to make a false promise cannot be 
answered in this fashion (in fact, Kant cautions against basing practical judgments on 
feelings in the way that theoretical judgments are based on sensations, CPrR 5:58). It 
is at this point that we re-encounter the Empty Formalism Objection, albeit in an 
importantly different form: if we presuppose that it is part of our shared understanding 
of the concept of a promise that, in these kinds of circumstances, promises ought to 
be made in good faith, then we can see how my acting on a maxim of false promising 
in this situation gives rise to a contradiction – but who says that we should presup-
pose this? The concern behind this critical question is no longer a concern about 
having to presuppose moral content at all. We already know that concepts could not 
secure the objective purport of our moral judgments if they did not set standards that 
determine what agents acting under these concepts ought to do in various kinds of 
circumstances. The question is merely which standards they set. This point is crucial 
because it does away with the misguided notion that willing the frequent violation of 
a practice or convention is essential to contradicting oneself in the sense that Kant 
envisages. If the rule that, in a given set of circumstances, a promise ought to be 
made in good faith belongs to the concept of a promise, then, being in these circum-
stances, I cannot promise in bad faith without contradicting myself, and it is then 
immaterial whether the frequent violation of that rule would lead to an atmosphere 
of mutual distrust (for a similar point, see Engstrom 2009: 188-9, 195). With this in 
mind, we can now turn to the question of content.    
Most of the time, what agents, qua objects of practical judgment, ought to do in 
a given set of circumstances depends on their ends: whether an agent ought to drink 
depends on whether they will the end of quenching their thirst; similarly, whether an 
object has a trunk depends on whether it is a tree. However, in some instances, what 
an agent ought to do is independent of their ends. It is worth noting that analogous 																																																								
195 This may not have been Kant’s view, but it is, in any case, very plausible.  
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cases can be found in the theoretical domain as well: whether an object is a squared 
circle, for example, does not depend on what kind of object it is, and whether an 
event has a cause does not depend on what kind of event it is. I want to argue that 
the former case is, in some respects, analogous to a contradiction in conception, and 
the latter to a contradiction in willing. Let us begin with the former and examine why 
the false promisor’s employment of the concept of a promise entails a commitment 
to promising in good faith. 
On the face of it, the false promisor’s concept seems like a perfectly coherent 
concept that does not involve any contradictions in the way that the pseudo-concept 
of a squared circle does. This impression is misleading, however. To begin with, it is 
worth noting that there are some circumstances in which to say “I promise to do x” 
is not generally presumed to express a genuine commitment to doing x: when it is 
said on stage, for example, or when one is being coerced. So perhaps the promisor in 
Kant’s example believes that they are in such a situation. Perhaps it is part of the 
concept of promising that they are relying on that, in circumstances of dire need, to 
say “I promise” is, basically, to beg for charity. If this were so, then their knowledge 
that they will not be able to repay the promisee would not contradict any of the 
commitments incurred by making the promise. (Compare this to a game in which 
“square” means round; in the context of such a game, the concept of a squared circle 
would not be contradictory). Moreover, it is clearly possible to think of, and indeed to 
will, this rule as a universal law, as one of the laws that together determine what 
agents ought to do in various kinds of circumstances and thus secure the possibility 
of objective practical knowledge.196 That is all well and good, except this is not the 
concept that the promisor is relying on. In fact, the promisor wants to have their 
cake and eat it. They might “mean” to beg, but they also want to be understood as 
making a genuine promise. Their maxim is fit for purpose only because it exploits 																																																								
196 Kant might disagree. In his view, promises and acceptances are two acts that co-constitute a con-
tract. And despite the fact that the parties to a contract make their respective declarations at different 
times, he argues that the two acts are really one: a joining of two wills, which creates an obligation to 
deliver what is being promised, e.g. a service or commodity (MM 6:272-3). In light of this, it might be 
objected that I have not managed to defend the view sketched above, namely that the principle “One 
ought not to make false promises” can be universally valid even if it does not hold in all circumstanc-
es. All I have shown, it might be said, is that, in some circumstances, a certain string of words (“I 
promise”) does not amount to a promise at all. Similarly, it could be argued that a white lie is not a real 
lie, because a thin-skinned friend asking for my opinion on their new haircut simply cannot expect to 
be told the truth and hence should not rely on my response. This brings us back to the discussion of 
the Casuistical Questions Response in ch. 1, sect. 4. There I argued that derivative uses of concepts 
deserve to be taken seriously; that they are still uses of the relevant concepts. The same point applies here.   
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two inconsistent concepts of promising. This is why it cannot even be conceived as a 
universal law or part of a genuine concept. (Compare this to a game where one can 
use “square” to mean square or round, as one pleases).197  
Let us turn to contradictions in willing. To contradict oneself in willing is not to 
act under such a pseudo-concept. It is more akin to judging that a given event has no 
cause: something that can be thought without a contradiction, but cannot be experienced 
by finite beings like us. Consider what our agential finitude amounts to, according to 
Kant. For finite rational agents with a lower faculty of desire, happiness is a necessary 
end. Happiness is a state in which the agreeable is attainable, a state in which we are 
self-sufficient, where “everything goes according to wish and will” (CPrR 5:124). But 
happiness is not the same as blessedness: while both are states of self-sufficiency, the 
former, unlike the latter, depends on fortune. Accordingly, our pursuit of happiness is 
a pursuit that is informed by the recognition that our powers are limited and that our 
ability to attain self-sufficiency depends on factors beyond our control. One of the 
factors beyond our control is the extent to which the attainability of our goals will 
depend on the actions and the cooperativeness of other people. It is, for example, 
beyond our control whether we are born with a disability that makes us dependent 
on other people, or whether we inherit enough money to fund our own education, or 
whether the talents that we happen to have are valued at a given point in time. With 
this in mind, we can return to the question of whether and how morality can impose 
substantive constraints on the deontic concepts that communities of finite rational 
																																																								
197 This account of contradictions in conception may seem to render Kant’s ethics relativistic. After all, 
it seems to imply that the permissibility of acting on the above maxim of false promising depends, in 
part, on how one’s linguistic community happens to understand the concept of promising at a given 
point in time, or on the characteristics of an existing practice in a given cultural and historical context.  
So perhaps Hegel is right after all: perhaps we do have to presuppose some moral content, though not 
as individuals applying the universalisability test (subjectivism), but rather as communities (relativism). 
Although this concern would merit a far more detailed discussion, I shall limit myself to two points. 
First, it is true that my reading leaves considerable room for local variations in moral codes. It assumes 
(perhaps against Kant) that, to a certain extent, what is right and wrong does depend on the cultural and 
historical context (on this point, see Herman 2007: 143-5). But – and this is the second point – there 
are constraints, and these can be derived from the Formula of Universal Law and the other formulas of 
the Categorical Imperative, though not without doing argumentative work. Oftentimes, Kant’s critics 
look at the arguments in the Groundwork and jump to the conclusion that Kant’s ethics is empty. But 
Kant does not just presuppose judgments such as the judgment that there ought to be property or 
contracts or a practice of charity. He argues for them in the Metaphysics of Morals, using variations of 
the principle established in the Groundwork. The account of contradictions in willing that I present in 
the following paragraph gives some indication of what an argument for a practice of charity might 
look like, for example. I will return to the threats of subjectivism and relativism in ch. 4.   
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agents form and use. Consider Kant’s example of a maxim of never helping others.198 
It is certainly possible for a community of finite rational agents to use the concept of 
helping in such a way that helping others is completely voluntary and that receiving 
help is demeaning. But since only some members of this community would possess 
the means to help, it would be entirely up to them and no one else how the concept 
of helping is used and how it evolves. Accordingly, this community would not have a 
truly shared understanding of this concept, even if all or most of its members acqui-
esced to using it in the way that its privileged members did.199 
4.  Taking Stock: The Particularist Challenge and Beyond 
To conclude the first part of this thesis, I want to briefly reflect on what my Kantian 
brand of generalism can contribute to the contemporary debate between generalists 
and particularists. In the introduction (sect. 1.2), I noted that the Particularist Challenge 
to Kantian ethics is an instance of the broader challenge that particularists mount 
against their generalist opponents: the challenge to devise moral principles that are 
both deserving of their name and suited to accommodate holism. More specifically, I 
pointed out that principles proper are expected to fulfil two demands, which holism 
seems to render incompatible: the demand to cover a determinate range of cases and 
the demand to play the role of guides and/or explanatory standards. By showing how 
the Agent-Scope Reading of Universality and the concomitant account of principles of 
duty dissolve the trilemma, I have already indicated how my brand of generalism 
meets some of these demands. Now I want to broaden the perspective further and 
ask the more general question of how it fares in comparison to other generalist ap-
proaches.  
My argument in this chapter aims to meet the challenge that particularists mount 
against their opponents, not to reject it, as other generalists have (e.g. McNaughton 
and Rawling 2000: 267, Raz 2006: 107-13). Accordingly, I have sought to dissolve the 
trilemma instead of embracing one of its horns, as some other Kantians have (e.g. 
Timmermann 2001: 65-67, Cholbi 2013: 447). Broadly speaking, generalists’ attempts 
to meet their opponents’ challenge fall into two categories. Some appeal to unhedged 																																																								
198 For an illuminating discussion of how Kantians can appeal to Kant’s notion of happiness and its 
role in practical reasoning to address empty formalism concerns, see Bojanowski 2017: 4, 6, 8, and 10.      
199 This account of contradictions in willing is, of course, evocative of Rawls’ original position (1999: 
15-19), who I think would agree with my main thesis that moral and political principles should be 
understood as Agent-Scope universal.  
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principles (see e.g. Hooker 2008: 22-3), others to various kinds of hedged principles 
(e.g. Lance and Little 2004, Väyrynen 2009). I touched on some of the difficulties 
that haunt theories of unhedged principles in ch. 2., sect. 2.3.2 and 3.3.2. Roughly 
speaking, such principles fulfil the demand of covering a determinate range of cases, 
but they do not seem suited for the role of guides or explanatory standards, partly, 
because they obscure the relevant features by embedding them in a host of irrelevant 
features. In this chapter, I have presented an account of hedged principles. The main 
difficulty that proponents of such accounts face is to devise a type of hedging clause 
that does not trivialise the principles to which it is attached. Think of the principle 
“Ceteris paribus, lying is impermissible”. If this principle boiled down to the claim that 
lying is impermissible except when it is not, then this principle, although trivially true, 
would be utterly useless because it would leave undetermined when lying is imper-
missible and when it is permissible or obligatory, and why. As such, this principle 
would fail to fulfil both of the demands that proper moral principles are supposed to 
fulfil. Does my hedging clause fare any better?  
One of the conclusions reached in the above discussion is that Kant’s principles 
of duty come with the hedging clause “in objectively suitable circumstances”. As I 
noted in sect. 3.3, one might worry that this hedging clause is empty,200 that it is one of 
the hedging clauses that trivialise the principles to which they are attached. This is a 
worry that I tried to address by further unpacking this clause. First, I pointed out that 
the objective suitability of circumstances is determined by our shared understanding 
of the deontic concept that the relevant principle contains. Consider the principle “In 
objectively suitable circumstances, lying is impermissible”, and how it applies in the 
Murderer at the Door case. Whether the circumstances in this case are objectively suita-
ble, and thus whether this lie is impermissible, depends on whether it is part of our 
shared understanding of the concept of a lie that the addressee’s intention to use the 
information provided to murder an innocent victim functions as a defeater: whether 
it makes lying permissible or obligatory. This is a first step, but, as I acknowledged in 
sect. 3.3, it is not enough to fully address the emptiness concern. More substantive 
constraints are required. I therefore added the following second point. In order to 
determine whether treating a given feature as a defeater is warranted by our shared 																																																								
200 We discussed this in the context of Hegel’s Empty Formalism Objection in sect. 3.3 above; see, in 
particular, fn. 192, 197, and 198. 
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understanding of the deontic concept in question, I need to ask myself, first of all, 
whether, if all parties involved shared this understanding of the relevant concept, my 
envisaged action or interaction could be successful or whether I am presupposing a 
pseudo-concept (contradiction in conception). If my action does not presuppose that 
my own understanding of the relevant concept diverges from that of others, then I 
need to ask a more intricate question: could a community of finite agents like us, with 
our needs and limitations, choose this concept, so understood, to organise their lives 
together, or is the fact that this concept and this understanding of it is indeed ours a 
result of the fact that this concept was not chosen or developed together, that it 
evolved under the influence of power structures, say? (contradiction in willing). For if 
it is a result of the fact that this concept was not chosen or developed together, then 
the purportedly shared understanding of it is not truly shared.  
Once the hedging clause “in objectively suitable circumstances” is unpacked in 
this way, it becomes apparent that it is not empty: that, although the list of defeaters 
that this hedging clause admits is open-ended and subject to ongoing negotiations,201 
it does provide some guidance on how to conduct these negotiations, how to identify 
defeaters, and how to determine the range of cases in which a given principle of duty 
is valid.202 As a result, the principles of duty to which this clause is attached are suited 
to play their role in explanations and to serve as guides. What my argument has also 
shown, however, is that explaining and guiding are not the only and not the primary  
 																																																								
201 I think it is the wish to acknowledge this open-endedness, the de facto impossibility of compiling a 
complete list of defeaters, that leads McDowell to argue that the knowledge of the virtuous person is 
uncodifiable (1998: 57-65). He does not mean to say that, in morally deliberating, or explaining and 
justifying our actions to each other, we aren’t guided by the thought that we share an understanding of 
the deontic import of features that could, in principle, be codified as well as articulated. In short, he 
isn’t saying that principles don’t have any role to play at all or that we can make sense of a given moral 
situation without referring to others, as Dancy takes him to be saying, when he presents McDowell as 
the main source of inspiration for his particularism (e.g. in his 1993: xii, 79-80). 
202 My account of hedged principles can be understood as an instance of the broader framework or 
theory of hedged principles put forward by Pekka Väyrynen (2009). Väyrynen shows that, if we hedge 
moral principles by reference to so-called normative bases, then they will satisfy the two demands on 
principles outlined above. They will cover a determinate range of cases and they will be able to serve 
as explanatory standards. Väyrynen defines a normative basis as the factor because of which a given 
feature has a normative import and which explains that normative import (2009: 96). Let us assume, 
for example, that the normative basis of the deontic import of lying is that it destroys trust. If this is 
so, we can hedge the principle “Lying is impermissible” by adding the clause “unless the lie does not 
destroy trust”. Väyrynen points out that normative bases need not be features with the same deontic 
import on a higher level (e.g., higher-order reasons or wrong-makers) (2009: 101-2), and he notes that 
such bases might be able to contribute to explanations even if they are purely formal (2009: 117). If 
this is so, then my hedging clause fits the bill. 
	 131 
functions of Kantian principles of duty (see introduction, sect. 1.1). Their primary 
role is much more basic: qua constituents of concepts, they first enable us to think 
about and act in a shared objective world.  
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PART TWO 
In the following chapters, I will argue that the Agent-Scope Reading of Universality 
can strengthen the position of Kantians in two contemporary debates: the debate 
concerning the so-called Problem of Relevant Descriptions (ch. 4) and the debate 
between Humean and Kantian Constructivists (ch. 5). In each case, I will begin the 
discussion without presupposing any of the conclusions reached in ch. 1-3, and show 
how Kantians run into problems without them. Then, towards the end, I will present 
the Agent-Scope Reading as a solution. 
Chapter 4 
A Kantian Standard of Moral Relevance? 
Dissolving The Problem of Relevant Descriptions 
1.  The Problem of Relevant Descriptions 
There is a persistent suspicion among Kant’s critics that in applying the Formula of 
Universal Law we have to rely on moral determinations that are logically prior to the 
determinations that the formula itself can afford. The critics are worried that once it 
is settled which principle of action is at issue, various morally significant choices will 
already have been made: which goal to pursue and how to pursue it, which features 
of the situation to attend to and which to ignore, how to conceive of and how to 
characterize what one is doing. This perceived “belatedness” lies at the root of many 
different objections and counterexamples to Kant’s ethics: the charge that it yields 
counterintuitive results, that it is rigoristic, anachronistic and out of touch with the 
complexities of the moral domain. Anscombe captures this common root when she 
argues that Kant’s  
rule about universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall 
count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim 
about it.203 
																																																								
203 Anscombe 1958: 2. Anscombe levels the very same objection against utilitarianism, but utilitarians 
have mostly dismissed her challenge. On this point see e.g. Lyons 1965: 35. 
	 133 
Anscombe frames the worry in terms of discriminatory power.204 Without addi-
tional “stipulations”, the requirement expressed by the Formula of Universal Law 
seems to underdetermine the deontic status of actions because it is a description-relative 
requirement. It discriminates between obligatory, permissible and impermissible ac-
tions on the basis of the respective principles on which they are performed, and thus 
partly on the basis of how these actions are described. As a result, an action that is 
deemed permissible or obligatory under some descriptions may be deemed imper-
missible under others. Based on this observation, Anscombe concludes that Kant’s 
requirement is useless unless supplemented with stipulations that determine under 
which description an action should be assessed. Following Anscombe’s lead, O’Neill 
has labelled the problem of identifying such stipulations the “Problem of Relevant 
Descriptions” (O’Neill 2013: 61).205  
Let us consider an example.206  
Asylum1: An immigration officer faces an asylum seeker who is at risk of being exe-
cuted for engaging in banned homosexual activities in her home country. Since 
the host country does not recognize persecution of sexual minorities as grounds 
for asylum, the officer has to make a difficult decision. He decides to reject the 
application. We can describe what the officer has done in at least two ways. “He 
complied with the law” (that is, with the legal order of his nation state), we may 
say, or “He denied asylum to a victim of sexual persecution”.  
On all widely accepted interpretations of Kant’s Formula of Universal Law (e.g. 
Rawls 2000: 162-177, Korsgaard 1996a: 77-105, O’Neill 1989: 81-104), it would seem 
that a principle of law compliance meets the requirement that it expresses, whereas a 
principle of denying asylum to victims of sexual persecution does not.207 After all, 
anyone could find themselves attracted to people of the same gender, so no one can 
will a law that leaves homosexuals to the discretion of homophobic despots.208 																																																								
204 Below we will see that there are various other ways of framing it, e.g. in terms of a threat of subjec-
tivism (sect. 2.3), relativism (sect. 4.1) or empty formalism (see ch. 3, sect. 3.3, fn. 192, 197, and 198). 
205 For now, I won’t try to offer a more precise formulation of the Problem of Relevant Descriptions 
because this is my aim in sect. 2: to understand what the problem is, exactly.  
206 I borrow this example, with some modifications, from Angelina Maccarone’s film Unveiled. 
207 Note that, in this chapter, our primary concern is with maxims or principles of action and their 
universalisability, not with principles of duty and their universal validity, as it was before.    
208 Let me elaborate on this brief argument by considering the case in light of Korsgaard’s reading of 
the Formula of Universal Law (1996a: 77-105): if the immigration officer’s maxim to deny asylum to 
victims of sexual persecution became a standard practice among officials aiming to comply with the 
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Anscombe’s problem is this: under one description the officer seems to have dis-
charged his obligation, under another he seems to have violated it. Which of them 
should we focus on? Without an answer to this question, Kant’s universalisability 
requirement209 classifies the officer’s action as both obligatory and impermissible.210  
My aim in this chapter is twofold. It is, first, to clarify what the Problem of Rel-
evant Descriptions is and, second, to show that it is rooted in what we have called 
the Case-Scope Reading of Kant’s conception of universal validity.211 This reading, I 
will argue, also precludes its solution. Let me outline the course of my argument. 
Although the problem has received considerable attention among Kantians, several 
misunderstandings have impeded its satisfactory treatment. I will therefore begin by 
examining and dismissing three conceptions of the problem found in the literature 
(sect. 2.1-2.4). I will dismiss these because I do not think that the problem so con-
ceived casts genuine doubt on the discriminatory power of Kant’s universalisability 
requirement. I will then go on to present a conception of the problem that does ren-
der it a real threat to the latter requirement, as it is usually understood (sect. 2.5). This 
conception is such that a solution to the problem would have to appeal to the notion 
																																																																																																																																																							
law, then everyone would have to expect to be denied shelter if they were persecuted for their sexual 
orientation. Just as anyone could find themselves in need of help, so anyone could become a victim of 
sexual persecution, e.g. if they discovered that they are attracted to people of their own gender or if 
some other preference of theirs became a subject of disdain. Since security is vital to our ability to 
pursue ends, it should be seen as a purpose “which belong[s] essentially to the will” (Korsgaard 1996a: 
96). So if the maxim at issue were to become a universal law, then a purpose that is essential to our 
will would be in danger of being thwarted. Hence, we cannot will the maxim as a universal law. 
209 By “universalisability requirement”, I mean the requirement expressed by Kant’s Formula of Uni-
versal Law: the requirement to “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that it become a universal law” (G 4:421). For a clarification of the distinction between 
universality and universalisability, see ch. 3, sect. 3.2. 
210 One may object that this contradiction is merely apparent. If one believes that the relevant article 
of the asylum law is unjust and that officials ought to violate it, then one may want to say that a prin-
ciple of law compliance cannot be willed as a universal law; whereas if one assumes that it is never 
permissible to break the law, then one may want to say that a principle of granting asylum to the per-
secuted cannot be willed as universal law, as there will be occasions where doing so would mean 
breaking the law. Either way, the universalisability requirement would not yield any contradictory 
verdicts. But this objection is question-begging, for this is exactly what we would expect the universal-
isability requirement to tell us: whether the circumstances at hand justify breaking the law. And yet it 
seems that it can only do so once we have settled how the case is to be described. On this point see 
also Herman 1993: 140. 
211 The Case-Scope Reading was introduced in ch. 3, sect. 1 and discussed in ch. 3, sect. 2.5, among 
other places. There it was presented as a reading of the Universality desideratum. We can detach our-
selves from the specific dialectic of that discussion by speaking of the Case-Scope Reading of Kant’s 
conception of universal validity or, more precisely, Kant’s conception of universal validity in the moral do-
main. For the sake of brevity, I will omit this last clause in what follows.  
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of a moral sensibility,212 which Kantians tend to disregard or actively resist. I will de-
fend this conception against such suspicions by comparing the challenge it presents 
to that encountered by sensibility theorists (sect. 3).  
This comparison will also further my second aim, since it will show that a satis-
factory solution to the Problem of Relevant Descriptions would have to meet a spe-
cial demand: it would have to supplement Kant’s universalisability requirement with 
an account of moral sensibility that does not make that requirement itself superfluous. 
With this demand in mind, I will review two solutions to the problem that have been 
proposed in the literature (sect. 4). My discussion will bring to light that the demand 
cannot be met because there is no principle of moral relevance213 that is not also a 
moral principle, which, as such, would replace or transform the universalisability 
requirement into an altogether different requirement. These observations will reveal 
the root of the problem and point towards a strategy for its dissolution (sect. 5). As I 
noted above, the problem is rooted in the Case-Scope Reading of Kant’s conception 
of universal validity: the view that, for Kant, a principle is universally valid only if it is 
valid in all cases or circumstances. If this is how universal validity is understood, then 
Kant’s universalisability requirement faces Anscombe’s problem because it does not 
demand any sensitivity to the circumstances of action and indeed demands the oppo-
site. As such, it stands in need of a supplementary principle of moral relevance. We 
can preempt this criticism, however, if we embrace what I have called the Agent-
Scope Reading of Kant’s conception of universal validity, for, according to this read-
ing, the universalisability requirement does demand sensitivity to the circumstances. 
Note that, in this chapter, when I use the term “universalisability requirement” and 
related terms, I’m presupposing the Case-Scope Reading, unless otherwise indicated.  
2.  What Is the Problem of Relevant Descriptions? Three Misconceptions 
2.1  First Misconception: A Puzzle Concerning Kant’s Notion of Maxims 
Sometimes the Problem of Relevant Descriptions is either unwittingly conflated with 
or explicitly reduced to a puzzle concerning Kant’s notion of a maxim.214 It is not 																																																								
212 I use the term “moral sensibility” as it is used by Neo-Aristotelians in contemporary metaethics; it 
is not meant to refer to elements of Kant’s ethics (e.g. the subjective conditions of receptiveness to the 
concept of duty, MM 6:399-403). 
213 I will use “principle of moral relevance” and “standard of moral relevance” interchangeably.  
214 While I will argue that Anscombe’s objection cannot be reduced to a puzzle concerning Kant’s 
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very surprising that there is a tendency to frame the problem in this way, given that 
Anscombe’s objection seems to trade on a misunderstanding of this notion. 
Anscombe makes it sound as though any principle that an act could instantiate counts 
as a maxim. The Kantian will reply that a maxim is not just any principle. Kant de-
fines maxims as subjective principles of volition (G 4:400, CPrR 5:19). This defini-
tion suggests that the relevance of a given description is determined by whether or 
not it reflects the agent’s intentions. This is the reply that O’Neill seems to have in 
mind in the following passage: 
Kant’s universality test includes an explicit solution to the Problem of Relevant 
Descriptions. The principle ... whose universality it is relevant to test is the one 
on which the agent acts or proposes to act on a given occasion. This principle ... 
is the agent’s maxim. (O’Neill 2013: 61) 
As it stands, however, this reply is not sufficient. Kantians must flesh out what a 
maxim is, and that has proved difficult (see e.g. Timmermann 2000, Kitcher 2003). 
In particular, there has been an ongoing debate about whether maxims are general 
policies, perhaps even life rules, that range over a large number of actions and occa-
sions (Bittner 1974: 488-9),215 or whether they are specific principles that are tightly 
bound up with the circumstances of action. Anscombe’s reflections on intentional 
descriptions remind us that there are many ways of describing an action that capture 
the agent’s intentions – some more general, others more specific (Anscombe 1957: 
37-47). Some Kantians assume that the infamous difficulty of determining the ap-
propriate level of generality for maxims lies at the very heart of Anscombe’s chal-
lenge, that the threat of conflicting verdicts that she perceives reflects an uncertainty 
regarding whether maxims express agents’ final ends or their higher-order or lower-
order means. (Suppose, for instance, that the immigration officer in the Asylum1 ex-
ample intended to deny asylum to a victim of sexual persecution in order to comply 
with the law). They therefore shift their attention from the Problem of Relevant De-
scriptions to the generality puzzle, taking the former to ultimately boil down to the 
latter (see Kitcher 2003: 217, O’Neill 1989: 84, 2013: 108-9, and Wood 1999: 102–5). 																																																																																																																																																							
notion of a maxim, I think that some other objections and counterexamples to the Formula of Uni-
versal Law can be, and that critics were wrong in taking these to reveal issues with the formula itself. 
On this point see Kleingeld 2017: 113-4. 
215 This talk of general policies and life rules brings to mind Korsgaard’s idea that having a practical 
identity is a matter of having standing commitments (see ch. 2, sect. 2.1, and ch. 3, sect. 1).   
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In what follows, I focus on O’Neill’s solutions to the generality puzzle because, 
although she does not fully reduce the Problem of Relevant Descriptions to this 
puzzle, tracing the development of her thoughts on the latter helps to get a sense of 
the debate as a whole. Initially, O’Neill argues that Kant’s universalisability require-
ment is a requirement to “assess all aspects and phases of what we do” (O’Neill 
2013: 109), thus implying that actions are based on as many maxims as there are in-
tentional descriptions of them. Later she comes to believe that this view is problem-
atic (O’Neill 1989: 129) and therefore revises her position. Her revised view is that 
maxims are “underlying [or fundamental] intention[s] by which [agents] guide and 
control [their] more specific intentions”.216 It seems to me that the latter view is more 
problematic, so I shall consider it first. 
What distinguishes maxims-qua-underlying-intentions from specific intentions, 
in O’Neill’s view, is that only specific intentions make reference “to incidental as-
pects of the particular act and situation” (1989: 129), that is, to aspects whose bearing 
on the carrying out of the underlying intention depends on the circumstances. Since 
the suitability of means is always circumstance-dependent, this explanation suggests 
that maxims reflect commitments to ends pursued for their own sake. One may wor-
ry that this account of maxims is too narrow because it implies that the universalisa-
bility requirement is not “enough to determine the rightness or wrongness of particu-
lar acts”.217 But even if we accept that the sole purpose of Kant’s requirement really is 
to assess the moral quality of our underlying intentions insofar as these indicate the 
moral quality of our wills, it is doubtful that it could serve even this limited purpose 
if the only descriptions maxims contained were of final ends. 
Consider the following versions of the Asylum1 case.  
Asylum2 
Officer A, B and C pursue the end of being law-abiding officials for its own sake. 
[A]  Officer A thinks that, in standard circumstances, his end of being a law-abiding 
official is best served by complying with the asylum regulations, and he does not 
see the circumstances at hand as exceptional. So, for him, the fact that the refu-																																																								
216 O’Neill 1989: 84. In arguing for this solution, O’Neill appeals to the fact that Kant uses the term 
“maxim”, which suggests that he is thinking of the first major premise of a poly-syllogism (see also 
Beck 1960: 81). My argument aims to show that the way in which O’Neill makes sense of this choice 
of terminology cannot be the right way. 
217 O’Neill 1989: 130. Allison argues that this view cannot make good sense of Kant’s examples (1990: 
93-4). 
	 138 
gee appeals to invalid grounds for asylum makes rejecting the application a suit-
able means to his end. 
[B] Officer B shares A’s view of the default, but regards the circumstances at hand 
as exceptional. In his view, if a refugee appealing to invalid grounds is suffering, 
then, other things being equal, this shows a respect in which the asylum regula-
tions fall short of the constitutional right of asylum. So, for him, the fact that the 
refugee is suffering defeats the bindingness of the asylum regulations and makes 
granting asylum a suitable means to his end. 
[C] Officer C shares A’s and B’s views of the default, and also B’s view of the de-
feating import of the fact that a refugee is suffering. And he does recognize that 
the refugee before him is suffering. However, in his view, if the suffering of a 
refugee appealing to invalid grounds is self-inflicted, then, other things being 
equal, it does not show a respect in which the asylum regulations fall short of 
the constitutional right of asylum. And as a homophobe, this is how he sees the 
persecution of sexual minorities. So, for him, the (alleged) fact that the refugee’s 
suffering is self-inflicted restores the bindingness of the asylum regulations and 
makes rejecting the application a suitable means to his end. 
For now I want to compare officers A and C. The difference between them is nei-
ther a matter of whether they do the right thing (after all, it is the same act) nor a 
matter of deliberating more or less carefully. It is a difference in how they understand 
what it means to be a law-abiding official, a difference that only comes into view once 
we look at counterfactual scenarios in which their judgments about the conducive-
ness of certain means to what, initially, appears like the same end diverge.218 The 
problem with O’Neill’s more recent solution to the generality puzzle is that it is 
simply impossible to determine what someone’s underlying intentions are, and what 
these intentions say about the quality of their will, until we know how they would 
implement them under various kinds of circumstances.219 As a result, we seem forced 																																																								
218 We made the same point in ch. 2, sect. 3.2, when discussing the ambiguity in how Herman speaks 
of grounds and ends. There we used the metaphor of ends as “mere labels” to indicate that, so con-
ceived, ends do not suffice to reveal the moral character of our actions.  
219 In Acting on Principle, O’Neill seems to agree with this point. This is manifest in her response to 
counterexamples to the universalisability requirement that rest on overly detailed “maxims” (e.g. Allen 
Wood’s Hildreth-Milton-Flitcraft example in his 1999: 102). Her response to such examples is that “a 
person cannot simply claim a highly specific maxim ... He must in fact intend his act to be contingent 
on those restrictions and not merely pursued by these means” (2013: 156). What she seems to have in 
mind is this. Knowing that the agent is willing to make a false promise (action) in order to secure 
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to turn back to her initial solution, according to which, for every action, there are as 
many maxims as there are intentional descriptions of it. 
It seems to me that O’Neill abandons this initial solution to the generality puzzle 
because she worries that it not only fails to deal with the threat of conflicting verdicts 
but makes dealing with it a matter of conceptual impossibility. Recall that we wanted 
to know which one of the many intentions we should regard as the agent’s maxim be-
cause we realized that picking one would yield one result, while picking another 
would yield a different result. In light of this, being told that all intentions are max-
ims does indeed seem to make things a lot worse. However, as Marcus Willaschek 
points out, we can block this problematic implication of O’Neill’s initial solution by 
combining it with the following modified version of the universalisability require-
ment: an action is permissible if and only if all the maxims that it is based on satisfy 
the universalisability requirement.220 Although this combination of views is not free 
of ambiguities and problems,221 it suffices to show what we wanted to show: that 
there are ways of dealing with the multiplicity of intentional descriptions and, thus, 
that conceiving of the Problem of Relevant Descriptions as a consequence of the 
generality puzzle renders it a non-issue for Kant’s Formula of Universal Law. The 
foregoing discussion also draws attention to a point to which I will return in sect. 5: 
that a satisfactory reading of Kant’s Formula of Universal Law and of his conception 
of maxims, taken together, must ensure that the agent’s deliberative route as a whole is 
subjected to scrutiny through the universalisability requirement. Otherwise, the deon-
tic assessment afforded by this requirement will be superficial, an assessment of ends 
as mere labels, as it is on O’Neill’s revised account. 																																																																																																																																																							
some extra money (underlying intention) is not enough to determine which maxim they are acting on. 
We need to know more about the nature of their pursuit, e.g. whether, if the promisee was not called 
Hildreth Milton Flitcraft, they would still see the false promise as a good means to their end, or 
whether their willingness to deceive Hildreth may reflect a lack of respect for this person, in particular. 
220 Willaschek 1992: 299. According to this view, our maxims come in hierarchies. I agree with this 
view and see it as a natural extension of the view that principles of duty come in hierarchies (see ch. 3, 
sect. 2.3). However, I do not think that the universalisability requirement demands that, in each case, 
we assess the whole hierarchy. Instead, I argue that one principle from this hierarchy is assessed in light 
of the circumstances. 
221 Let me mention one problem with the view that we must assess whole hierarchies of maxims. 
According to Willaschek, we have to take into account all our steps in the derivation of means from 
ends (vertical perspective), but he does not say whether the principles that specify the means should 
make reference to defeaters as well (horizontal perspective). Here, as before, the combination of the 
Asymmetry desideratum and the Complexity desideratum, discussed in ch. 2, sect. 1, 2.3.2, and 3.3.2, 
constrains our options. When discussing the Murderer at the Door case, for instance, Willaschek includes 
all the features that are intuitively relevant in the case at hand and leaves aside others that seem irrele-
vant (1992: 300), but he does not give an account of how this is justified and where to draw the line.  
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2.2  Second Misconception: The Opacity of the Human Heart 
There is a further problem with what O’Neill, in the passage cited in sect. 2.1 above, 
calls Kant’s “solution” to the Problem of Relevant Descriptions. While we know that 
the universalisability requirement applies to the agent’s maxim,222 we often do not 
know what someone’s maxim on a given occasion really is. It is not only that other 
people can be wrong about our intentions, we ourselves are often deceived about 
them as well. Kant famously maintains that “the depths of the human heart are un-
fathomable” (MM 6:447) and that we have a tendency to “flatter ourselves by falsely 
attributing to ourselves a nobler motive” (G 4:407). This so-called “opacity thesis” 
(Ware 2009: 672) has inspired another reading of Anscombe’s objection, according 
to which the Problem of Relevant Descriptions is the problem of determining which 
maxim a given action was truly based on – a task that proves difficult, even from the 
first-person perspective.223 Recall the above Asylum2 case and immigration officer C, 
whose intention to reject the application was contingent on the applicant’s being a 
homosexual. Had C convinced himself that his intention was based on a non-
discriminatory consideration (on the impression that the applicant was not really 
suffering, say), then asking whether the corresponding maxim meets the universalisa-
bility requirement would not have been a reliable guide to the deontic status of his 
action. 
If this is how we understand the Problem of Relevant Descriptions, then solving 
it cannot be a matter of further explicating Kant’s Formula of Universal Law or the 
concepts employed therein. Lack of self-knowledge is not a theoretical problem. It is 
a practical problem that we face in our everyday lives. At the level of theory, we 
could at best supplement the Formula of Universal Law with a sincerity clause de-
manding that the tested principle express what the agent, after having carefully scru-
tinized his or her intentions, sincerely takes to be their content and deep structure 
(see e.g. Rawls 2000: 167-8, O’Neill 2013: 248). But, of course, such introspective 
scrutiny need not be crowned with success, and so it seems that the Problem of Rel-
evant Descriptions, so conceived, is a real threat to a core element of Kant’s ethics. 																																																								
222 Given what I said in the previous section, it might be more appropriate to speak of maxims in the 
plural, but I shall use the singular, partly because I do not accept Willaschek’s account and partly for 
the sake of simplicity.  
223 O’Neill indicates that she sees this as part of the problem when she recommends trying to avoid 
self-deception as a method for selecting relevant descriptions. See O’Neill 2013: 225-27, 248-49. 
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It is indeed a threat if one assumes that the Formula of Universal Law is primari-
ly meant to provide a decision tool that agents can use to navigate their way around 
the moral domain. It is not a threat, however, if its primary role is to articulate a 
norm that determines the deontic status of actions.224 For the universalisability re-
quirement to be a reliable decision tool, the agent would have to know which maxim 
will underlie the future action that they are considering performing, and that is some-
thing they may not be able to know for sure.225 But this epistemic limitation is not an 
issue if the main point of the universalisability requirement is to determine the deon-
tic status of actions on the basis of the maxims on which they were, in fact, per-
formed. It is of no importance to the discriminatory power of the universalisability 
requirement whether anyone has epistemic access to these facts. Kant’s conception 
of his own project as an exercise in the metaphysics of morals favours this latter in-
terpretation. To conclude, if the Problem of Relevant Descriptions is taken to arise 
from the opacity thesis, it casts doubt on the reliability of Kant’s universalisability 
requirement as a decision tool, but it does not undermine its discriminatory power as 
a norm that determines the deontic status of actions, which is what it is primarily 
intended to be.226 
2.3  Upshot: Is There a Problem Left to Solve? The Subjectivizing Move 
The two approaches to the Problem of Relevant Descriptions that I have discussed 
so far rely on the thought that O’Neill articulates in the passage cited in sect. 2.1 
above, namely, that Kant himself offers a solution to the problem by pointing us to 
the agent’s maxim and to the description it contains. The challenges that remain, 
according to these approaches, stem from the obstacles encountered in trying to de-																																																								
224 This question, the question of whether the Categorical Imperative is primarily a decision tool or a 
norm that determines the deontic status of actions, already came up. We discussed it in ch. 2, sect. 3.2. 
225 In any case, it is far from uncontroversial that the opacity thesis denies that agents can know their 
maxims. Some commentators argue that it is absurd to deny that we can know our specific intentions, 
and thus they conclude that Kant must have meant the fundamental maxim (or Gesinnung). See e.g. 
Allison 1990: 93. 
226 The tendency to conflate these two ways of viewing the Formula of Universal Law stems, in part, 
from a confusion about constructivist approaches in ethics and metaethics. Constructivists argue that 
a practical judgment is correct insofar as it results from a certain “construction procedure”. This talk 
of a procedure should not be taken to refer to a decision procedure or tool that guarantees success, 
however. For constructivists, this is merely a metaphor, a way of illustrating fundamental principles of 
practical reason. In using this metaphor, they do not mean to say that any judgment an agent might 
arrive at when sincerely employing that procedure is correct. What they mean is rather that the fun-
damental principles of practical reason, which their procedure illustrates, define what it is to properly 
exercise one’s capacity of practical reason – an ideal that any agent can fall short of, no matter how 
hard they try. We will come back to this in ch. 5.  
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termine what the agent’s maxim is, both generally speaking (first misconception) and 
in specific instances (second misconception). I have argued that these obstacles do 
not in fact threaten the discriminatory power of Kant’s universalisability requirement. 
Does that mean that there is no problem left to solve? I shall now argue that it does 
not. 
First, however, an exegetical point. If we pay close attention to Anscombe’s 
phrasing, we can see that the two conceptions of the problem discussed above fail to 
make good sense of what she says. According to her, the Problem of Relevant De-
scriptions arises “with a view to constructing a maxim”. This suggests, first, that she 
is well aware of what O’Neill presents as a solution to her problem: the fact that 
Kant was not interested in descriptions other than the one contained in the agent’s 
maxim. Second, and more importantly, her use of the phrase “constructing a maxim” 
indicates from which perspective she takes the problem to arise: the perspective of a 
morally deliberating agent trying to formulate a principle of action.227 The perspective 
that she has in mind is neither the perspective of a commentator who is fiddling with 
Kant’s notion of a maxim, nor the perspective of a self-scrutinizing agent who is 
trying to get to the bottom of their “unfathomable heart”. It would be odd to de-
scribe what the latter two are doing as “constructing maxims”. This indicates that 
Anscombe is not actually worried that Kant’s theory might lack the resources to de-
termine which description it is that an agent’s maxim contains, but rather that the 
description that the maxim does in fact contain could be irrelevant and that Kant’s 
theory lacks the resources to rule out this possibility. Some Kant scholars deny this 
possibility.228 I will argue that they do so at too high a cost, but first let me illustrate 
what it is that they are denying. Consider the following example.  
Grandmother: You promised to help your grandmother on Sunday afternoon, but 
when the time arrives, you just stay on your favourite bench in the park, playing 
the guitar. “Why did you stay in the park?” your friend asks perplexedly. “I was 
practicing in order to develop my guitar skills,” you say. In saying this, you are 																																																								
227 It must be admitted that the evidence cited here is not conclusive. The fact that Anscombe speaks 
of “constructing a maxim about it”, for example, might be taken to suggest that she is thinking of an 
observer describing an action that has already been performed from a third-person perspective. The 
point that I go on to make is not affected by this: the two approaches discussed thus far make even 
less sense of her choice of words. 
228 Wood’s criticism of the Formula of Universal Law, for instance, rests on denying this possibility 
(1999: 102-7). 
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being honest, you are not keeping anything from your friend, and you are not 
deceived about your intentions.229 
There is certainly a problem with your maxim, but it is not that it cannot be 
willed as a universal law. It can (or so it seems). The problem is that, given the cir-
cumstances, the considerations from which you are acting are irrelevant, or at least 
they are not the only considerations that are relevant to what you are allowed or obli-
gated to do in this case. The opponent I am envisaging would say that this intuition 
is misleading. If, in forming your maxim, you complied with an attentiveness clause 
akin to the above sincerity clause,230 then you simply “can do nothing more to deter-
mine that [your] maxim does not match [your] situation” (O’Neill 2013: 249). Ac-
cording to my opponent, your action is right in the only sense that is available to 
Kantians: subjectively right.231 If you had acted under a different description, e.g. from a 
maxim of promise-breaking, then your action would have been wrong. But you did 
not, and so it is right.232 
Such a claim will strike many people as deeply un-Kantian, but this is the cost of 
denying the possibility that even an attentively formed maxim might contain an irrel-
evant description: one must deny that Kant’s ethics can deliver on its promise of 
objectivity and must settle for subjective rightness instead. If this is indeed the cost 
of putting Anscombe’s objection to one side, it is surely a cost that Kantians should 
refuse to pay. Instead, it seems, they should admit not only that the intentions with 
which agents act may be morally unworthy (this possibility is already acknowledged 
in the very idea of a Categorical Imperative), but also that such shortcomings may be 
rooted in a mismatch between maxim and circumstances, and not necessarily in a 
failure to meet the universalisability requirement. In acknowledging the possibility of 																																																								
229 This is an example that Stratton-Lake uses to illustrate his objection to what he labels the “justifica-
tory conception of the moral law”. On this conception, the “lawlike nature of [one’s] maxim is suffi-
cient to make [the] action morally right” (Stratton-Lake 2000: 58). I will say more about the justificato-
ry conception and its flaws in sect. 3 below, but the fact that my behaviour in this example seems so 
oddly unmotivated (Have I forgotten? Do I properly understand what promising is? Am I weak-
willed? Etc.) is part of what Stratton-Lake takes issue with. For current purposes, I want to leave it 
open why I ignore the promise and postpone the discussion of this question to sect. 2.5 and 3. 
230 According to O’Neill, the deliberating agent must not only try to avoid self-deception, she must 
also do her best to avoid ignorance and bias (2013: 249). That’s what I mean by “attentiveness clause”. 
231 Even though O’Neill endorses this subjectivizing move (2013: 251-3), her view is more nuanced 
than the view of the opponent I envisage in this section, because she does not deny that descriptions 
can be irrelevant. 
232 For simplicity’s sake, I am here adopting O’Neill’s way of speaking, so I speak of “right” and 
“wrong” actions, rather than “permissible”, “impermissible”, and “obligatory” actions, as I have done 
so far. I will do the same in sect. 4.2, when I discuss Mark Timmons’ solution. 
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such mismatch-based shortcomings, we make room for a different approach to 
Anscombe’s challenge. According to this new approach, she is not asking for stipula-
tions that would determine which description a maxim does contain (or what the 
agent’s maxim is), but rather which description it ought to contain, given the circum-
stances.233 If such stipulations can be found, then there is hope that Kant can make 
good on his promise of objectivity and that his ethics can overcome Anscombe’s 
challenge. However, even if it is accepted that this is the point of her challenge, there 
is still room for a further misconception. 
2.4  Third Misconception: Inadvertent Ignorance 
The reductio argument against the view that “there is no problem left to solve” that I 
presented in the previous section invites a response. My opponent may grant that 
subjectivizing Kant’s ethics is an inadequate way of dealing with the problem, but 
still maintain that no additional stipulations are needed. All that is needed to solve 
the problem, they may argue, is a conditional restatement of the Formula of Univer-
sal Law, according to which the latter determines the deontic status of an action if 
and only if the action is based on a maxim that matches the circumstances. This pro-
posal assumes that the Problem of Relevant Descriptions arises from the possibility 
of epistemic failure in the contemporary sense of the term. In what follows, I argue 
that this conception of the problem overlooks an important distinction between two 
ways in which one may fail to choose a relevant description, thus making it impossi-
ble to account for the core instances of such failure. 
We find an example of such a conflation in O’Neill’s early work. In sect. 2.3 
above, I argued against those who deny the possibility of acting under irrelevant de-
scriptions altogether. O’Neill admits this possibility, but, as a proponent of the sub-
jectivizing move, she treats it as deontically insignificant.234 Let us consider how 
O’Neill explains the occurrence of actions performed under descriptions that are 																																																								
233 Recall that this is Herman’s objection to the view that the Categorical Imperative is an algorithm 
for moral deliberation: that, if it was, there would be no way of ensuring that the resulting judgments 
take account of all and only the morally relevant features of the case. For this reason, she aims to 
develop an account of moral deliberation on which the classification of features as morally relevant is 
regulated. See ch. 2, sect. 3.1. 
234 On this point see sect. 2.3 and O’Neill 2013: 230. O’Neill does not distinguish between approaches 
that take Anscombe to be worried about what an agent’s maxim is and those that take her to be wor-
ried about what it ought to be; instead she treats the two worries as different aspects of the problem. For 
the former aspect see, in particular, 2013: 106-10 and 1989: 83-9; for the latter 2013: 223-32 and 246-
77. 
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irrelevant from the “bird’s-eye point of view” (O’Neill 2013: 257). She lists three 
types of error that can afflict agents when they are forming their maxims of action: 
self-deception, ignorance, and bias (O’Neill 2013: 225-30). In sect. 2.2, I showed that 
the first type is not a genuine instance of the problem at all,235 so we can focus on the 
latter two. O’Neill treats them both as corollaries of the pervasive epistemic limita-
tions that affect human agents in decision situations. In doing so, however, she ne-
glects a key difference between them, which bears on the prospects of resolving dis-
agreements about whether a description is relevant or not. 
Recall the Grandmother example. If you stayed on the bench playing the guitar, 
thereby ignoring a promise that you made to your grandmother, it would be rather 
odd for you to reply to your friend’s why-question in the way you did (“I was practic-
ing in order to develop my guitar skills”) unless the promise had completely slipped 
your mind. Let us assume that this was the case. Now imagine your friend were to 
point out to you that you had made that promise. Naturally you would spring to your 
feet and get going. In instances of inadvertent ignorance, instances where an agent 
fails to remember or notice something or where they draw a false conclusion, disa-
greements about the relevance of their description are usually easy to resolve. There 
is, at any rate, a truth of the matter, visible from the bird’s-eye point of view, on 
which the parties to the disagreement can converge.236 Now recall the Asylum2 cases. 
Of officer A we cannot say that he inadvertently ignored the fact that he was facing a 
distressed victim of sexual persecution (they spoke face to face, he could not have 
deemed the ground she appealed to invalid if he wasn’t aware of it, etc.). If the de-
scription under which he acted seems irrelevant to us, then this is because we regard 
the above fact as morally relevant and he does not. We may want to accuse him of 
being biased, but how could we justify this accusation? How would we go about re-
solving such a disagreement? An advocate of Kant’s Formula of Universal Law 
seems forced to say that this kind of disagreement, unlike the first one, is potentially 
intractable, because there is no standard of moral relevance prior to the universalisa-																																																								
235 Self-deception, in the sense emphasized by Kant, is usually taken to lead to a mismatch between 
the maxim one is actually acting on (perhaps the fundamental maxim one is acting on, see fn. 225) and 
the maxim that one takes oneself to be acting on, not a mismatch between maxim and circumstances. 
Accordingly, self-deception and the errors that are pertinent here operate on different levels. This is 
not to deny that they can go hand in hand. In fact, the former often helps to sustain the latter. 
236 The assumption that in cases of ideally informed factual disagreement normal methods of rational 
discourse will persuade the mistaken party is not beyond doubt. On this point see Cassam 2015. 
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bility requirement (no “stipulations”) that the parties to the disagreement could ap-
peal to, even if they were to take up the bird’s-eye viewpoint.237 There seems to be no 
objectively relevant description that represents the situation as it really is, morally 
speaking, and thus no possibility of getting it wrong. 
Instead of properly appreciating the difference between these two varieties of er-
ror, O’Neill contradicts herself by claiming both that there is a meaningful distinction 
between relevant and irrelevant descriptions and that “Kant’s theory of right does 
not provide any method for determining the relevant ... act description under which 
to assess an act when we take the bird’s-eye point of view” (O’Neill 2013: 257). What 
she should have said is that there is a distinction between epistemic failure and suc-
cess, between getting the facts right and getting them wrong, but that, for a Kantian, 
there is no (or does not seem to be)238 any meaningful distinction between correct 
and incorrect claims concerning the moral relevance of facts. But given that some 
mismatches between maxims and circumstances do result from epistemic failure, one 
may wonder why the conception that we considered here is a misconception rather 
than a partially correct conception. 
2.5  The Correct Conception: A Flawed Moral Sensibility 
In order to answer this question, let us recall what we have established so far. It 
emerged from our discussion that Anscombe rejects Kant’s ethics because, in her 
view, his universalisability requirement misclassifies actions based on maxims that 
contain irrelevant descriptions. We now have to ask how much force this objection 
would carry if it targeted cases where the mismatch between maxim and circum-
stances arose from an inadvertent epistemic failure. The answer is “not much”. After 
all, it is not the primary task of a moral theory or its supreme principle to rule out 
epistemic errors. Such errors do occur, and we admitted that they can lead to wrong-
doing (e.g. to unkept promises), but they are at best a subsidiary matter in the context 
of moral theorizing. Their marginal importance is manifest in the fact that we tend 
not to blame people for committing such errors. Recall the Grandmother example: if 
you had simply forgotten, we would not blame you or at least not fully, because we 
do not see forgetfulness as a moral failure. This suggests that actions from epistemi-																																																								
237 O’Neill concedes that such disagreements are intractable (2013: 254-5). 
238 In sect. 5, I will argue that Kantians can draw the desired distinction, but that they can do so only if 
they abandon the Case-Scope Reading of Kant’s conception of universal validity.  
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cally flawed maxims are merely peripheral instances of the class of actions that exem-
plify Anscombe’s problem. Its core instances are actions from biased maxims. This is 
why an epistemic success condition (sect. 2.4) cannot dissolve the threat that the 
problem presents, why it cannot replace the stipulations that Anscombe is after, 
namely, an objective standard of moral relevance. 
To grasp what we are looking for, we must elaborate on the notion of bias that 
we adopted from O’Neill. In the context of the present discussion, the notion should 
be read quite broadly, as referring to all the different ways in which one may misap-
prehend the moral relevance of a circumstantial feature that one is otherwise aware 
of. Biases are not singular instances of such misapprehension, however. They are 
objectionable dispositions, such as misogyny, homophobia, or racism, that produce 
corresponding patterns of behaviour.239 Going back to our Asylum2 cases, we can 
imagine different scenarios: that officer A acted under an irrelevant description be-
cause he is particularly submissive to authority or because he is generally insensitive 
to human suffering, say. In contemporary metaethics, discussions of biases and ob-
jectionable dispositions are oftentimes couched in terms of a flawed moral sensibility. 
We could therefore reformulate the task associated with Anscombe’s challenge by 
saying that Kant needs an account of moral sensibility. 
Before moving on to some more specific worries about this task, let me forestall 
a general objection. The search for an objective standard of moral relevance may 
appear as un-Kantian as the subjectivizing move (see sect. 2.3) because it presuppos-
es that there is moral content prior to the universalisability requirement. I agree that 
positing such content would go against some of Kant’s most basic commitments, 
and this is precisely why, in the end, I argue that the task associated with the Problem 
of Relevant Descriptions cannot be discharged. Nonetheless, I think that an objec-
tive standard of moral relevance is what would be needed to solve the problem, given 
the strongest interpretation of it. 
																																																								
239 For further remarks on biases and objectionable dispositions see ch. 2, sect. 3.3.1 and ch. 3, sect. 
2.4, where I associate the notion of bias with the notion of making exceptions for oneself.  
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3.  Does Kant Need a Sensibility Theory? Clarifying the Task 
The notion of a moral sensibility is familiar from a number of Neo-Aristotelian views 
known as sensibility theories.240 My claim that this notion is key to developing a con-
sistent reading of Kant’s ethics will thus be met with suspicion. These suspicions need 
to be addressed, not only in order to show that my preferred conception of the Prob-
lem of Relevant Descriptions is indeed a threat to Kant’s universalisability require-
ment, but also because, in doing so, we will identify a demand that an adequate solu-
tion to the problem would have to meet. In sect. 1, I observed that the universalisa-
bility requirement is susceptible to Anscombe’s criticism because it is description-
relative. In order to dismiss the suspicions at hand, we need to sharpen this notion in 
two respects. 
The first suspicion is rather superficial. It may seem that, by using the term “de-
scription”, Anscombe has misled us from the start. A sensibility theorist, who thinks 
of moral reasoning in perceptual terms, might say that such reasoning aims at appro-
priate descriptions, for example, at a description of the applicant in the Asylum cases 
as someone who is desperately seeking shelter rather than as someone who is com-
mitting asylum fraud. But to ascribe such a claim to Kant seems inapt, because to do 
so would be to neglect his distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. 
Open-ended reasoning towards a description of a given object, situation, or act, for 
Kant, is an exercise of reflective, that is, theoretical judgment. However, as O’Neill 
points out in a more recent piece,241 
in practical judging we are not judging a particular act. The task in practical judg-
ment is to shape action that is not yet done. There is no particular act [or situation] 
to be judged. The aim of practical judgment is to shape the world (in small part), 
not to identify some way in which the world is shaped. ... The different direction 
of fit shields practical judgment from the problem of relevant descriptions.242 
O’Neill’s emphasis on the distinction between practical and theoretical judgment 
is true to Kant’s text, of course, but her attempt to use it to dismiss the Problem of 																																																								
240 See Wiggins 1998: 87-138, 185-214, McDowell 1998: 131-150, 77-94, and (less obviously) Murdoch 
2001: 1-44. In recent discussions, the label “fitting-attitude” theories has become more fashionable. 
241 We already mentioned a closely related worry of hers when discussing the Casuistical Questions 
Response to the Rigorism Objection in ch. 1, sect. 4.1. My response there was similar to the response I 
give here. 
242 O’Neill 2004: 312-3. She reaffirms these doubts about the Problem of Relevant Descriptions in a 
new introduction to Acting on Principle. O’Neill 2013: 10–2. 
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Relevant Descriptions rests on an ambiguity in how we use the term “description”. 
In its narrow sense, the term is indeed associated with the mind-to-world direction of 
fit, making it inapplicable to practical judgments or “prescriptions”. But we also use 
the term in a broad sense to refer to any form of conceptualization. With this disam-
biguation in mind, we can concede the terminological point, namely, that Kant’s uni-
versalisability requirement is description-relative only in the broad sense, while hold-
ing on to the substantive point: that there is a relativity in it, which, for lack of a bet-
ter term, we could call “prescription-relativity”. Is there a Problem of Relevant Pre-
scriptions, then? Prima facie, we have no reason to assume otherwise, at least not on 
the basis of O’Neill’s observations about directions of fit. For we still need to know 
how to get from the Formula of Universal Law to a specific course of action (a spe-
cific way of “shaping the world”) that constitutes a morally appropriate response to a 
given situation, other than by relying on our moral sensibility, for which Kant appar-
ently failed to set a standard.243 But here a second, more weighty suspicion about my 
appeal to the notion of a moral sensibility rears its head. 
Unlike sensibility theorists, Kant does not think that an action’s deontic status is 
determined by whether it constitutes an appropriate response to the circumstances 
(that, after all, is the task that he assigns to the Categorical Imperative). So it would 
be quite surprising if he thought of moral reasoning in terms of exercising one’s 
moral sensibility. Let us grant, for now, that this is correct. But a weaker claim might 
be true nonetheless: an action’s deontic status might depend on whether the action 
constitutes an appropriate response to the circumstances or not, so that the Categor-
ical Imperative, at least in its first formulation, would need to be supplemented with 
an account of moral sensibility. To evaluate this dependence claim, we must examine 
what it would mean to deny it. There are two options. 
A radical denial of the dependence claim would amount to the view that Kant’s 
universalisability requirement is practical reason’s only guide, both necessary and suf-
ficient to determine what we ought to do. It is obvious that this view has implausible 
implications: if it were true, we would always be bound by a single overarching im-
perative with disjunctive content that would prescribe acting on any one of infinitely 																																																								
243 In fact, O’Neill goes on to argue that there is no Problem of Relevant Prescriptions either, because 
the appearance of indeterminacy in practical reasoning results from an artificial focus on one principle 
of action at a time. However, her argument for this conclusion conflates hypothetical and categorical 
imperatives. O’Neill 2004: 313-4. 
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many maxims that meet the universalisability requirement, no matter what the cir-
cumstances.244 Many of the actions that would then be open to us in any given situa-
tion would be outrageous or instrumentally pointless or both. This observation mere-
ly confirms what we knew all along: that the universalisability requirement cannot do 
all the work by itself or that categorical imperatives are not the only imperatives there 
are. It also points towards a weaker, more plausible denial of the dependence claim, 
to a view that we can label the Naive Stance on the Problem of Relevant Descrip-
tions.  
Naive Stance: Kant’s universalisability requirement applies to whatever principles of 
action instrumental reason proposes. Of course, when we reason instrumentally, 
we need to be responsive to the circumstances, but only insofar as circumstanc-
es bear on which means we have to take to accomplish our ends. The respon-
siveness involved is theoretical, not moral; it does not require a moral sensibility.  
To assess the Naive Stance we need to go back to the third misconception. Recall 
that, in sect. 2.4, we drew attention to mismatches between maxims and circum-
stances that defy explanation in terms of epistemic malfunctioning. The inadequacy 
of the Naive Stance shows up in the fact that it cannot accommodate this possibility 
because it casts practical reason’s answerability to the circumstances in purely theo-
retical terms.245 Or, if it purports to accommodate it, then it effectively sidesteps the 
problematic aspect of Kant’s theory: the universalisability requirement. Let me ex-
plain why this is so. 
Consider what proponents of the Naive Stance would have to say about the Asy-
lum2 cases. Officer A, we said, rejects the application simply because the grounds 
appealed to are invalid; officer B grants asylum to the victim of sexual persecution 
because he takes her suffering to make a difference to what he is allowed or obligated 
to do. Both are fully aware of the facts, rely on sound theoretical judgments, and act 
on maxims that satisfy the universalisability requirement. If Naive Stance theorists 
want to avoid saying that both decisions are right (on this subjectivizing move, see 
																																																								
244 This is Stratton-Lake’s reductio argument against the justificatory conception of the moral law (see fn. 
229). 
245 In this respect, it is similar to Timmermann’s account of the relation between moral and instru-
mental reasoning, which we discussed in ch. 1, sect. 3.2.  
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sect. 2.3), they have to say that only one of the officers has adopted the right final ends.246 
This takes us back to the discussion of O’Neill’s maxims-as-underlying-intentions 
account in sect. 2.1. This account of O’Neill’s does not come out of nowhere. There 
are well-known passages in Kant’s writings where he himself appeals to a system of 
obligatory ends, which is organised around the end of self-perfection and the end of 
promoting other people’s happiness. In light of the results of our discussion in sect. 
2.1 above, we can rule out one way of reading this appeal: if we want to account for 
the difference between officers A and B, we have to do more than insist that one of 
them failed to make other people’s happiness his end, for the difference may lie in 
how they understand what that entails. So when Naive Stance theorists appeal to the 
thought that furthering other people’s happiness is an obligatory end, they must be 
appealing to a conception of that end on which it is more than a label, on which it 
has a deep structure: an end that contains within it an understanding of how to bal-
ance various concerns in various sorts of circumstances.247  
But if appeals to obligatory ends take this form, they cannot be part of an argu-
ment that is supposed to rescue the Formula of Universal Law from Anscombe’s 
objection, because this argument would render the very object it purports to rescue 
superfluous. Instead of showing that, when taken together, the universalisability re-
quirement and the deliverances of instrumental reason secure an adequate sensitivity 
to the circumstances, such an argument would just replace the universalisability re-
quirement with a different requirement:248 the requirement to adopt certain ends, 
namely those that contain an appropriate understanding of what we are allowed or 
obligated to do under various circumstances.249 Does a response to Anscombe really 
require doing the former? Let us go back to the end of the previous section. When I 
said that Kantians need an account of moral sensibility, I was drawing on the forego-																																																								
246 For Kant’s notion of an end that is also a duty see, in particular, MM 6:382-88 and ch. 1, sect. 4.1 
above. It is a matter of controversy how to reconcile these passages with some of the more formalistic 
sounding passages that are prominent in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. 
247 This is how Kant’s talk of obligatory ends has to be understood. These are ends prescribed by 
duties of virtue, and their pursuit is practically necessary (ch. 1, sect. 4.1), so, in doing wrong, one is not 
pursuing them. 
248 If the tension mentioned in fn. 246 is merely apparent, then it is not, strictly speaking, an alterna-
tive requirement, but rather an alternative perspective on the very same requirement. But if they do 
express the same requirement, then one of them should not, as Anscombe puts it, be “useless” with-
out the other. 
249 This is the problem with Herman’s recent attempt (2013) to show that Kant’s ethics can accom-
modate the role of circumstances. Her appeal to both obligatory ends and the Categorical Imperative 
amounts to a problematic duplication. See ch. 2, sect. 3.2, fn. 115.  
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ing discussion: they need one, if they want to respond to Anscombe’s objection, 
which concerns the Formula of Universal Law. It is thus beside the point that some 
other requirement that we can find in Kant’s oeuvre can get by without an appeal to 
moral sensibility. Keeping this in mind, we can finally conclude that the dependence 
claim survives both attacks. 
Ironically, it takes the breakdown of the Naive Stance to remind us of the kernel 
of truth in the second suspicion, the suspicion that we are mistaking Kant for a sen-
sibility theorist. If we are to solve the Problem of Relevant Descriptions, we cannot 
make the even stronger claim that, for Kant, an action’s deontic status is determined by 
whether it constitutes an appropriate response to the circumstances because, in doing 
so, we would throw out the baby with the bathwater. There may be nothing wrong 
with this position as such. In fact, it is the position of sensibility theorists proper, for 
whom “seeing” the circumstances in a certain light, conceiving of them as requiring 
some course of action, and acting accordingly is all that morality demands.250 “If I 
attend properly,” Iris Murdoch says, “I will have no choices and this is the ultimate 
condition to be aimed at” (2001: 38). The idea that there is a further requirement, for 
instance, a universalisability requirement, is, in her view, a dangerous idea, both in 
philosophy and in life (Murdoch 2001: 15-6, 37-8). For sensibility theorists, acting 
under a relevant description is necessary as well as sufficient for moral conduct, which 
seems to make their task quite different from Kant’s.251 To bring this difference into 
focus, it will be useful to draw a further distinction between two senses in which a 
theory can be description-relative.252 We shall say that sensibility theories and Kant’s 
theory have in common that they are description-relative in the general sense of con-
ceiving the deontic status of actions as dependent on the descriptions under which 
these actions are performed.253 But, within Kant’s theory, this general description-																																																								
250 McDowell, for example, conceives of moral conduct as a matter of seeing the circumstances in the 
light in which a properly brought up person would see them (1998: 100-1). For Murdoch, it is a matter 
of attending to the infinite complexities of human reality and coming to see things and persons justly 
and lovingly (2001: 33). For both the quasi-visual experience at issue is conceptual. 
251 In sect. 5, we will see that this is actually a mistaken impression. 
252 I borrow the following terminology from Timmons, who distinguishes between a general and a 
special problem of moral relevance (1997: 402).  
253 It has to be admitted that this is a somewhat unusual take on sensibility theories, so let me say a bit 
more. A sensibility theorist would take the deontic status of an action to be determined by whether 
the description under which it is performed is a description under which a virtuous person might have 
acted in this situation, and, if so, by whether she would have considered it necessary or merely possi-
ble to act in this way. I think that this correctly captures the view, if we assume, in addition, that the 
virtuous person is not prone to epistemic malfunctioning. 
	 153 
relativity takes a special form: the deontic status of actions is taken to depend on the 
satisfaction of a distinct requirement, whose satisfaction, in turn, depends on the 
descriptions under which these actions are performed. What Kant needs in order to 
deal with the Problem of Relevant Descriptions, then, is not a sensibility theory – or 
so it seems. What he needs is an account of moral sensibility that does not make the 
universalisability requirement superfluous. Let us call this the “non-superfluous de-
mand”. In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that there is no account that meets 
this demand. On this basis, I conclude that we must regard the Formula of Universal 
Law itself as an expression of Kant’s account of moral sensibility. 
4. A Kantian Standard of Moral Relevance? Two Unsuccessful Solutions 
4.1  First Solution: Culturally Imparted Rules of Moral Salience 
Let us consider Herman’s attempt to accomplish the above task. Although she does 
not address the Problem of Relevant Descriptions explicitly, her account of rules of 
moral salience can be understood as a solution to it. Here is her starting point. 
In order to use the CI as a principle of judgment or assessment, the agent must 
first produce his maxim. ... If actions are to be assessed (directly) by the CI 
through their maxims, there is a need in the Kantian system for some kind of 
independent moral knowledge. An agent who came to the CI procedure with no 
knowledge of the moral characteristics of actions would be very unlikely to de-
scribe his action in a morally appropriate way. (Herman 1993:75) 
Herman argues that Kant responds to this need by presenting “moral judgment as an 
activity with a customary context of occurrence”.254 She invites us to think of the 
structure of our moral sensibility in terms of so-called rules of moral salience that 
communities impart to their children through moral education. These rules, once 
internalized, make us perceive a world with moral features and help us “pick out 
those elements of [our] circumstances or ... proposed actions that require moral at-
tention”.255  
																																																								
254 Herman 1993: 76. She cites Kant’s account of moral education (MM 6:477-484) as evidence. 
255 Herman 1993: 77. This account of how features of the circumstances are picked out as relevant is 
slightly different from the account that Herman puts forward in “Moral Deliberation and the Deriva-
tion of Duties”, which we discussed in ch. 2, sect. 3. She comments on the relation between the two 
in her 1993: 151. 
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In developing this solution, Herman is attentive to the non-superfluous demand. 
She stresses that rules of moral salience should not be confused with rules of pro 
tanto duty, which assign independent deontic import or moral weight to the features 
they pick out. Rules of pro tanto duty fully determine the deontic status of actions in 
accordance with the balance of these features’ import or weight, and make no appeal 
to whether the maxims on which these actions are based meet the universalisability 
requirement. So a theory of pro tanto duties would render the latter requirement 
superfluous. But, of course, Herman’s rules of moral salience do influence and shape 
our moral judgments. And this causes trouble for Herman’s approach. 
The rules that we pass on through moral education represent the ethical self-
under-standing of our community. It goes without saying that different communities 
(cultural, subcultural, religious, generational) vary in this self-understanding, creating 
differences in how members of these communities “see” and describe their circum-
stances, what they take to be appropriate in a given case, and which maxims they 
form. As Herman admits, these differences “raise[ ] the spectre of relativism” (1993: 
89), a close relative of the subjectivism that we encountered in sect. 2.3. For if the 
members of different communities have a dispute about what one is allowed or obli-
gated to do in a given situation, they may not be able to settle this dispute by appeal 
to the Formula of Universal Law. Once again, determinacy comes at the cost of ob-
jectivity. 
However, unlike O’Neill, Herman refuses to settle for this un-Kantian conclu-
sion. Rules of moral salience, she adds, are objectively better or worse, depending on 
how well they accord with Kant’s conception of the person as a moral agent or end-
in-themselves (Herman 1993: 86). It is thus “a practical task for a community of moral 
agents” (Herman 1993: 87) to continually revise their defeasible rules in light of this 
conception.256 But how does this collective responsibility bear on the assessment of 
individual actions, which is the subject matter of Anscombe’s criticism? Herman’s 
remarks on this point are inconclusive. On the one hand, she seems to embrace rela-
tivism on the individual level, saying that “moral fault ... occurs only when an agent’s 
maxim contains a principle that cannot be willed as a universal law” (Herman 1993: 																																																								
256 Here defeasibility is understood as fallibility. This is the conception of defeasibility that we criti-
cized when discussing Korsgaard’s appeal to provisional universality. However, in this context, it is 
appropriate, because we do want to say that having to revise our rules of moral salience would mean 
that we got it wrong before. See ch. 2, sect. 4. 
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89), and not when it is based on rules of moral salience that fall short of Kant’s con-
ception of the person. On the other hand, she suggests that there are some cases in 
which individuals can be criticized for not having discovered the shortcomings in 
their rules of moral salience (Herman 1993: 90-2). Nazis are such a case, she believes. 
Let us ask whether going one way or the other gets us what we need to solve the 
Problem of Relevant Descriptions.257 
We have already established that the relativistic route does not lead to a satisfac-
tory solution. Think of the Asylum2 cases and imagine that the prosecutor who or-
dered the persecution of the refugee in her home country was asked to pass judg-
ment on officer B’s decision to grant asylum. Presumably, he would say that the latter 
violated his duty because, having adopted the homophobic outlook of his communi-
ty, the prosecutor would not regard a gay person’s suffering as morally relevant (in 
this respect, he would be similar to officer C). In sect. 2.4, we saw that a disagree-
ment of this kind could not be settled by appeal to the Formula of Universal Law. 
Prima facie, Herman’s alternative route does offer a way out. The appeal to Kant’s 
conception of the person allows us to judge officer B’s rules of moral salience to be 
superior to those of his opponent because they pay heed to the fact that the refugee 
is a moral agent. This proposal for a solution is quite similar to Mark Timmons’ pro-
posal, which is the topic of the next section. We will find that it fails to satisfy the 
non-superfluous demand, albeit in a less obvious manner than a theory of pro tanto 
duties. 
4.2  Second Solution: The Formula of Humanity 
Timmons maintains that there is a “pretty obvious solution” (1997: 399) to the Prob-
lem of Relevant Descriptions in Kant’s work. That it has been overlooked, he con-
jectures, is due to the fact that critics and commentators alike have disregarded the 
different roles assigned to the formulas of the Categorical Imperative in the architec-
																																																								
257 Perhaps Herman is thinking that we do not have to choose, that the question whether an agent is 
to be blamed for relying on flawed rules of moral salience is to be decided on a case by case basis. I 
think that this is actually the most accurate account of our practice of praising and blaming. But the 
fact that someone ought not to be blamed does not mean that they did not do anything impermissible. 
So, as far as the Problem of Relevant Descriptions is concerned, this middle ground is tantamount to 
saying that the deontic status of actions does, in fact, depend on whether the rules of moral salience 
relied on are in accord with Kant’s conception of the person. 
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tonic of Kant’s system.258 The difference between these roles, he says, becomes ap-
parent when we reflect on the two main aims of moral theorizing: the practical aim 
of providing agents with a decision tool (or “procedure”, as he calls it) and the theo-
retical aim of finding a criterion of right that systematizes the fundamental right- and 
wrong-making features of actions.259 The requirement that is expressed in the Formu-
la of Universal Law is generally expected to achieve both these aims, thus running 
into the Problem of Relevant Descriptions. According to Timmons, however, we can 
avoid this problem if we treat the latter as a mere decision tool and turn to the For-
mula of Humanity for Kant’s criterion of right.260 It is the Formula of Humanity, he 
maintains, that “represents Kant’s theory about [the] ultimate features in virtue of 
which an action is right or wrong,” insofar as it tells us that they are “facts about how 
a concrete action, were it performed, would affect ‘humanity’ (whether in others or 
one’s self)” (Timmons 1997: 401, see also 395-7). Timmons argues that, as such, 
Kant’s Formula of Humanity supplies an objective standard of moral relevance or a 
norm for the ideal exercise of our moral sensibility. It is this: in forming their max-
ims, agents ought to be sensitive to how their proposed action will affect their own 
and other people’s autonomy and the conditions thereof in the circumstances at issue 
and choose a description that makes this impact explicit.261 
If we abstract from inconsequential interpretative differences and attend to the 
substance of the proposals, we can see that this is exactly the solution that we arrive 
at if we take seriously Herman’s claim that individual actions based on flawed rules 
																																																								
258 Timmons 1997: 390. A further reason is that too much attention has been paid to the first formula 
(1997: 415). 
259 For a detailed account of the two roles, see Timmons 1997: 391-5. We distinguished these roles in 
the introduction, sect. 1.1. There we spoke of guides and standards. In sect. 2.2 above and, earlier, in 
ch. 2, sect. 3.2, we also considered how this distinction applies to Kant’s Categorical Imperative. In 
these contexts, we spoke of the Categorical Imperative as either a decision tool or a norm that deter-
mines the deontic status of actions. The latter notion is related to Timmons’ notion of a criterion of 
right and the notion of an explanatory standard that we used in the introduction, but it is not equiva-
lent to them. In my view, the Categorical Imperative is primarily a norm that determines the deontic 
status of actions, but it does not specify the features in virtue of which these actions are permissible, 
impermissible or obligatory or explain why they are. For this, we need to look at specific principles of 
duty. 
260 Kant’s Formula of Humanity, recall, says to “so act that you use humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (G 
4:429). 
261 Timmons 1997: 406-8. According to Timmons, Kant specifies the content of the idea of respecting 
autonomy in his system of duties, as outlined in the Doctrine of Virtue. 
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of moral salience can be classified as impermissible.262 Herman does not speak of 
roles, but she distinguishes between two “aspects” of the moral law: the “CI proce-
dure [which] interprets [the moral law] in a manner suited to the limits of the human 
understanding and the conditions of human judgment” (Herman 1993: 84), and the 
more fundamental “conception of oneself as a moral agent, [which is] the aspect of 
the moral law [that] provides the foundation for pre-procedural moral rules”.263 The 
former is akin to Timmons’ notion of a decision tool, the latter to his notion of a 
criterion of right. Both believe that at the heart of Kant’s account of moral sensibility 
lies his conception of autonomy, and that the moral sensibility of an agent is ade-
quate to the extent that it reflects a proper understanding of autonomy, its extension, 
and the conditions of its exercise. In assessing this idea, I will focus on Timmons’ 
account. 
Note, first of all, that this proposal seems to violate the demand that we uncov-
ered in sect. 3. According to Timmons, the Formula of Humanity is a criterion of 
right, that is, a requirement that by itself determines the deontic status of actions. As 
such, it is not just a standard of relevance. It prescribes treating autonomous agents 
in a certain way, not merely attending to their being such agents for the purpose of 
maxim formation, and it deems facts about how our actions will affect autonomy 
right- or wrong-making, which is not the same as deeming them morally relevant. As 
far as Anscombe’s objection is concerned, the Formula of Humanity is thus a stipula-
tion of the wrong kind. Instead of supplementing the Formula of Universal Law, it 
replaces it. Timmons is aware of this pitfall. In a section entitled “Isn’t the Universal 
Law formulation really superfluous on the differential roles interpretation?”, he tries 
to show that this is a false impression (Timmons 1997: 411-3). The Formula of Uni-
versal Law, he points out, is still needed as a decision tool because it helps agents to 
contemplate their actions and the situations that they are in from an impartial point 
of view. As such, it safeguards their judgment from the distorting influence of incli-
nation and helps them adjudicate conflicting grounds of obligation.264  
																																																								
262 Herman argues that the conception of persons as ends-in-themselves is not derived from the For-
mula of Humanity. Instead, she maintains that it lies behind all the formulations of the Categorical 
Imperative. Herman 1993: 87, n. 12. This exegetical difference between her and Timmons’ accounts is 
inconsequential, however. 
263 Herman 1993: 86. For the claim that this conception is more fundamental, see her 1993: 87, n. 12. 
264 For a discussion of grounds of obligation, see ch. 1, sect. 3.  
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In order to evaluate this response, we have to elaborate on an idea already 
touched on in sect. 2.2: the idea that Kant’s Formula of Universal Law supplies a mere 
decision tool. In the context of Timmons’ differential roles interpretation, terms such 
as “decision tool” or “decision procedure” are not metaphorical: they are not mere 
illustrations of a norm that determines the deontic status of actions (if they were, 
then the distinction between decision tool and criterion of right would collapse).265 
Instead, these terms refer to a tool that helps finite rational agents to control the dis-
torting effects that inclinations have on their judgment. Such an interpretation of 
Kant’s Formula of Universal Law not only underestimates the importance accorded 
to all the formulations of the Categorical Imperative in what is, after all, meant to be 
a metaphysical inquiry, it also misconstrues the relation between the formulas. While 
Kant asserts their equivalence (G 4:436), this interpretation treats the first formula as 
auxiliary to the second, as a mere control device that cannot be applied on its own. 
In light of these remarks, Timmons’ reply seems almost question-begging: he can 
only avoid making the Formula of Universal Law superfluous by arguing that it was 
more or less superfluous all along. 
The proposal to solve the Problem of Relevant Descriptions by appeal to Kant’s 
Formula of Humanity faces a second objection that is graver still. The very same 
criticism that Anscombe levels against the Formula of Universal Law seems to apply 
to the Formula of Humanity as well. We were hoping that this latter formula would 
bridge the gap between the circumstances of action and the agent’s conception of 
them, but on closer examination it, too, expresses a requirement that is description-
relative in the special sense. While there is no mention of maxims, there is mention 
of treating something as a means or an end, so that the question of whether the re-
quirement is met hinges, once again, on how agents conceive their actions and cir-
cumstances, but not on whether their conceptions fit the circumstances that they are 
actually in.  
Compare the above Grandmother example to Kant’s famous example of someone 
who acts on a maxim of false promising, which we discussed in ch. 3, sect. 3.3.  
																																																								
265 It is tempting to think that they are because Kantian Constructivists couch their views in procedur-
al terms, too. See fn. 113 above.  
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False Promising: “When I believe myself to be in need of money, I shall borrow money 
and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen” (G 
4:422). 
When acting act on a maxim of making a false promise in order to save oneself from 
financial embarrassment, one relies on their being a promisee who will accept one’s 
promise and give one money. There is thus a straightforward sense in which one is 
using them as a means, and as a mere means at that. But what would it mean to say 
that, in acting on a maxim of practicing in order to develop your guitar skills, you are 
treating your grandmother as a means or mere means? In sect. 2.4, we noted that you 
may not have thought about your grandmother at all, let alone planned on using her 
as a means to your end of guitar skill development. Had you acted on a maxim of 
breaking the promise that you made to her, you would have treated her as a mere 
means; but, as things stand, it seems that the Formula of Humanity would deem your 
staying in the park permissible or even obligatory. Here, again, it seems that Kant’s 
formula would need to be supplemented with stipulations determining how one ought 
to think of one’s means and ends in order for it to yield objective verdicts.266 Kantians 
will object. They will say that you are using your grandmother as a mere means be-
cause she cannot agree to being treated in this way, and this is what it means to treat 
someone as a mere means.267 
My reading of the Formula of Humanity will seem uncharitable because it as-
sumes that the grandmother cannot object to being left in the lurch unless she has 
some general objection to practicing the guitar for the sake of guitar skill development 
(in the way that one might have a general objection to making false promises for the 
sake of financial relief, say). The reading assumes that treating humanity as an end 
does not require adopting ends and means that fit the circumstances, that it does not 
require being sensitive to the morally relevant features of the case. This assumption 
makes it susceptible to an objection that is similar to Anscombe’s. We have seen that 
there is a more charitable reading, however. On this reading, one is being treated as a 
mere means if one cannot agree to being treated in this way. The demonstrative adjec-																																																								
266 We saw that such stipulations would make any further requirement superfluous, be it the universali-
sability requirement or the requirement to always treat humanity as an end. This is related to the point 
we made about obligatory ends in sect. 3 above. 
267 This interpretation of the Formula of Humanity, suggested by Kant’s discussion of his four exam-
ples in G 4:429–30, is a widely accepted one. See e.g. Wood 1999: 148-9. 
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tive indicates that the italicized phrase refers to a particular action, an action that is 
embedded in the circumstances of its occurrence. When the injunction to always 
treat humanity as an end is taken to apply to actions in context, it gives us grounds 
for criticizing agents whose actions result from their flawed moral sensibility.268 With 
that said, we must ask whether the Problem of Relevant Descriptions needs a solu-
tion at all, or whether an analogous reading of the Formula of Universal Law would 
allow us to dissolve it.269 Let me conclude with a few remarks on the prospects of solv-
ing and dissolving it, respectively. 
5.  Taking Stock: A Dissolution of the Problem of Relevant Descriptions 
We have shown that the two solutions considered in sect. 4.1 and 4.2 fail to meet the 
non-superfluous demand. Instead of supplementing Kant’s universalisability re-
quirement with a neutral principle of moral relevance, they replace it with a different 
requirement or moral principle. That they suffer from this flaw is not a coincidence. 
In fact, given how we have construed the problem, every attempt to solve it is bound 
to suffer from this flaw because there is no robust theory of moral relevance that is 
not, at the same time, a moral theory. If pleasure is morally relevant, it is relevant 
because it ought to be promoted; if all the considerations mentioned in divine com-
mands are morally relevant, they are relevant because divine commands ought to be 
complied with. R.M. Hare gets to the heart of this idea when he says that it is 
a great mistake to think that there can be a morally or evaluatively neutral pro-
cess of picking out relevant features of a situation, which can then be followed 
by the job of appraising or evaluating the situation morally ... When we decide 
what features of the description are morally relevant, we are already in the moral 
business.270 
Some solutions to the Problem of Relevant Descriptions may conceal the fact 
that a principle of moral relevance is always already a moral principle. Herman, for 
instance, goes to great lengths to convince the reader that her rules of moral salience 																																																								
268 This reading of the Formula of Humanity goes hand in hand with the Agent-Scope Reading of 
Kant’s conception of universal validity, as it figures in his Formula of Universal Law. In both cases, 
the deontic status of actions is assessed relative to the circumstances in which these actions are embedded. 
269 To solve the problem, one would have to provide the stipulations that Anscombe demands, that is, 
an account of moral sensibility or, in other words, an objective standard of moral relevance. To dissolve 
the problem, one would have to provide an interpretation of the Formula of Universal Law that 
shows that no such stipulations are needed. 
270 Hare 1978: 193. On this point see also Lyons 1965: 101-2 and Timmons 1997: 403. 
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are there only to direct our attention to “moral danger” (1993: 78) and not to replace 
the universalisability requirement. Nevertheless, if we supplement Kant’s Formula of 
Universal Law with such a set of merely attention-guiding rules that we decide to 
privilege over other such rules (which, without a robust moral theory in the back-
ground, would be arbitrary), we arrive at a compound principle that is different from 
and thus a substitute for the universalisability requirement. Either way, the non-
superfluous demand cannot be met. So where does this leave Kantians? 
In sect. 4.2 above, we saw that there is, in principle, as much reason to think that 
the Formula of Humanity faces the Problem of Relevant Descriptions as there is in 
the case of the Formula of Universal Law. But no one seems to be worried that it 
does. In fact, with the Formula of Humanity, the Kantian retort was at our fingertips: 
of course, being treated as an end in itself means being able to agree to being treated 
in this way, being able to agree to this particular action in these particular circumstances. 
In order to understand why there is this difference, why the Problem of Relevant 
Descriptions seems so urgent and pressing in one case, whereas, in the other, even 
raising it seems dumb, we need to remind ourselves of the distinction that we high-
lighted in ch. 3, sect. 2.5. According to the standard Case-Scope Reading of Kant’s 
conception of universal validity, the Formula of Universal Law expresses the re-
quirement to only act on principles that one can will to hold in all cases or in all cir-
cumstances. It is a demand to act on principles whose moral standing is not only 
independent of whether they fit the specific circumstances that one is in, but in fact 
precisely a matter of whether they generalize to all other cases. With this reading in 
mind, one is bound to wonder how the universalisability requirement is meant to 
ensure that the maxims it countenances refer to all and only morally relevant features 
of the case at hand.  
Here the Agent-Scope Reading comes to the rescue. According to this reading, 
the universalisability requirement is the requirement to only act on principles that 
one (any-one) can will to be morally viable for any rational agent who is in the same 
circumstance.271 The great advantage of this reading lies in the fact that it subjects the 
agent’s assumption that their maxim fits the circumstances to critical scrutiny 																																																								
271 Recall that this is the difference between universality and universalisability (see ch. 3, sect. 3.2). Not 
all principles of action are principles of duty. Many of them reflect our non-moral ends and projects. 
Such principles must be morally viable for anyone in the same circumstances in the sense that anyone 
must be allowed to act on them, but, of course, they do not bind people who don’t share the relevant 
ends.  
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through the universalisability requirement itself. In short, to satisfy the Agent-Scope 
version of the universalisability requirement, one has to act on a principle that fits the 
circumstances. As such, this requirement does not call for any Anscombian rele-
vance-stipulations. In fact, to think of the universalisability requirement in this way is 
to think that it is Kant’s account of moral sensibility:272 that it is description-relative 
in the general sense, not in the special sense, and that it urges us to ask, about each 
deliberative step that we take in forming our maxim, whether it can be justified to all 
rational agents. Unlike the Case-Scope version of the universalisability requirement, 
satisfying this version is not merely a matter of adopting or dismissing principles that 
were formed in accordance with another standard or through the employment of 
some random sensibility beforehand.  
Recall the Asylum2 cases and immigration officer A who rejects the application 
simply because the grounds appealed to are invalid. There might be many situations 
in which his maxim would satisfy the Agent-Scope version of the universalisability 
requirement. But whether it does so in the circumstances at hand depends on wheth-
er all rational agents can agree that the fact that the applicant is a victim of sexual 
persecution has no bearing on what one is allowed or obligated to do in the officer’s 
position. One may well think that it does.273  
 
  
																																																								
272 In fact, this interpretation is supported by textual evidence. In a section entitled “Of the Typic of 
Pure Practical Judgment”, where Kant discusses the problem of subsuming actions possible in the 
sensible world under the moral law, he claims that “the rule of judgment under laws of pure practical 
reason is this: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place by a law of the nature 
of which you were yourself a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your will” (CPrR 
5:69). This suggests that the Categorical Imperative itself bridges the gap between abstract principles 
and concrete actions. 
273 Here, again, one might worry about the Empty Formalism Objection. See ch. 3, sect. 3.3, esp. fn. 
192, 197 and 198 for comments on this point.  
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Chapter 5 
Kantian Constructivism – Formal or Substantive? 
A Response to Street 
1.  The Point of Contention between Humean and Kantian Constructivists 
The ambitions associated with the term “Kantian Constructivism” have certainly 
grown since it first appeared on the stage of philosophical debate in 1980. Initially 
devised as a theory of political justification meant to account for deep moral disa-
greement,274 Rawls’ idea has been developed into a full-fledged metaethical view that 
aims to secure both the objectivity of moral demands and their authority over us.275 
Although critics have acknowledged the appeal of the constructivist project, they 
have cast doubt on its viability. In particular, many question whether Kantian Con-
structivists can vindicate their claim that moral judgments are strongly objective: that 
they hold for all rational agents as such.    
My main aim in this chapter is to defend Kantian Constructivism against Sharon 
Street’s version of this criticism, but what I have to say seems to me to apply more 
widely. As a Humean Constructivist, Street subscribes to the main tenet of the con-
structivist doctrine: the idea that, even though judgments about practical reasons are 
subject to standards of correctness, these standards should be thought of as internal 
to the practical point of view.276 Whether our judgments about reasons are correct is 
not, as moral realists have it, a matter of how they represent the relevant attitude-
independent moral facts, but rather a matter of their withstanding a procedure of 																																																								
274 This reading of Rawls’ lectures on “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” (1980: 515-72) has 
been advocated by Miriam Ronzoni and Laura Valentini (2008: 416-7). 
275 For a comparison of this view with other metaethical views, see Korsgaard 2008: 321-4 and Street 
2010: 363-84. 
276 Street 2008: 207-8. Three preliminary remarks on the focus of this chapter. First, since my primary 
concern is Street’s criticism, I will not address the ontological question of whether reasons exist atti-
tude-independently, because that is a point on which Humean and Kantian Constructivists agree. 
They are united in their opposition to moral realism (for arguments that Kant is a moral realist, see 
e.g. Wood 2008: 111-4 and Stern 2012: 26-40, 2015: 31-33; for an argument that he is not a moral 
realist, see e.g. Bojanowski 2012). What I will focus on instead is a question about the correctness of 
our judgments about practical reasons. Here, too, the two camps seem to agree on a response: the 
correctness of our judgments about reasons is determined by standards internal to the practical point 
of view. However, as we shall see, this response is only superficially identical. Second, I am concerned 
exclusively with practical reasons, so when I say “judgments about reasons” or “normative judg-
ments”, this is short for “judgments about practical reasons”. Third, I will follow Street in speaking 
about the correctness or validity of judgments about reasons rather than their truth. Nothing in what I 
say below hinges on this point.  
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scrutiny or construction from the standpoint of (a subset of) our other judgments 
about reasons.277 In sect. 3.1 below, I will outline Street’s taxonomy of constructivist 
positions, but for now it will suffice to pin down her disagreement with the Kantian 
Constructivist.  
To bring the point of contention into focus, it is useful to distinguish between a 
weak and a strong conception of objectivity. As a constructivist, Street prides herself 
on being able to account for the objectivity of judgments about reasons. What she 
means by that, however, is merely that her procedure of scrutiny enables everyone to 
reach agreement on what a particular agent has reason to do given his or her com-
mitments.278 For Street, a statement of the form “X is a reason to Y” is elliptical in 
that it cannot be assessed before we specify whose reasons are at issue. Kantian Con-
structivists, by contrast, hope to establish that judgments about reasons can be objec-
tive in a stronger sense. They claim that, with their procedure of scrutiny at hand, 
certain judgments about reasons (namely judgments about moral reasons) can be 
agreed to hold not only by all rational agents as such but also for them. In their view, 
if a statement of the form “X is a reason to Y” picks out a moral reason, we can as-
sess its validity without knowing to whom it is meant to apply. I shall label this claim, 
which is the main point of contention between Humean and Kantian Constructivists, 
the Strong Objectivity claim.279 
Strong Objectivity: There are judgments about reasons, namely judgments about moral 
reasons, that can be agreed to hold by and for all rational agents as such. 
																																																								
277 In what follows, I will use the term “procedure of scrutiny” rather than “procedure of construc-
tion”. When it comes to metaethical constructivism, I would say that the former term is more appro-
priate because the term “construction” suggests that we use some specific set of materials to construct 
judgments “from scratch”. According to metaethical constructivists like Street and Korsgaard, howev-
er, this is not what we are doing when we make judgments about reasons. What we are doing, on their 
view, is scrutinizing a candidate judgment that presents itself (e.g. through an impulse) in light of a 
fluid system of normative commitments the content of which cannot be presupposed as part of the 
procedure itself. 
278 Street 2008: 224-5. Drawing on a distinction introduced by Scanlon, we could say that, on Street’s 
view, reasons are “judgment-independent” in the sense that it is possible for us to go wrong in our 
judgments about them, but they are not “choice-independent” in the sense that the standards for 
assessing judgments about reasons depend on what we have chosen or adopted (Scanlon 2012: 233). 
For Kantians, moral reasons are both judgment-independent and choice-independent. 
279 Note that this is not how Street characterizes the disagreement (2012: 41). My reason for diverging 
from her characterization will become apparent in the course of my argument. Briefly, my account of 
the controversy is broader than Street’s because I want to leave room for an alternative understanding 
of Kantian Constructivism, which I will contrast with hers.  
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Note the twofold significance of the phrase “as such” in the above formulation. On 
the one hand, it renders the claim more modest than it would otherwise be, since it 
registers the well-known fact that Kantians are not concerned with actual agreement – 
that they leave room for our cognitive limitations. To be correct, a judgment about 
reasons only has to be agreed to hold by agents insofar as they take up the standpoint 
of rationality. On the other hand, the phrase renders the claim more ambitious, and 
the sense in which it does is pertinent to understanding how Kantian Constructivism 
differs from Humean Constructivism. To say that a judgment holds for all rational 
agents as such is to say that its validity for each and every one of them doesn’t depend 
on any contingent overlap among their individual commitments.280 Consider the 
judgment “The fact that my country is at war is a reason to sacrifice my life”. If, as a 
matter of coincidence or due to some evolutionary force, all people (past, future, and 
present) happened to be fanatical nationalists, all rational agents would indeed be 
able to agree that the above judgment holds for them: that their country’s involve-
ment in a war gives them a reason to sacrifice their lives. But this judgment would 
not hold for all rational agents as such. It would hold for them only as nationalists. For 
Humean Constructivists, our moral judgments are at most contingently universal 
(Street: 2008: 225); for Kantian Constructivists, their universal validity is necessary.  
Street’s argument against Kantian Constructivism is supposed to undermine the 
Strong Objectivity claim. In what follows, I hope to show that her dismissal of the view 
is based on the uncharitable assumption that there is only one metaethical version of 
Kantian Constructivism, namely the approach advocated by Korsgaard in The Sources 
of Normativity. Korsgaard’s argument in the Sources seeks to establish that, insofar as 
we engage in practical reasoning at all, we have reason to adopt a moral outlook, or, 
in other words, to value humanity in ourselves and others (1996b: 120-6, 132-45). It 
is from this basic substantive judgment that all further judgments about moral rea-
sons are thought to derive and from which they are supposed to inherit their strong 
objectivity. In my view, this form of argument grants too much to the Humean be-
cause it relies on their account of what it means to make a judgment about reasons. 
But this Korsgaardian version of Kantian Constructivism is in fact not the only ver-
																																																								
280 In short, the phrase “as such” indicates that the judgment is counterfactually robust. We have 
already touched on counterfactual robustness in ch. 3, sect. 2.2, and we will return to the points raised 
there later on.  
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sion there is. I will argue for an alternative version, which establishes the Strong Objec-
tivity claim via a much more direct route.   
In sect. 2, I will outline the view that Street ascribes to Kant. Her interpretation 
relies largely, if not entirely, on Korsgaard’s argument for the value of humanity in 
The Sources of Normativity. Along the way, I will focus on the claims and passages that 
expose Korsgaard to Street’s attacks. The resulting reading of the Sources is certainly 
not the most charitable one available, but I will take time to show how the text lends 
itself to the problematic interpretation that has invited so much criticism. I will then 
go on to present Street’s objection to Korsgaard (2012) and supplement it with simi-
lar points of criticism raised elsewhere. For the most part, I will endorse her objec-
tion, but I will note that, given the arguments she offers, one of her conclusions con-
cerning constitutive standards is too strong. Having shown that Kantian Constructiv-
ism as Street, following Korsgaard, conceives of it is prone to fatal objections, I will examine 
whether there is room for an alternative version of Kantian Constructivism.  
This is the task I will tackle in sect. 3. Taking Street’s taxonomy of constructivist 
positions as a starting point, I will expose her undefended move from the claim that 
metaethical constructivists must appeal to a purely formal procedure of scrutiny to 
the claim that they must appeal to her procedure (2008: 224-30). This claim saddles 
her with a rather implausible view: the view that the difference between Kantian and 
Humean Constructivism does not concern their procedures of scrutiny. I will argue 
that this is wrong and that Street neglects an alternative. This alternative position 
comes into view once we reflect on why Kantians go along with this: why Korsgaard 
opts for a Humean procedure of scrutiny, for example. In trying to answer this ques-
tion, I will draw on a contrast that I highlighted earlier (ch. 3, sect. 1, sect. 2.5), name-
ly the contrast between two concerns that might be taken to underlie Kant’s insist-
ence on universal validity: a concern for consistency and a concern for objectivity. 
Korsgaard seems to assume that his main concern is the former. This leads her to a 
reading of the Categorical Imperative according to which it is a mere coherence re-
quirement. If we instead suppose that Kant’s main concern is the latter – a concern 
for objectivity – then we arrive at a formal procedure of scrutiny that is distinctly 
Kantian. Unlike Korsgaard’s, the corresponding version of Kantian Constructivism 
can secure the Strong Objectivity claim because it introduces the perspective of other 
agents into the procedure itself.  
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2.  Street’s Objections to Kantian Constructivism  
Street reserves the label “Kantian Constructivism” for a metaethical theory that is 
concerned with the correctness of judgments about reasons in general. She contrasts 
such metaethical versions of constructivism with restricted versions that limit the scope 
of their claims to a specific set of judgments about reasons, e.g. judgments about 
justice or judgments about moral rightness and wrongness.281 Even though this use 
of the term might strike some as inappropriately narrow (after all, it was Rawls, a 
restricted constructivist, who introduced the term “Kantian Constructivism”), it is a 
use that suits our purposes: the purpose of determining whether Kantian Construc-
tivists can establish the Strong Objectivity claim. We can see this if we think about how 
restricted constructivists proceed. According to Street’s taxonomy, restricted con-
structivists are constructivists who presuppose a “grounding set of judgments” about 
reasons (Street 2008: 210).282 As such, they develop procedures that fail to address all 
those who do not share these judgments. The deliverances of their procedures are 
judgments that only certain rational agents, as those who accept the judgments in the grounding 
set, can agree to hold for them.  
Consider Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, for example. If voters and political 
decision makers are to use his procedure of scrutiny (the so-called original position) 
when choosing principles of justice and assessing the basic structure of their society, 
they must already be convinced that they have reason to participate in a fair system 
of cooperation and to treat people as free and equal (Rawls 1999: 475). The original 
position doesn’t have a grip on those who reject the two basic judgments that are 
embedded in it. For why should they regard its verdicts as binding? Take the judg-
ment “The fact that this policy violates the second principle of justice is a reason not 
to implement it”. A political decision maker who rejects the normative conceptions 
of persons and societies embedded in Rawls’ original position might grant the factual 																																																								
281 Street discusses the views of Rawls and Scanlon in particular (2008: 209-14). 
282 Because restricted constructivists do not say anything about what it is for the judgments in their 
grounding set to be correct, Street concludes that their theories are not metaethical theories proper. In 
fact, in her view, their accounts are compatible with different metaethical theories (Street 2008: 217-
20). Of course, Street acknowledges that Rawls does address this question. His response to it changes 
over time. Some passages in his early work suggest that he takes a Kantian stance on it, assuming that 
the grounding set judgments are constitutive of what it means to make judgments about reasons. But 
other passages, especially those concerned with his notion of reflective equilibrium, make our com-
mitment to the grounding set judgments look more contingent and retractable. In his later work, he 
takes an explicitly quietist stance, arguing that endorsement of the grounding set judgments must be 
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claim contained in this judgment but deny that it gives him any reason to stop the 
policy in question from being implemented. Because Rawls’ constructivist theory can 
only establish what a certain limited set of rational agents can or cannot agree to hold 
for them, it cannot secure the Strong Objectivity claim. In what follows, I will focus on 
non-restricted, metaethical versions of Kantian Constructivism. Street considers only 
one view that falls into this category: Korsgaard’s view in the Sources. However, as we 
shall see in sect. 3, there might be others.  
2.1  Korsgaard’s Argument for the Value of Humanity 
In The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard pursues two projects. On the one hand, she 
provides a constructivist theory of rational agency in general, or, in other words, an 
account of what constitutes the correctness of judgments about reasons in general. 
On the other hand, she offers an answer to what she calls “the normative question”, 
the question of “what justifies the claims that morality makes on us” (1996b: 9-10). 
The answers to these questions cannot be entirely independent, of course, since to 
justify a claim just is to give a reason, but to the extent that there are two separate 
questions they can be treated separately – and that is exactly what Korsgaard seems 
to be doing. This, I will argue, is the main problem with her view and the reason why 
it is susceptible to the kind of criticism voiced by Street and others. So let us consider 
her answers to the two questions in turn. 
Korsgaard’s theory of rational agency is constructivist in that it conceives of the 
correctness of our judgments about reasons as a matter of withstanding a procedure 
of scrutiny from the standpoint of our other judgments about reasons. The proce-
dure of scrutiny that she favours, the so-called “reflective endorsement method” 
(1996b: 50), is inspired by a range of historical and contemporary figures, including 
David Hume, John Stuart Mill, and Bernard Williams.283 What makes us rational 
agents, according to Korsgaard, is the fact that we are reflective beings. When we are 
confronted with an impulse, we can and must step back from it and ask ourselves 
whether we really have reason to do what, in virtue of the impulse, we are inclined to 
do. “Each impulse as it offers itself to the will,” she writes, “must pass a kind of test 
																																																								
283 That Korsgaard’s procedure traces back to Hume prefigures my criticism that she grants too much 
to the Humean. 
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of normativity before we can adopt it as a reason for action”.284 And that test is the 
test of reflective endorsement. Translating this thought into Kant’s terms, she re-
phrases it in the following way: before we can act on a desire, “we must make it our 
maxim” (Korsgaard 1996b: 94) by asking ourselves whether it can be a law for us. 
Below we will see that her understanding of this question deviates from Kant’s, but 
for now let us consider her account of how we answer it.    
Part of what it is to be a reflective being, according to Korsgaard, is to have a 
normative conception of oneself or practical identities. A practical identity is a “de-
scription under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your 
life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking” (Korsgaard 1996b: 
101). These identities, e.g. the identity of a teacher, a lover or a citizen, give rise to 
reasons and obligations because it is in light of these various identities that we ask 
ourselves whether to endorse an impulse. If we abstract from the practical identities 
of the person whose reasons are at issue, the question whether a maxim can be a law 
for them has no answer; it is empty.285 In order to square her claim that the reflective 
endorsement test per se is empty with Kant’s Formula of Universal Law, Korsgaard 
is forced to introduce a distinction that does not appear in Kant. She distinguishes 
between the Categorical Imperative, which for her is another name for the test of 
reflective endorsement, and the moral law, which she views as the law of an agent 
with a particular identity: a citizen of the Kingdom of Ends (Korsgaard 1996b: 98-
100). The moral law is not empty. It demands that we “act only on maxims that all 
rational beings could agree to act on together in a workable cooperative system” 
(Korsgaard 1996b: 99). But because this requirement is not part of Korsgaard’s con-
ception of what it is to make a correct judgment about reason, it has to be estab-
lished by means of a separate argument that this law, and the identity that lies behind 
it, is one that all rational agents as such have a reason to adopt. Before I explain how 
																																																								
284 Korsgaard 1996b: 91. She adds that “the reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, 
not just as such. It needs a reason. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it cannot commit itself or go 
forward” (1996b: 93).  
285 Korsgaard 1996b: 113. This, she notes, is the “element of relativism” that attaches to the reflective 
endorsement test and to Kant’s question of whether a maxim can be a law for us. When confronted 
with this question, we must always ask: a law for whom? It seems to me that there is a tension between 
Korsgaard’s claim that a maxim is an intrinsically normative entity (1996b: 108) and the view that a 
maxim’s endorsability depends on the agent’s identities. This tension leads to some of the difficulties 
discussed below.  
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this separation exposes her argument to Street’s objection, let me comment on her 
second project: answering the normative question.  
While most of our various practical identities are contingent, there is something 
about them, Korsgaard argues, that is not: we must adopt some practical identity or 
other.286 For without any such identity, a reflective being could not act at all. So we 
have a reason to embrace and conform to some practical identity or other, and that 
reason springs from our nature as reflective beings, or from our humanity. In contrast 
to our particular practical identities, our identity as human beings is one that we can-
not reject. It is inescapable because we are the kinds of beings that we are, and it is 
inescapable in a normative sense: it provides us with reasons to identify ourselves in 
some way. Note the twofold relation that our identity as human beings bears to the 
particular identities and reasons we have. On the one hand, it is supported by the fact 
that we need some identities and reasons if we are to act at all.287 On the other hand, 
it also supports these particular identities and reasons insofar as “their importance is 
partly derived from the importance of being human” (Korsgaard 1996b: 121). It is 
due to this twofold relation that our identity as humans can stop the looming regress 
of reasons. It supplies a reason for embracing particular practical identities and does 
not require any higher-order identity to supply reasons in its support. In Korsgaard’s 
view, our identity as human beings is at the same time our moral identity because it 
gives us a reason to value humanity as such.  
In order to move from the idea that we have a reason to embrace some practical 
identity or other to the Strong Objectivity claim, Korsgaard relies on two assumptions, 
only one of which is explicitly argued for in the text. The first assumption is that our 
identity as humans comes with substantive reasons and obligations that are recog-
nizably moral, i.e. that embracing this identity is tantamount to valuing humanity in a 
non-technical sense of the term. We might wonder why this should be so, but 
Korsgaard does not provide much of an answer288 – and indeed, we will see below 
that there isn’t one. The second assumption is that the reason that one has for valu-																																																								
286 Korsgaard 1996b: 120. The argument I go on to reconstruct can be found in her 1996b: 120-125.  
287 Perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that it is self-supporting because, technically speaking, it 
is not that our particular identities and reasons give us a reason to embrace our identity as humans. 
Rather, this traces to the fact that we are reflective beings who cannot act without reasons. On this 
point see Street 2012: 47. 
288 Recall that my focus in this section is exclusively on the Sources because this is the text that Street 
engages with. I think that Korsgaard does offer an answer to this question elsewhere.  
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ing one’s own humanity is in fact a reason to value humanity as such, and therefore 
also a reason to value other people’s humanity. Korsgaard’s argument in support of 
this second assumption draws on Wittgenstein’s famous private language argument 
(1996b: 132-45). Since Street’s objection, as well as the objections of many others, 
are directed at the first assumption, I will not go into Korsgaard’s argument for the 
second here.289 Instead, let me return to the question of how the two projects pur-
sued in the Sources are related to one another.  
Now that we have seen how Korsgaard accounts for the correctness of judg-
ments about reasons, it is in fact plainly obvious that her answer to the normative 
question and her argument for the Strong Objectivity claim must take precisely the form 
they do. If a judgment about reasons holds for an agent insofar as it can be derived 
from and does not conflict with their various practical identities, then, in order to 
establish that moral judgments hold for all rational agents as such, one needs to show 
that all rational agents as such must identify themselves as moral agents. To have a 
reason is to embrace an identity from which that reason arises; thus, to have a moral 
reason is to embrace a moral identity.  
2.2  Street’s Objection to Korsgaard’s Argument 
Ever since the publication of Korsgaard’s Tanner Lectures in 1996,290 her arguments 
have been the subject of ongoing debate, and over the course of the years many 
readers have raised doubts about and objections to her argument for the value of 
humanity. Although my discussion will focus on Street’s objection to the argument, I 
will draw attention to some of the links and similarities to criticisms and worries 
voiced by others. Street’s objection turns on the observation that the conclusion of 
Korsgaard’s argument for the value of humanity lends itself to two different readings 
(Street 2012: 51). The answer to the normative question that Korsgaard takes to 
emerge from that argument, and by means of which she takes herself to have estab-
lished the Strong Objectivity claim, is that we must embrace our identity as human be-
ings; we must value humanity in ourselves and in others. The “must” contained in 
																																																								
289 The argument against the notion of a private reason that Korsgaard offers in support of the second 
assumption suggests that Street’s reading of the argument in the Sources, which I follow here, is not the 
most charitable one available. In fact, this argument points to the account that I will propose in sect. 
3, as do arguments that she presents in other pieces (see e.g. Korsgaard 1996a: 275-310).  
290 The Tanner Lectures, held in 1992, form the basis of The Sources of Normativity. 
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this conclusion, Street remarks, can be understood as a normative or as a constitutive 
notion.  
If Korsgaard uses the term “must” to denote a normative requirement, then she is 
saying that we have a reason to value humanity in ourselves and in others. Her project 
could then be described as an attempt “to place morality within practical reason”291 
by showing how moral reasons follow from certain other branches of practical rea-
son. Although Street herself does not comment on the plausibility of this reading, it 
is in fact supported by a considerable amount of textual evidence. In the second lec-
ture, where Korsgaard retraces the history of the reflective endorsement method, she 
casts the task that is associated with the normative question in the following way: 
The normative question is answered by showing that the points of view from 
which these different interests arise are congruent, that meeting the claims made 
from one point of view [e.g. the point of view of self-interest, or sympathy, or 
morality] will not necessarily mean violating those that arise from another. 
(Korsgaard 1996b: 61)  
According to this way of understanding the question, morality’s demands on us will 
be justified if and only if they can be vindicated from within the various standpoints 
that make practical claims on us – that is, from within our various practical identities. 
Now, of course, it might be objected that Korsgaard is not speaking with her own 
voice in the above passage. After all, this is said in the context of her engagement 
with Hume’s position, so it is perhaps unfair to take her at her word. I think this is 
true: for Korsgaard, the normative force of moral demands does not depend on par-
ticular practical identities in any straightforward way.292 Otherwise, she would not 
regard herself as a Kantian Constructivist who is defending the Strong Objectivity claim.  
																																																								
291 This formulation is from Hussain and Shah (2006: 267). In their paper, the two authors aim to 
show that, because Korsgaard’s project in the Sources is one of placing morality within practical reason, 
her position is not really a metaethical position that can be regarded as an alternative to moral realism. 
This conclusion is supposed to follow no matter how her project is understood – that is, whether it is 
understood as an attempt a) to show how moral reasons follow from other types of reasons or b) to 
show how moral reasons follow from a conception of practical reason as such. I agree that a) should 
be classified as an exercise in normative ethics, but the claim that b) is an exercise in normative ethics as 
well is at least disputable.  
292 If it did, if she was trying to offer non-moral reasons for moral conduct, then she would face what, 
following Robert Stern, we can call the “Prichardian Challenge” (Stern 2015: 76, referring to Prichard 
2002: 7-20). She could be accused of trying to convince sceptical agents that morality has a grip on 
them by offering them the wrong kinds of reasons for moral behaviour.  
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However, there is nonetheless a sense in which Korsgaard presents morality as 
seeking approval from our particular practical identities. Recall that our identity as 
humans not only supports but is also itself supported by our particular practical iden-
tities. This need for approval “from below” is reflected in the deliberative situation 
of an agent who identifies, primarily, as a lover and a teacher, for example, and who 
asks themselves: should I do what morality demands of me? The answer at which 
our lover and teacher arrives, of course, is not the straightforward one that Humeans 
would expect. It is not that their love for their partner and their concern for their 
students, simply as such, give rise to reasons to be moral. Rather, they acknowledge 
that, qua reflective being, they could neither love their partner nor care for their stu-
dents if they did not embrace their identity as a human. In order to do these things, 
they need reasons, and these reasons must bottom out in an appropriate way. So, in 
this limited sense, Korsgaard does take the demands of morality to be vindicated from 
within our particular identities, e.g. the identity of a lover or a teacher.293   
 In Street’s view, the project of establishing the Strong Objectivity claim by way of 
placing morality within practical reason is incoherent. It is based on a reading of the 
normative question that renders it ill-formed, at least in the mouth of someone who 
accepts metaethical constructivism (Street 2012: 49). To see why, we need to return 
to Korsgaard’s constructivist account of the correctness of judgments about reasons. 
On this account, a judgment about reasons is correct if and only if it withstands the 
reflective endorsement test: if it can be shown to be compatible with and derivable 
from (or, in short, to cohere with) the agent’s various practical identities. This coherentist 
characterization of the reflective endorsement method fits with Korsgaard’s claim 
that, in itself, the method is empty. It cannot be applied before we settle whose rea-
sons are in question because otherwise there simply wouldn’t be any practical identi-
ties that a judgment candidate could (fail to) cohere with. But, as Street observes, this 
is exactly what we are being asked to do when faced with the question of whether we 
have any reason to embrace our practical identity as humans. For, given Korsgaard’s 																																																								
293 Rae Langton argues that this makes it impossible for Korsgaard to accommodate Kant’s claim that 
the value of humanity is unconditional (2007: 177-81). Since, in Korsgaard’s view, our commitment to 
the value of humanity is conditional upon the fact that we value certain other things (our partner or 
our students, etc.), people who do not value anything (e.g. because they are too depressed to do so) 
lose their status as unconditionally valuable beings. Arguably, Korsgaard could respond that even very 
depressed people must value something, if only their own death. However, such an evaluative attitude 
does not seem to entail any moral constraints. We will come back to this problem shortly.     
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technical use of the term, this is just the question of whether we have any reason to 
identify ourselves as anything at all. We are being asked to “stand apart from all [our 
practical identities and] judgments about what count as reasons, and then to ask 
whether [we] have some further reason” (Street 2012: 49) – and that, in Street’s view, 
is a question that a metaethical constructivist should dismiss as unanswerable. They 
should dismiss it as unanswerable because it is asserted from nowhere (Street 2012: 
50).294 
So it is only if we interpret the “must” in Korsgaard’s conclusion as a constitutive 
notion that the conclusion as a whole can be taken to express something meaningful. 
That a rational agent must embrace their humanity, Street argues, can only mean that 
a rational agent is defined as someone who identifies themselves in one way or another 
and therefore takes something or other to be a reason (2012: 51). She suggests that 
we should read Korsgaard’s conclusion along the same lines as the claim that a par-
ent must have a child: not as a claim about what a not-yet-parent has reason to do 
but rather as a claim about what it is to be a parent (Street 2012: 51). On the face of 
it, we wouldn’t expect Korsgaard to object to such an interpretation of her conclu-
sion. For although she does not appeal to constitutive standards in the Sources, she 
has since become well known for advocating the claim that moral demands arise 
from what is constitutive of agency.295 But here we need to be careful, because what 
Street means by “constitutive” is not quite what Korsgaard means in her more recent 
writings. Before I explain what the difference amounts to, let me outline Street’s ar-
																																																								
294 This is only one of many criticisms that the “regress of reasons” or “regress of identities” reading 
of Korsgaard’s argument has attracted. Stern, for instance, has argued that this argument goes wrong 
in assuming that we can fall into doubt about every single one of our particular practical identities in a 
way that would make it necessary to appeal to a more basic identity, our identity as humans (2015: 67). 
Some of our particular identities, he believes, are invulnerable to this kind of challenge from the point 
of view of other identities. However, in Stern’s view, there is a better reading available: the “regress of 
value” reading (2015: 68-72). According to this reading, Korsgaard’s argument proceeds roughly in the 
following way. We can only think of our identities as providing us with reasons if we value them, and 
(given Korsgaard’s opposition to value realism) we can only value them if we value our leading the 
kinds of rational lives that such identities make possible. In response, one could raise an objection that 
is similar to the second part of Street’s objection, which I go on to present in what follows. The crux 
of this objection, as I see it, is whether anything substantive follows from the idea of leading a rational 
life (or being a rational agent). Does this idea entail that I should not harm myself, for example? 
Something along these lines would seem to be required in order to get to moral demands once we 
move from the need to value our own humanity to the need to value the humanity of other people. 
295 See Korsgaard 2008 and 2009. Part of my argument in this chapter depends on the interpretative 
claim that Korsgaard’s argument for the value of humanity, as presented in the Sources, is precisely not 
an argument to the effect that morality arises from what is constitutive of agency. That is what I see as 
its deepest flaw.     
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gument for why, on this reading too, Korsgaard’s argument for the value of humani-
ty falls short of establishing the Strong Objectivity claim. 
According to Street, metaethical constructivists should regard the conclusion of 
Korsgaard’s argument, so understood, as trivially true (2012: 51). Of course, if the 
correctness of our judgments about reasons is assessed on the basis of how these 
judgments cohere with our prior judgments about reasons, then only those who have 
prior commitments can count as making judgments about reasons – only they can 
count as exercising their rational agency. However, far from establishing the Strong 
Objectivity claim, this understanding of the term “rational agent” has no moral impli-
cations whatsoever. It says nothing about how we ought to treat ourselves or other 
people. As Street observes in the following passage, the only implication that it has is 
tautological: 
Nothing substantive about the value of one’s self is implied by the mere fact that 
one takes something or other to be valuable. At this point, the Kantian might 
grant that [we] need not take [ourselves] to be valuable in the ordinary sense of 
this expression (a sense we normally take to involve valuing one’s own survival, 
bodily integrity, and so forth), but insist that what [we] must do is take [ourselves] 
to be valuable in the sense of valuing [our] own valuing. So far as I can see, how-
ever, this understanding of the “value of the self” is empty in the sense that it di-
rects nothing substantive: it just says to value what you value. (Street 2012: 54-5) 
If this observation is accurate, it follows that Korsgaard’s argument for the value 
of humanity does not accomplish any of the goals that unite Kantian Constructivists. 
It doesn’t answer the normative question (meaning that it doesn’t establish morality’s 
authority over us) and it doesn’t establish the Strong Objectivity claim (meaning that it 
doesn’t establish that moral demands are strongly objective). From the perspective of 
a Humean Constructivist like Street, it is precisely because Korsgaard is trying to do 
both that she is bound to fail: it is because she is trying to establish the correctness of 
our moral judgments independently of the judgments that express our contingent 
commitments and identities that she ends up with an empty set. Although Korsgaard 
does not spell out which particular moral demands her argument has shown to be 
binding,296 it is clear that a commitment to one’s identity as a human is supposed to 
exclude certain specific practical identities and forms of conduct. Broadly speaking, it 																																																								
296 She says that she will have “little to say about the content of ... [moral] obligations” (1996b: 92). 
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is meant to exclude all those identities and forms of conduct that tend to undermine 
or diminish someone’s capacity for rational agency, e.g. by harming them, violating 
their freedom or ruining their self-respect.297 Humeans agree that the bindingness of 
such recognizably moral restrictions can be established; they agree that the normative 
question can be answered. But, in their view, it cannot be answered for all rational 
agents as such.298 This is because the mere fact that someone satisfies the definition of  
“rational agent” entails only that they have a reason to do whatever follows from the 
particular identities in virtue of which they satisfy this definition. There is nothing 
that representatives of the set of rational agents in general have reason to do.   
What is easily overlooked, I think, is that this second part of Street’s objection, 
which focuses on the constitutive reading, proves too much – and the way in which 
it does is quite surprising. In the recent literature on metaethical constructivism, it 
has become something of a convention to use the terms “constructivism” and “con-
stitutivism” interchangeably, and this is not least because the notion of constitutive 
standards is so prominent in Korsgaard’s more recent writings (Bagnoli 2011: §7.3). 
Street herself not only uses the term “constitutive” when outlining her procedure of 
scrutiny, but also explicitly recognizes that her thinking about what is constitutive of 
judgments about reasons “owes a great deal” (2008: 228) to Korsgaard. It is in light 
of this that Street’s objection is somewhat surprising because she seems to agree with 
the idea, famously articulated and defended by David Enoch, that “normativity will 
not come from what is constitutive of action” (Enoch 2006: 171). This is an idea that 
Korsgaard would firmly reject. We can see how Street’s account of the constitutive 
differs from Korsgaard’s by comparing how they deal with violations. For 
Korsgaard, what is constitutive of a form of being or activity provides a standard for 
evaluation. So for her, an agent who violates a constitutive principle of agency is a 																																																								
297 When we treat others in ways that neglect and thereby undermine their rational agency, we treat 
them as mere means rather than ends in themselves. Korsgaard elaborates on this idea in 1996a: 295-9.  
298 Street expresses this idea as follows: “On a characteristically Kantian way of thinking about morali-
ty, it’s part of the very idea of morality that its requirements are categorical – not something whose 
‘bindingness’ one may escape merely by failing to care about it. ... The Kantian constructivist’s mistake is 
the mistake of thinking that moral requirements must bind us independently of the particular evaluative 
nature with which we find ourselves – and, in particular, independently of whether we already have 
moral concerns as a deep part of our nature” (2012: 55-6). Korsgaard’s stance on the modal status of 
our practical identities is hybrid: while she agrees with Humean Constructivists that our reasons could 
have been different had we adopted other identities, she shares the realist view that our moral reasons 
could not have been different, whatever choices we had made. The realist’s objection to Korsgaard’s 
view is accordingly the reverse of Street’s: our particular identities, too, must be based on the reasons 
there are for adopting them. See e.g. Scanlon 2012: 238.  
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bad agent (Korsgaard 2009: 32-3, 159-76). Street, by contrast, treats what is constitu-
tive of a form of being or activity as a classification criterion. In her view, an agent 
who consciously violates a constitutive principle of agency simply drops out of agency.299 
It is not that, in such a case, they are doing something wrong. Instead, they simply 
aren’t acting – they are shmacting, as Enoch would say (2006: 179). 
I started out by saying that Street’s objection proves too much, and with these 
two accounts of the constitutive in mind, I can now explain why. All she needed to 
show, to adapt Enoch’s phrase, is that “morality will not come from what Korsgaard 
(in The Sources) takes to be constitutive of action”. This, I think, is the claim she actually 
argues for, and convincingly so. The stronger claim, namely that “morality will not 
come from what is constitutive of action (period),” it seems to me, is simply being 
assumed. Below I will provide some reasons for thinking that the stronger claim 
might be false. It will in any case become apparent that it is no accident that Street 
conflates these two claims.  
3.  Formal Metaethical Constructivism: A Kantian Variety 
The considerations presented in sect. 2.2 indicate that Korsgaard fails to show that 
“there are certain normative judgments [moral judgments] to which every reflective 
creature who accepts any normative judgment at all is committed” (Street 2008: 244). 
To be sure, one must accept some such judgments to count as a rational agent. But, 
according to Street, the mere fact that one is “playing the game of rational agency” 
and that one is subject to the demand to make coherent judgments does not by itself 
place any substantive restrictions on what one has reason to do. More specifically, 
she sees it as a distinguishing mark of metaethical constructivism that it appeals to a 
purely formal procedure of scrutiny, because this is what makes it a metaethical theory 
that can account for the correctness of judgments about reasons in general (Street 
2008: 226). But, in her view, the hope that such a formal procedure, e.g. the reflective 
endorsement method, could entail a set of substantive judgments is in vain.  
We agreed with Street that Korsgaard’s reflective endorsement method does not 
entail any particular reasons or obligations, moral or otherwise. In what follows, we 
shall ask whether this is true of all formal procedures of scrutiny, and, specifically, 																																																								
299 Street 2008: 228. This account of the constitutive has strange implications. These will be addressed 
in sect. 3.1 below.  
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whether it is true of the procedure that emerges from the Agent-Scope Reading of 
Kant’s conception of universal validity. The first step is to see that this is a neglected 
alternative within Street’s taxonomy of constructivist positions and that Korsgaard’s 
interpretation of Kant’s ethics facilitates this oversight. 
3.1  Street’s Taxonomy of Constructivist Positions 
Restricted vs. Metaethical Constructivism 
We began our discussion in sect. 2 by considering Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness 
as an example of restricted constructivism. Such theories, we noted, cannot be re-
garded as full-fledged metaethical theories. Nor can they secure the Strong Objectivity 
claim, because the procedure of scrutiny that they appeal to has a so-called grounding 
set of judgments built into it. Rawls’ original position, for instance, determines what 
is just or unjust on the basis of two first-order judgments about reasons that are built 
into the procedure, namely that persons are to be treated as free and equal and that 
societies are to be set up as fair systems of cooperation. The scope of his procedure 
is therefore limited to determining whether a judgment holds for those who accept (and 
as those who accept) these normative conceptions of persons and societies. The key 
to developing a constructivist theory that can at least potentially secure the Strong 
Objectivity claim is therefore to answer the following two questions separately:300  
a) Which procedure of scrutiny determines the correctness of judgments about 
reasons, and in light of which other judgments about reasons does it do so? 
b) Which judgments about reasons are correct? 
Metaethical constructivists answer question a) without relying on anything that 
could be offered in response to question b) – that is, without incorporating any mor-
al or other content into their procedure. In order to avoid contentful presuppositions, 
they characterize the set of judgments in light of which any proposed judgment is to 
be assessed not in terms of their content but in terms of whose judgments they are. 
The procedure itself captures the nature of the relationship that the proposed  
judgment is supposed to bear to these other judgments. The result is what Street calls 
																																																								
300 The first is a metaethical question, the second a normative ethical question. It is because restricted con-
structivists do not keep these questions apart, that their theories seem to fall between the cracks of 
metaethics and normative ethics.  
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“a purely formal characterization” (2008: 226) of what it means to make judgments 
about reasons in general. This is what all metaethical constructivist positions have in 
common.  
Formal vs. Substantive Metaethical Constructivism 
The disagreement between formal and substantive metaethical constructivists concerns 
the question of whether this formal characterization of the standpoint of rational 
agency entails any substantive judgments about reasons, i.e. whether the metaethical 
constructivist’s answer to question a) implies any answers to question b) (Street 2008: 
243-4). According to Street, Korsgaard is a substantive metaethical constructivist.301 
As such, Korsgaard’s position differs from the position of restricted constructivists 
in that she characterizes her procedure of scrutiny without presupposing any first-order 
judgments about reasons. Instead, she argues that her formal procedure of scrutiny, 
the reflective endorsement method, entails some such judgments, namely judgments 
about moral reasons. In this way, she seeks to establish the Strong Objectivity claim.  
*The* Formal Procedure of Scrutiny 
In her discussion, Street seems to assume that her formal procedure of scrutiny is the 
only game in town (2008: 224-30). Below, we will see that Korsgaard’s reading of 
Kant lends support to this assumption. But first we need to consider the details of 
Street’s answer to question a). 
In reflecting on the set of judgments in light of which a proposed judgment is to 
be assessed, and in particular on the question of whose judgments they should be, 
Street reviews two possibilities: the correctness of judgments about reasons could 
relativize either to the standpoint of the speaker, i.e. the standpoint of the person 
judging, or to the standpoint of the agent. The first option is dismissed because it 
does not accord with how we speak. After all, on this account, “it [would be] impos-
sible for you and me sensibly to disagree about whether X is a reason to Y for [agent] 
A, since the answer might be ‘yes’ for me but ‘no’ for you” (Street 2008: 224). By 
contrast, if the correctness of “X is a reason to Y for A” relativizes to A’s commit-
ments, then there is something we can sensibly disagree about because then we have 
a common question: does the judgment at hand withstand the relevant procedure of 																																																								
301 Street 2008: 243. I hope to have shown that such a reading of the Sources is at least not implausible, 
even if it is not the most charitable reading available.   
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scrutiny from the standpoint of A’s other judgments about reasons? Let us grant that 
this is right: the standpoint of the agent is a better fit than the standpoint of the 
speaker.302 But is the standpoint of the individual agent really the only alternative? 
Before we address this question, let us review Street’s account of the procedure of 
scrutiny itself.  
To the extent that Street’s account of the relation that a judgment must bear to 
the agent’s other judgments is Humean at all, it is based on an instrumentalist reading 
of Hume.303 In her view, acting for reasons is a matter of acting in accordance with 
the instrumental principle and the basic principles of theoretical reason. Accordingly, 
her procedure of scrutiny is composed of the following principles (see Street 2008: 
227-9): 
Instrumental Principle: Whoever judges that she has conclusive reason to Y judges that 
she has reason to take (what she recognizes to be) the necessary means to Y.  
Principle of Non-Contradiction:  
(a) Whoever judges that X is a reason to Y cannot also (simultaneously and in 
full awareness) judge that X is not a reason to Y.  
(b) Whoever judges that X is a reason to Y cannot also (simultaneously and in 
full awareness) judge that Z, which is identical with X, is not a reason to Y. 
(c) Whoever judges that only facts of kind X are reasons to Y, and recognizes 
that Z is not a fact of kind X, cannot also (simultaneously and in full awareness) 
judge that Z is a reason to Y.  
These principles, Street argues, are constitutive of making judgments about reasons. For 
her, this means that someone who consciously violates these principles cannot count 
as making judgments about reasons at all (see sect. 2.2).304  																																																								
302 If Street had opted for the standpoint of the speaker, then she would not have been able to secure 
any objectivity. In opting for the agent’s standpoint, she is able to secure weak objectivity (see sect. 1).   
303 For a discussion of whether Hume is an instrumentalist or a sceptic about practical reason, see e.g. 
Hampton 1995. 
304 Now that Street’s procedure of scrutiny is in full view, we can see that, unlike Korsgaard’s account 
of the constitutive, hers has rather counterintuitive implications. Consider an example that she herself 
discusses (Street 2008: 227). You judge that you have conclusive reason to go to Rome immediately 
and, as a matter of fact, flying is the only way to do so. If you then say that you have no reason what-
soever to get on a plane, this might be because you are just not aware that flying is the only means to 
your end. In that case, you are making a normal mistake. However, if you are aware that flying is the 
only way to get to Rome immediately and you nevertheless deny that you have any reason to get on a 
plane, then, on Street’s view, you do not “count as genuinely making [a] ‘normative judgment’ at all” 
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To sum up, Street’s answer to question a) is this: a judgment about reasons is 
correct if and only if it does not contradict any of the agent’s other judgments about 
reasons and does not amount to a failure to take the necessary means to the various 
ends that these other judgments commit the agent to. For Street, this is not just one 
answer that a metaethical constructivist might give but rather the answer – the only 
one there is (2008: 224-30). Accordingly, she assumes that it must be the Kantian 
answer, too: Kantians who want to be metaethical constructivists must endorse this 
account of what is constitutive of agency. This explains an observation that we made 
when concluding sect. 2.2: that Street jumps from the claim that morality won’t come 
from what Korsgaard takes to be constitutive of agency (which is the only claim that 
her criticism can actually establish) to the stronger claim that morality won’t come 
from what is constitutive of agency, period. If we take into consideration that Street 
sees her account of what is constitutive of agency as the only account there is, then 
we can understand why, having argued that normativity does not come from what is 
constitutive of agency on that account, she feels entitled to conclude that it doesn’t 
come from what is constitutive of agency at all. But is this the only option? 
What Korsgaard and Street Agree On 
Street’s assumption that Kantians share her answer to question a) is confirmed in The 
Sources of Normativity. Recall our sketch of the reflective endorsement method in sect. 
2.1. The reflective endorsement method demands that agents scrutinize their impuls-
es in light of their various practical identities. An impulse passes the reflective en-
dorsement test if and only if it proposes a judgment that coheres with the agent’s 
practical identities. These identities are, at bottom, commitments to ends, both basic 
and specific. And it is in virtue of promoting some such ends and not undermining 
(important) others that the actions recommended by the agent’s impulses are deemed 
worthy of pursuit or even obligatory. If this is right, then it seems that Korsgaard’s 
reflective endorsement method is simply a more vivid representation of the Instrumen-
tal Principle and the Principle of Non-Contradiction, which make up Street’s procedure of 
scrutiny. In a nutshell, Korsgaard seems to agree with both parts of Street’s answer 																																																																																																																																																							
(2008: 228). This assessment is counterintuitive, however, because surely what we would want to say is 
that you are being irrational. The only way to act irrationally, according to Street, is to act against one’s 
own judgment: to act akratically (Street 2008: 228). I agree that akrasia is an instance of irrationality, 
but so is the Flying-to-Rome case. 
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to question a): the view that the correctness of judgments about reasons relativizes to 
the standpoint of an individual agent and that such a judgment is correct insofar as it 
stands in appropriate instrumental relations to their other judgments about reasons.  
Why does Korsgaard opt for such a Humean account of rational agency? Here, 
we need to remind ourselves of some of the points discussed in ch. 3, sect. 1. In par-
ticular, we need to remind ourselves of what I called the “standing-commitment 
thread” of her argument against particularism: the idea that having a practical identity 
is a matter of having commitments that one stands by in every situation – a matter of 
being a principled person, for example, someone who is generally honest or generally 
interested in theatre. This way of thinking about practical identities, we said, is bound 
up with the subsumptive conception of rationality, according to which consistency in 
judgment and action is a matter of subsuming particular cases or actions under Case-
Scope universal principles. Now if this is the set of concerns that one takes to lie be-
hind Kant’s insistence on universal laws – if one thinks that his main concern is a 
concern with consistency – then it is to be expected that one’s attempt to interpret the 
Categorical Imperative as a procedure of scrutiny would lead to the kind of Humean 
account that we outlined above. To act on principles that one can will as universal 
laws, on this account, is to assess and embrace impulses on the basis of whether they 
cohere with one’s overall ends, projects and commitments, which one upholds over 
time and across changing circumstances.  
That this is indeed how Korsgaard understands Kant’s underlying motivations is 
manifest in the fact that she distinguishes between the Categorical Imperative and the 
moral law – a distinction which she herself calls un-Kantian (1996b: 98). Recall that 
the former is understood as the demand to act only on maxims that one can will as 
universal laws for oneself, which is simply a different articulation of the reflective en-
dorsement method. Korsgaard’s reading of the Categorical Imperative reveals that, 
for her, Kant’s concern for universal validity is in the first instance a concern for 
internal consistency – and this is the concern that informs her answer to question a). 
It is an implication of this reading that Kant’s moral law is not part of the Kantian 
story about the correctness of judgments about reasons, that it is not part of the 
formal procedure of scrutiny that Kantians rely on. Instead, it is a (set of) judg-
ment(s) about what reasons we have, which Korsgaard seeks to derive from this 
formal procedure. It is an answer to question b), not a). So Street and Korsgaard 
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agree on this much: to be a metaethical constructivist is to adopt a Humean account 
of the correctness of judgments about reasons. Their disagreement is merely about 
whether this formal procedure of scrutiny entails any substantive judgments about 
reasons.  
This result is certainly surprising, if not counterintuitive. After all, we are used to 
thinking that the dispute between Humean and Kantian Constructivists is a dispute 
precisely about which procedure of scrutiny is the right one, and only derivatively, if at 
all, about first-order judgments about reasons. In what follows, I will argue that we 
should not settle for this counterintuitive account of the dispute. Instead, I will put 
forward what I see as a more genuinely Kantian version of formal metaethical con-
structivism.  
3.2 Kantian Formal Metaethical Constructivism: A Neglected Alternative 
On closer examination, Street’s taxonomy of constructivist views is not exhaustive. It 
is not exhaustive because Kantian Constructivists are free to reject the assumption 
that the concern for universal validity that underlies Kant’s Categorical Imperative is, 
in the first instance, a concern for consistency, as Korsgaard seems to think. Instead, 
Kantians can agree with the conclusion that we reached in ch. 3: that Kant’s concern, 
at this point, is a concern for objectivity. Recall where this insight led us: it led us to 
reject the Case-Scope Reading of Kant’s conception of universal validity in favour of 
the Agent-Scope Reading. According to the latter reading, the Categorical Imperative 
is not tantamount to the coherence norm that is built into the reflective endorsement 
method. Instead, it points to an alternative formal procedure of scrutiny that Street 
overlooks and that emerges if we answer both parts of question a) differently: the 
standpoint question (whose other judgments matter?) and the relationship question 
(in which relationship should a given judgment stand to these other judgments?).  
According to the Agent-Scope Reading, a principle of duty is universally valid if 
and only if it can be agreed to hold by all rational agents and for all such agents who 
are in the same circumstances (see ch. 3, sect. 2.5). If this is what Kant means when 
he speaks of universal laws in the practical domain, then the Categorical Imperative 
is the demand to only act on principles that all rational agents can will to be morally 
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viable for all rational agents who are in the same circumstances.305 In order to bring 
out how this requirement relates to the principles on Street’s list, we can reformulate 
it as follows: 
Categorical Imperative(Const.): Whoever judges that X is a reason to Y presupposes that all 
rational agents can agree that all rational agents in the same situation would be 
allowed to treat X as a reason to Y.306  
Before we consider how a procedure of scrutiny involving this principle would differ 
from Street’s Humean procedure, let us look at an example in order to illustrate why 
one might think that Categorical Imperative(Const.) is indeed a standard against which we 
measure our judgments about reasons.  
Piano Lesson: My child needs a lift to their piano lesson and your child needs a lift to 
the hospital because they had an accident. You don’t have a car, and I’m the on-
ly one who can help – but I refuse. “Why?!” you ask, in desperation. “Because I 
don’t want my child to miss their piano lesson,” I say. I gave you a reason, or so 
it seems. In this kind of situation, it would be natural for you to object. “That’s 
not a reason!” you might say. 
On the face of it, you are rejecting my judgment that my child’s needing a lift to the 
piano lesson is a reason to deny your child a lift to the hospital. However, according 
to Street, the final say is always mine. In her view, all you are trying to do is remind 
me that, given my other commitments, I should give priority to your child’s needs. 
But I have made it clear that my child’s musical education means more to me than 
your child’s injuries, haven’t I? What other commitments could you be referring to? 
Perhaps Street could say that you are reminding me of my own moral commitments. 
If this is what you are doing, then, according to Humeans, I can brush off your ob-
jection as follows: “When it comes to my children, I don’t care about morality!” My 
identity as a mother is deeper than my moral identity, and that’s that. Now, at this 
point, if you keep insisting that my judgment is invalid, the Humean must treat you 
as linguistically confused. Here one might beg to differ. Surely, one might say, you 																																																								
305 In saying this, I am assuming that the various formulas of the Categorical Imperative are equivalent 
and that each refers to both the subjective aspect (can be willed by all) and the objective aspect (can 
be willed for all) of universal validity. 
306 Strictly speaking, we should say: “would be allowed or obligated”. After all, the reason in question 
might be a moral reason. Below I will suggest how we might circumscribe the moral domain within 
this larger field.     
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are not linguistically confused.307 If Kantian Constructivists were to incorporate Cate-
gorical Imperative(Const.) into their procedure of scrutiny, they could take this intuition 
seriously. They could say that my judgment is incorrect because it rests on a false 
presupposition: it is not true that all rational agents could agree that all rational agents 
in my situation would be allowed to treat their child’s needing a lift to a piano lesson 
as a reason to deny someone else’s child a lift to the hospital.308 
A Kantian Formal Procedure of Scrutiny 
How would a procedure of scrutiny that included Categorical Imperative(Const.) among its 
principles compare to the Humean procedure that we outlined above? Both are purely 
formal. The Kantian procedure that we are considering does not presuppose any sub-
stantive judgments about reasons or make any assumptions about the content of our 
reasons. Nonetheless, it is very different from the Humean procedure.  
Consider how a proponent of this procedure would answer the above standpoint 
question (the question of whose other judgments matter). They would say that it is the 
standpoint of all of us: of all rational agents insofar as they occupy the standpoint of 
rationality.309 This answer to the standpoint question is an important step on the way 
to establishing the Strong Objectivity claim. For if the failure of Korsgaard’s argument 
has taught us anything, it is that, when it comes to constructivist accounts of rational 
agency, “you only get out what you put in”. If one’s procedure of scrutiny demands 
that the judgments of individual agents cohere with one another, then all reasons that 
arise from it, including the moral ones, will only apply to agents as individuals. So the 
only way to establish the Strong Objectivity claim is to build answerability to other 
agents into one’s procedure of scrutiny itself: to make answerability to others part of 
one’s understanding of what it is to act for reasons.310  
																																																								
307 Of course, if you continue to insist, we might suspect that you are not so much linguistically con-
fused as simply trying to manipulate me. In that case, I should regard your insistence not as a chal-
lenge to my reasoning but rather as a further fact, an obstacle, that I need to take into account. If you 
scream and shout, will it embarrass me so much that it would be better to give in? On this point see 
Korsgaard 2009: 193-4. 
308 How do we know that they could not agree? Here we need to remind ourselves of our discussion 
of the Empty Formalism Objection in ch. 3, sect. 3.3, esp. fn. 192, 197 and 198. 
309 The caveat that they have to occupy the standpoint of rationality follows from the “can” in the 
above rendering of the Categorical Imperative. This is a point that we touched on in sect. 1, when we 
commented on the qualification “as such” in the Strong Objectivity claim: Kantians are not interested in 
actual agreement since they acknowledge that real agents may go wrong.  
310 Carla Bagnoli makes a similar point when discussing Engstrom’s interpretation of Kant (2012: 64). 
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The idea that reasons, qua reasons, ought to be public or shareable is an idea 
that many Kantians endorse (see e.g. O’Neill 1989: 28-50). In fact, Korsgaard herself 
is known for presenting arguments to this effect elsewhere.311 To flesh this out, Kant-
ians often highlight that reasons are not only the subject matter of deliberation but 
also objects of exchange. We exchange them whenever we converse about what to do 
and how to live. As O’Neill notes, such exchanges are not “primarily expressive, 
something that can in principle be purely private, indeed solitary, ... [instead they are] 
primarily communicative”.312 They aim at recognition or uptake by others and, in 
fact, at the possibility of recognition or uptake by all others.313 Insofar as our inter-
locutors are rational, our attempts to give them reasons should not result in puzzled 
looks. If they do, we treat them as failed attempts. When discussing the Piano Lesson 
example, we saw that this is an idea that Humean Constructivists struggle to accom-
modate. Although they maintain that our judgments about reasons are weakly objec-
tive in the sense that we should be able to agree on what a particular agent has reason 
to do in a particular situation, given their individual commitments,314 they deny that 
such judgments are strongly objective. As a result, they must cast your refusal to ac-
cept my reason for not taking your child to the hospital as a case of linguistic confu-
sion, which is not a satisfactory account of what is going on in our example.  
Let us turn to the relationship question. In which relationship, if any, should our 
judgments about reasons stand to the judgments of others? It is certainly a weaker 
relationship than the one characterized by the Instrumental Principle and the Principle of 
Non-Contradiction. After all, it is perfectly acceptable for you to judge that the sunny 
weather is a reason to hide away in your room, even though this “contradicts” your 																																																								
311 In fact, one of these arguments is provided in the Sources (1996b: 132-42), though after the argu-
ment for the value of humanity. I’ve already mentioned that Street’s reading of Korsgaard, which I 
have traced above, is perhaps not the most charitable one. But I do think that there are at least ten-
sions between the passages of the Sources that we discussed above and the argument against private 
reasons presented later. The shareability or publicity of reasons is also discussed in other parts of 
Korsgaard’s work, e.g. in her 1996a: 275-310 and her 2009: 177-206. 
312 O’Neill 1989: 31. O’Neill makes this remark when discussing the public uses of reason. She argues 
that the toleration of such uses, on which Kant insists, is more than just a matter of non-interference. 
313 When commenting on Kant’s distinction between private and public uses of reason, O’Neill notes 
that private uses of reason are uses that fail to address “the world at large” because they presuppose 
some contingent authority, e.g. the church. As such they are deficient uses of reason because they fail to 
provide a full justification of the claims made. O’Neill 1989: 33-7. The same issue arises for uses of 
reason in accordance with the procedures of scrutiny put forward by restricted constructivists. 
314 In this respect, they are in a better position that some others, e.g. emotivists. Emotivists cannot 
make proper sense of reasoned exchanges at all, since they regard judgments about reasons as merely 
expressive. They cannot explain why any interlocutor should do anything other than shrugging their 
shoulders.  
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neighbour’s judgment that the sunny weather is a reason to go outside, or to judge 
that the summer sale is no reason to go shopping, even though this “undermines” 
your friend’s end of buying a new summer dress. Others can agree that anyone in 
your situation would be allowed to treat X as a reason to Y, without having to treat X 
as a reason to Y themselves; they don’t have to see Y as conducive to their ends or as 
compatible with all their commitments.315 I think the appropriate term for the weaker 
relationship that Categorical Imperative(Const.) picks out is “justifiability”. Our judgments 
about reasons have to be justifiable in light of the judgments of other people, insofar 
as they take up the standpoint of rationality. But what does this mean, exactly? 
We can answer this question by appealing to the framework developed in ch. 3. 
To say that taking yourself to have reason to Y or that treating X as a reason to Y is 
not justifiable to others is to say that, in Y-ing or treating X as a reason to Y, you 
would be making an exception for yourself. You would be allowing yourself to act and 
“reason” (or rather “rationalize” your act) in a way that you can’t will to be available 
to other people with the same ends and projects who are in the same situation as 
you.316 If this is what your Y-ing or treating X as a reason to Y would amount to, 
then the presupposition that all rational agents can agree that anyone in your situa-
tion would be allowed to Y or treat X as a reason to Y is false, and then you have a 
moral reason not to do so. According to the Kantian Constructivist account that I am 
proposing, moral reasons differ from other kinds of reasons in that they do not de-
rive from or depend on the ends and commitments that we, as individuals, happen to 
have.317 Instead, they derive from the non-universalisability of certain ends or policies 
that we might be tempted to adopt. Recall the Piano Lesson case. When I try to answer 
the question whether all rational agents could agree to my treating my child’s musical 
education as a reason not to take your child to the hospital in this kind of situation, I 
do not need to think about any of my ends or commitments at all. In fact, it is crucial 
that I abstract from all the ends and commitments that distinguish me from others 																																																								
315 This is why Kantian Constructivists who endorse Categorical Imperative(Const.) are not committed to the 
view that all reasons are moral reasons (see ch. 3, sect. 3.2) or, in more contemporary terms, that all 
reasons as agent-neutral reasons, which many people find implausible. See e.g. Nagel 1986: 152-6. 
316 You might deny this. The rich person who is enjoying certain privileges, for example, might say 
that they want everyone to have the same opportunities that they had in their life. But they cannot 
mean it, for if everyone had those opportunities, then they would not be able to enjoy the privileges 
that they are currently enjoying. 
317 This is a formal way of distinguishing the moral domain from other domains. Bagnoli endorses this 
way of circumscribing the moral domain when she says that “there is no one eminent domain of mo-
rality, because there is no one fixed set of interests that immediately qualifies as moral” (2012: 67).  
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and that I take up the standpoint of a rational agent as such. From this standpoint, I 
will be able to see that my judgment is incorrect. These reflections indicate that my 
version of Kantian Constructivism can secure the Strong Objectivity claim. But before I 
spell out how it does so, I want to cite some textual evidence to substantiate my hy-
pothesis that Kant is a formal rather than a substantive metaethical constructivist.  
Kant on Formal and Material Principles 
Kant’s formalism is one of the most heavily criticized aspects of his ethics. He is well 
known for insisting that we ought to adopt and reject principles of action solely on 
the basis of a purely formal consideration, namely whether we can will that they be-
come universal laws. Whether a principle of action is a legitimate ground for the der-
ivation of judgments about what we have reason to do on a given occasion is solely a 
matter of form, not content. This view, however problematic, is a view that Kant 
endorses time and again,318 but on reflection it is difficult to see how Korsgaard can 
make sense of it. For if she is right – if the Categorical Imperative merely demands 
that I adopt principles that can be laws for me, given my various practical identities – 
then, in deliberating about the satisfaction of this allegedly formal requirement, I 
have to bring in substantive considerations. I have to see how the relevant principle 
squares with my ends, projects, and commitments, including the moral ones.  
Unlike Street, Kant does not neglect this alternative view of morality. In fact, he 
uses it as a foil when developing his own view. Somewhat curiously, he would argue 
that endorsing a judgment solely on the basis that it withstands Street’s and 
Korsgaard’s “purely formal” procedure of scrutiny would mean grounding it on its 
matter, not its form. On their Humean view, to make a judgment about reasons is to 
claim that the action it recommends is appropriately related to one’s system of ends: 
that it promotes some of these ends and does not undermine important others. Since 
such a judgment “presupposes an object (matter) of the faculty of desire as the deter-
mining ground of the will” (Kant CPrR 5:21), our endorsement of it is based on the 
way we affectively relate to the end that it promotes. According to Kant, to act on 
																																																								
318 Kant says, for example: “If a rational being is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws, he 
can think of them only as principles that contain the determining ground of the will not by their mat-
ter but only by their form” (CPrR 5:27).  
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such a judgment is to act on a material principle of action.319 Compare this to the ver-
sion of Kantian Constructivism that we developed above. On this view, acting on a 
moral reason is a matter of acknowledging that alternative courses of action are not 
justifiable to others. So when we endorse the judgment that X is a moral reason to Y, 
our endorsement is not contingent on an affective relation to the object or end at 
which Y is directed.  
Kant’s reflections on why material principles of action “can furnish no practical 
laws” (CPrR 5:21) shed further light on the difference between the kind of universal 
validity that Street’s metaethical constructivism can make room for and the kind that 
Kant is after. For Street and Korsgaard, the universal validity of moral demands is 
the result of an overlap. If there are judgments about reasons that can be agreed to 
hold by and for all rational agents, insofar as they are in the same situation, then this 
is because these judgments are entailed by the identities of each and every one of 
them, separately. (For Street this may be true, for Korsgaard it must be). However, 
following Kant, we may wonder whether such overlaps in what people value would 
really lead to anything that resembles moral conduct. Here is what he says: 
For whereas elsewhere a universal law of nature makes everything harmonious, 
here, if one wanted to give the maxim [a material maxim] the universality of a 
law, the most extreme opposite of harmony would follow, the worst conflict, and 
the complete annihilation of the maxim itself and its purpose. ... In this way there 
results a harmony like that which a certain satirical poem depicts in the unanimity 
between a married couple bent on going to ruin: “O marvellous harmony, what 
he wants she wants too” and so forth, or like what is said of the pledge of King 
Francis I to the Emperor Charles V: “What my brother Charles would have (Mi-
lan), that I would also have”. (Kant CPrR 5:28) 
Now, of course, this is slightly unfair. Both Street and Korsgaard seek to explain 
why there may or must be a kind of overlap that differs from that depicted in this 
quote, an overlap of judgments about reasons that results in genuinely harmonious 
coexistence and recognizably moral behaviour. But given the failure of Korsgaard’s 
attempt to secure the Strong Objectivity claim, it seems that any overlap can only ever 
yield contingently universal moral demands. In order to show that the universal validity 																																																								
319 Kant CPrR 5:22. In Korsgaard’s terms, we could put it as follows: although we step back from our 
impulses, and ask ourselves whether to endorse them or not, the standpoint from which this question 
is asked is ultimately the standpoint of other impulses that we have decided to endorse in the past.  
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of moral judgments is necessary – that moral reasons bind all rational agents as such –
we must build the demand to, as it were, aim at harmony right into our account of 
what it means to make judgments about reasons. This is precisely what my formal 
version of Kantian metaethical constructivism is designed to achieve. As such, it suc-
ceeds in establishing the Strong Objectivity claim. 
4.  Taking Stock: Conjuring Rabbits out of Hats 
My aim in this chapter was to show that Street’s criticism of Kantian Constructivism 
targets a view that is neither properly Kantian nor very convincing in its own right. 
Substantive metaethical constructivism, as defined by Street, tries to conjure a rabbit 
out of a hat. It tries to establish that the authority of moral demands extends to all 
rational agents as such, but then, in doing so, it appeals to a procedure of scrutiny 
that casts all normative demands as relative to the systems of ends and commitments 
of individual agents. As one might expect, this conjuring trick miscarries. Through-
out my discussion, I have presented Korsgaard as an accomplice. Whether this as-
sessment of the Sources is fair depends, in part, on whether she really does pursue the 
two projects that I distinguished above (sect. 2.1) separately: whether her general ac-
count of the correctness of judgments about reasons really is independent of her 
answer to the normative question in the way I have suggested.  
The more important conclusion is, in any case, the following: if Kantian Con-
structivists aim to show not only that moral demands are internal to our standpoint 
as rational agents but also that they are strongly objective, then this aim – the aim of 
accounting for objectivity – should inform their thinking about the appropriate formal 
procedure of scrutiny. That this aim informed Kant’s thinking about the supreme 
principle of morality and its content was one of my main claims in this thesis. In this 
final chapter, I hope to have shown that it helps to advance the debate between 
Humean and Kantian Constructivists. 
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